Opinion
Civil Action 2:19-cv-0542
06-03-2021
RICHARD A. RYAN, Petitioner, v. MALINDA ADAMS, SUPERINTENDENT DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
Marilyn J. Horan, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, Richard A. Ryan, a prisoner currently confined at the State Correctional Institution at Mercer, in Mercer, Pennsylvania, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 3). He is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed on him by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on April 27, 2016, in his criminal case at CP-02-CR-0012696-2015. For the reasons outlined below, it is recommended that the Petition be denied and a certificate of appealability likewise be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute applicable to prisoners in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. That provision allows a federal court to grant a state prisoner the writ of habeas corpus “on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It is Mr. Ryan's burden, as petitioner, to prove he is entitled to the writ. Id., see, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2017).
B. Relevant and Procedural Background
On April 27, 2016, Mr. Ryan pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea to Rape of a Child, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Child, Aggravated Indecent Assault, Incest of a Minor, and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. In exchange, the Commonwealth dismissed five charges and agreed upon a term of imprisonment to seven to fifteen years.
Statutory Sexual Assault, Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Indecent Assault of a Person Under 13, Indecent Exposure, and Corruption of Minors.
During the plea and sentencing hearing on April 27, 2016, the Commonwealth summarized the facts of the case:
Your Honor, had the Commonwealth proceeded to trial in this case the Commonwealth would have called Detective Kuma along with Detective Felicion of the Allegheny County Police Department. We also would have called the victim[ ].
The detectives would have testified that they received a report of suspected child sexual abuse through Moon Township Police Department. They took over the investigation of the case and that in speaking with the victim she disclosed at the time of 16 years of age that between the ages of six and eleven years old that she had been repeatedly sexually abused by her father at their residence, that the abuse began as digital penetration of the vagina and progressed to oral sex around the time she was eight years old and progressed to vaginal and anal six.
She would have testified that the defendant is her biological father. She would have testified that these occurrences happened often and regularly in that home. She also would have testified that the defendant being her biological father was in the role as caretaker for her in the home and that these events were occurring over the course of five years and that she did not feel at that young age she would be safe in telling anyone.
And with that, Your Honor, the Commonwealth - I'm sorry, and also the Commonwealth would have introduced evidence of a recorded voice mail from the defendant making statements to someone in order to have them relay as a message to the victim asking that she not proceed with the charges, that she not
report this to the police and asking for her mercy and forgiveness for what he had done.
With that the Commonwealth would rest.
Plea and Sentencing Transcript, at 5-7 (ECF No. 27). During the plea hearing, Mr. Ryan was represented by Patrick Sweeney, Esquire, of the Allegheny County Public Defender's office.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Ryan was immediately sentenced to a term of seven to fifteen years imprisonment, to be followed by a five-year term of probation. No post-sentence motions were filed and no direct appeal was taken. Commonwealth v. Ryan, No. 47 WDA 2018, Memorandum filed 10/9/2018. (ECF No. 25-5, Exh. 5).
Mr. Ryan then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction collateral relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Attorney Rachel Santoriella was appointed to represent Mr. Ryan during the PCRA proceedings. On January 23, 2018, PCRA counsel filed a No Merit Letter / Motion to Withdraw. The PCRA court denied the petition on March 5, 2018, and Mr. Ryan filed a Notice of Appeal pro se. The PCRA court appointed Attorney Scott Coffey to represent Mr. Ryan in the appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of the PCRA Petition on October 9, 2018, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Mr. Ryan's petition for allowance of appeal.
Having been denied relief in state court, Mr. Ryan filed a pro se federal habeas petition in this Court, in which he raises four issues. (ECF No. 3). Respondents filed an Answer in which they argue that Claims 1-3 should be denied on the merits under AEDPA's standard of review. As to Claim 4, Respondents argue this claim is procedurally defaulted because the Pennsylvania Superior Court deemed it waived on appeal and Mr. Ryan has failed to carry his burden to overcome the procedural default. (ECF No. 25). The Court has reviewed the filings of the parties, the Guilty Plea - Explanation of Defendant's Rights signed by Mr. Ryan and his attorney on April 27, 2016, (ECF No. 27 at 1-11), the Guilty Plea / Sentencing Transcript (ECF No. 27 at 12-24), and the Memorandum Opinion of the Superior Court filed October 9, 2018 (ECF No. 8-1 at 16-25). The matter is briefed and ripe for resolution.
