Opinion
2012-12-5
Mario FIGUEROA, appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, defendant, New York City Transit Authority, respondent (and third-party actions).
Trolman, Glaser & Lichtman, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Michael T. Altman of counsel), for appellant. Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Steven S. Efron of counsel), for respondent.
Trolman, Glaser & Lichtman, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Michael T. Altman of counsel), for appellant. Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Steven S. Efron of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), entered September 21, 2011, which, upon the granting of the motion of the defendant New York City Transit Authority pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law, made at the close of evidence, is in favor of the defendant New York City Transit Authority and against him dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
To succeed on a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401, a defendant has the burden of showing that there is no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the plaintiff and against the moving defendant ( see Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346;Ryan v. New York City Tr. Auth., 89 A.D.3d 1005, 933 N.Y.S.2d 346;Magidenko v. Consolidated Edison, 3 A.D.3d 553, 770 N.Y.S.2d 644). In determining whether the defendant has met this burden, a court must accept the plaintiff's evidence as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence presented at trial ( see Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d at 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346;Liounis v. New York City Tr. Auth., 92 A.D.3d 643, 938 N.Y.S.2d 176;Velez v. Goldenberg, 29 A.D.3d 780, 781, 815 N.Y.S.2d 205). Under the circumstances of this case, the motion of the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA) pursuant to CPLR 4401 was properly granted since the plaintiff, who had difficulty identifying the location of the subject accident, testified at trial that he did not know what had caused him *486to fall ( see Knudsen v. Mamaroneck Post No. 90, Dept. of N.Y.-Am. Legion, Inc., 94 A.D.3d 1058, 942 N.Y.S.2d 800;Capasso v. Capasso, 84 A.D.3d 997, 923 N.Y.S.2d 199;Thompson v. Commack Multiplex Cinemas, 83 A.D.3d 929, 921 N.Y.S.2d 304). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the NYCTA's motion.