C. The Standard for Habeas Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). Federal courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions “must be vigilant and independent . . . a commitment that entails substantial judicial resources.” Id. This case is governed by the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), “which imposes significant procedural and substantive limitations on the scope” of the Court's review. Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2017). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts in habeas cases must give considerable deference to determinations of state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010). Various standards must be met before the Court can review the merits of Mr. Ryan's habeas petition.
The first consideration in reviewing a federal habeas petition is whether the petition was timely filed under AEDPA's one-year limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Initially, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the habeas petition was time barred. (ECF No. 8). The Court granted the motion and on December 5, 2019, the petition was dismissed as time barred. (ECF No. 17). Mr. Ryan filed a Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 18), to which Respondents conceded that a remand would be in the interests of justice. (ECF No. 20). On September 29, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the Certificate of Appealability and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings, expressing no opinion on the issue of timeliness or on the merits. Id. Mr. Ryan's PCRA petition was docketed on May 10, 2017. He asserts that he delivered his PCRA Petition to prison authorities on April 20, 2017. Applying the prison mailbox rule, it appears the PCRA Petition would have been timely filed. Respondents no longer contest the timeliness of the filing of Mr. Ryan's habeas petition. (ECF No. 25 at 6). The undersigned finds there is no need for a hearing on the timeliness issue because, as set forth in this report and recommendation, Mr. Ryan's substantive arguments merit no federal habeas relief.
1. Has the Petition Presented Cognizable Habeas Claims?
Habeas relief may be afforded to a state prisoner only when his or her custody violates federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 6 (2010). Mr. Ryan has presented four claims in this federal habeas petition, all of which are cognizable claims.
2. Federal Habeas Review of Properly Exhausted Claims
Among AEDPA's procedural prerequisites is a requirement that the petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). An exhausted claim is one that has been “fairly presented” to the state courts “by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process, ” and which has been adjudicated on the merits. Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296, F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 298, 302 (2013). “Fair presentation” of a claim merely requires the petitioner to “present [the] federal claim's factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). For § 2254(d) purposes, a claim has been adjudicated on the merits “when a state court has made a decision that finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.” Collins v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 545 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 2009)).
When a claim is properly exhausted in the state courts and then raised on federal habeas review, the level of deference afforded to the state-court decision is substantial. Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom., Gilmore v. Bey, 138 S.Ct. 740 (2018). AEDPA “does not ‘permit federal judges to . . . casually second-guess the decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.' ” Collins, 742 F.3d at 543 (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 14 (2013)). As a result, under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is unavailable for exhausted claims unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This is an intentionally difficult standard to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Section 2254(d) “preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with” clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Id. Thus, to obtain federal habeas relief on an exhausted claim, “a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
Finally, “[i]f a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petition[er] must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)[ ] on the record that was before that state court”; “evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)[ ] review.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (2011) (footnote omitted). “[D]istrict courts cannot conduct evidentiary hearings to supplement the existing state court record under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Otherwise, federal habeas petitioners would be able to circumvent the finality of state court judgments by establishing a new factual record.” Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011). “This would contravene AEDPA, which requires petitioners to diligently present the facts in state court before proceeding to the federal courthouse.” Id.
Although mandatory, the exhaustion requirement “turns on an inquiry into what procedures are ‘available' under state law.” O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847. Under Pennsylvania law, a federal claim becomes exhausted once it is presented to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, either as a direct appeal from a state criminal conviction or as an appeal from a PCRA Court's denial of post-conviction relief. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is unavailable, and therefore not required, for purposes of exhausting state court remedies).
Traditionally, under Pennsylvania law, exhaustion meant that a claim must be presented to the trial court, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, PA, 959 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992). However on May 9, 2000, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued Judicial Administration Order 218, which provides that “in all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing or allowance of appeal following an adverse decision by the Superior Court in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. When a claim has been presented to the Superior Court, or to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and relief has been denied in a final order, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief.... ” In re: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, No. 218 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1 (Pa. May 9, 2000) (per curiam).
Nor may a federal court grant a habeas petition if the state court's decision rests on a violation of a state procedural rule, even if the claim is properly exhausted. Johnston v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 2004). This procedural bar applies only when the state rule is “independent of the federal question [presented] and adequate to support the judgment.” Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007)).
3. Federal Habeas Review of Unexhausted, Defaulted Claims
If a state prisoner has not fairly presented a claim “to the state courts but state law clearly forecloses review, exhaustion is excused, but the doctrine of procedural default may come into play.” Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (citations omitted). The doctrine of procedural default serves as a corollary to the exhaustion requirement and provides a basis for a federal court to refuse to review a habeas claim. Federal courts may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner can demonstrate “cause” to excuse the default and “actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 375 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Davila v. Davis, -- U.S. ---, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017) (quoting Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1613 (2019). The burden lies with a petitioner to demonstrate circumstances that would serve to excuse a procedural default. See Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
A petitioner, alternatively, can overcome a procedural default by demonstrating that the court's failure to review the defaulted claim will result in a “miscarriage of justice.” See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991); McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 225, 260 (3d Cir. 1999). “However, this exception is limited to a ‘severely confined category [] [of] cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner]'.” Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 375 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 395 (2013) (internal alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 514 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)). Further, the Court concludes that nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Ryan could met the Schlup test. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (explaining that the miscarriage of justice standard “requires ‘new reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial.'”).
“Cause for a procedural default exists where something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[, ] . . . impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show not merely that there were errors that created a possibility of prejudice, but that they “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). If cause and prejudice are established, the federal court reviews the claim “de novo because the state court did not consider the claim on the merits.” Bey, 856 F.3d at 236 (citation omitted).
Mr. Ryan's four claims will be reviewed with these standards in mind.
D. Discussion
The constitutional claims at the heart of Mr. Ryan's federal habeas petition are that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Such claims are grounded in rights guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994), announced the test that a habeas petitioner must satisfy before a federal court could find that counsel failed to provide effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. This same standard has been incorporated by Pennsylvania courts as the proper basis to consider challenges for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Pennsylvania constitution. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 976 (Pa. 1987) (stating that Pennsylvania courts apply elements of the Strickland test to ineffective assistance of counsel claims). A Pennsylvania court's resolution of an ineffective assistance claim, therefore, is presumed to apply clearly established federal law and is due the substantial deference required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Under the two-prong Strickland test, a petitioner must show: (1) that his attorney's representation fell well below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 688-96. To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. To meet the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. Id. It is self-evident that counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue meritless claims or objections. United States v. Sanders, 165 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1999).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court adopted the two-part standard in Strickland to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims-like Mr. Ryan's-that arise out of the entry of a guilty plea. First, “the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 56. This is “nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence.” Id. at 58. So then, plea counsel's representation must fall “within the range of competence demanded of attorney's in criminal cases” if it is to provide a basis for a knowing and voluntary plea. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
If counsel's performance is deficient, the court must then determine whether the error affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Thus, Hill restates Strickland's prejudice prong a bit differently. In the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner needs to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59. Furthermore, where a petitioner pleaded guilty, he must show not only that he would not have done so and instead went on to trial, but also that “a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
The following four claims are presented by Mr. Ryan in this federal habeas petition:
GROUND ONE: Petitioner was denied to know the accusations against him.
GROUND TWO: Unconstitutional denial of subpoena for requested material -expert and character witnesses.
GROUND THREE: Denial of right to withdrawal of induced guilty plea, and denied the right not to be a witness against self.
GROUND FOUR: He's a victim of a miscarriage of justice prosecutorial misconduct-selective prosecution, denied effective assistance of meaningful counsel.Petition (quoted verbatim) (ECF No. 3).
1. Claims One, Two, and Three
These three claims were raised in by Mr. Ryan in his PCRA Petition and subsequent appeal. The Superior Court addressed the claims together and rejected all three on the merits. Pennsylvania courts are presumed to apply clearly established federal law and the decisions of those courts are due the substantial deference required by 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).
The Superior Court began its analysis by applying the Pennsylvania test for ineffective assistance of counsel derived from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.3d 973 (Pa. 1987):
Appellant's first three issues are related, and thus, we address them together. Appellant's issues challenge plea counsel's effectiveness as it relates to his guilty plea. In deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we begin with the presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2018). To overcome that presumption, the petitioner must establish: “ (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's action or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted). To demonstrate prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012). If the petitioner fails to prove any of these problems, the claim is subject to dismissal. Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188.
“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness cause the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotations and citation omitted). “Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “The reasonable probability test is not a stringent one; it merely refers to a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
With respect to valid guilty pleas, this Court has explained:
A valid guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. The Pennsylvania rules of criminal procedure mandate that please be taken in open court, and require the court to conduct an on the record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his plea. Specifically, the court must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the claim; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the agreement. This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016 (citations omitted).
Superior Court Memorandum, filed October 9, 2018, at 3-5 (ECF No. 8-1 at 18-20). The “Pierce Standard” has been found to be materially identical to the Strickland test. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2008). See also Grant v. Wilson, 282 Fed.Appx. 138 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, the Superior Court did not apply a rule of law that contradicts established Supreme Court precedent and therefore its decision was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
The only question here is whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied the Strickland standard or otherwise based its decision upon an unreasonable factual determination. That is, this Court must also analyze Mr. Ryan ineffectiveness claim under the “unreasonable application” provision of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). “Under that provision, the appropriate inquiry is whether the Pennsylvania courts' application of Strickland to [Mr. Ryan's] ineffectiveness claim was objective unreasonable, i.e., the state court decision evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonable be justified under Strickland.” Werts, 228 F.3d at 204. The question then is whether “the Pennsylvania Superior Court's determination that trial counsel rendered effective assistance was not an unreasonable applicable of Strickland.” Id.
This Court's review is limited to the last state court decision to pass on the merits of a particular claim. See Wright v. Vaughn, 473 F.3d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, this Court's review centers on the Superior Court's decision of October 9, 2018.
The Court finds Mr. Ryan's claim to be without merit. First, the Guilty Plea / Explanation of Defendant's Rights form signed by Mr. Ryan clearly indicates that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement. On the form, he affirmatively responded to the following questions:
6. Have you discussed with your attorney the elements of each charged offense?
7. Have you discussed with your attorney the factual basis of each charged offense?
8. Have you discussed with your attorney how the facts in your case prove the elements of each charged offense?
24. By pleading guilty, you are admitting you committed the crime. You are stating that you do not challenge the charges against you. Do you fully understand this?
61. Are you satisfied with the legal advice and legal representation of your attorney?
62. Have you had ample opportunity to consult with your attorney before entering your plea, and are you satisfied that your attorney knows all the facts of your case and has had enough time within which to check any questions of fact or law which either you or your attorney may have about the case?
67. If you are entering a plea of guilty, you admit that you committed the crime(s) with which you are charged and to which you are pleading guilty. Do you fully understand this?(ECF No. 27). Next, the Plea and Sentencing Hearing Transcript indicates that Mr. Ryan clearly understood all the questions on the Guilty Plea/ Explanation of Rights form. At the plea hearing, the court addressed the plea form asking Mr. Ryan:
THE COURT: Mr. Ryan, you are pleading guilty. Are you pleading guilty because you are?
THE DEFENDANT: I am, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You filled out the Guilty Plea Explanation of Defendant's rights. Did you read, understand, and answer all the questions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you do so while your attorney was available?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the services of Mr. Sweeney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.Transcript, 4/27/2016 at 7 (ECF No. 27 at 18).
In its opinion rejecting Mr. Ryan's claim of ineffectiveness, the Superior Court explained:
Based upon our review of the certified record, including the transcript of Appellant's guilty plea hearing and his written colloquy, we conclude that Appellant's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The record reflects that the trial court informed Appellant of the nature of the charges to which he pled guilty, the factual basis for the plea, the sentences, and that it was accepting the negotiated plea. N.T. 2/6/13, at 5-24 (sic); Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 4/27/16, at 2-11.
Importantly, during the oral colloquy, Appellant indicated that he was satisfied with counsel's representation. Id. at 7. Appellant acknowledged that he
had decided to exchange his rights in exchange for favorable sentence of 7 to 15 years of incarceration for rape of a child charge where the victim unequivocally identified Appellant as the perpetrator. Id. Appellant stated that he understood the ramifications of pleading guilty and that he was entering his plea on his own volition. He cannot now contradict these statements.
By arguing that plea counsel's ineffectiveness forced him into pleading guilty, Appellant implies that his responses to the plea colloquies were untruthful. A defendant who elects to plead guilty, however, “is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 881 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). “A criminal defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to answer questions truthfully.” Id. Accordingly, because the record supports the PCRA court's determination that Appellant's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant's claims.Superior Court Memorandum, filed October 9, 2018, at 6-7 (ECF No. 8-1 at 21-22).
Solemn declarations at a guilty plea proceeding that a defendant understands what he is doing, is pleading guilty on the advice of counsel, and that the advice is due to efforts of counsel that the defendant is satisfied with, “carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). After a thorough review of the state court record on this issue, the undersigned finds that the Superior Court's decision was not unreasonable under Strickland. As set forth above, during the plea and sentencing colloquy, Mr. Ryan stated, among other things, that he understood the nature of the charges against him; that he read, understood, and completed the Guilty Plea / Explanation of Defendant's Rights form; that he was entering his guilty plea because he was guilty; and that he was satisfied with the services of plea counsel. (Guilty Plea / Sentencing Transcript, 4/27/2016 at 7-8) (ECF No. 27 at 18-19).
To prevail on a claim that the state court has adjudicated on the merits, Mr. Ryan must demonstrate that the state court's decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold”). Mr. Ryan has not met that high threshold. Viewing the Superior Court's disposition of this claim through the deferential lens of AEDPA, the Court has no hesitancy in concluding that Mr. Ryan has failed to carry his burden to persuade this Court that the Superior Court's disposition was unreasonable, yet alone incorrect. The record reflects that trial counsel not only provided effective representation at Mr. Ryan's guilty plea proceeding, but counsel negotiated a sentence for him that involved substantially less jail time than he would have received without the plea agreement. In exchange for Mr. Ryan's plea to Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8, the Commonwealth withdrew Counts 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10. Further, the Commonwealth agreed upon a term of seven to fifteen years of incarceration. (N.T. at 2). Mr. Ryan was advised during the guilty plea colloquy, that he “could receive up to 77 years of imprisonment.” (Id. at 4). For this reason, it is recommended that Claims One, Two, and Three be denied.
2. Claim Four
Respondents argue that this issue does not warrant merits review because the Superior Court found the claim to be waived based upon a violation of state procedural rules, thus, the claim it is procedurally defaulted and Mr. Ryan does not present any exception to this bar which would warrant a merits review by this Court.
Mr. Ryan's second ground for relief in his PCRA Appeal was that “[t]he trial court erred in denying appellant's PCRA petition since appellant was the victim of prosecutorial misconduct/selective prosecution and an induced guilty plea.” App. Br. at 12 (ECF No. 25-4 at 16). The Superior Court disposed of the issue as follows:
Appellant baldly asserts that he “as a victim of prosecutorial misconduct.” Appellant's Brief at 12. Appellant, however, has failed to provide any legal argument on this issue beyond the citation pertaining to the standard of review for the denial of a PCRA petition. Id. at 13. It is well settled that the argument portion of an appellate brief must be developed with pertinent discussion of the issue, which includes citations to relevant authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring that an appellant develop an argument with citation to and analysis of relevant legal authority); see also Commonwealth v. Genovese, 675 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that “[t]he argument portion of an appellate brief must be developed with a pertinent discussion of the point which includes citations to the relevant authority”).
In Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2008), a panel of this Court offered the following relevant observation regarding the proper formation of the argument portion of an appellant brief:
In an appellate brief, parties must provide an argument as to each question, we should include a discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. This Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived.Id. at 371-72 (internal citations omitted). Thus, failure to cite case law or other legal authority in support of an argument results in waiver of the claim.
Instantly, Appellant's argument pertaining to this issue contains no citations to relevant legal authority beyond the cursory legal citation at the end of his argument. Appellant's Brief at 13. Rather, the argument portion of Appellant's brief consists of broad statements and allegations but no analysis with relevant law. This failure to develop a legal argument precludes appellate review period we conclude that this issue is waived.Superior Court Memorandum, 10/9/2018 at 8-9 (ECF No. 8-1 at 23-24).
A federal court ordinarily may not review a claim on the merits if the state court's denial of relief is based on a procedural default that rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support that judgment. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 820 (2012); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). Here, the Superior Court's decision rests comfortably on such basis.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(a) requires that each argument presented on appeal be “followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Federal habeas courts within the Third Circuit have concluded that Rule 2119(a) is an independent and adequate state court rule for purposes of default. See, e.g., Maitland v. Gilmore, 2019 WL 4194201, at *6 (M.D. Sept. 4, 2019) (citing cases); Rodriguez v. Giroux, No. CV 15-6182, 2017 WL 10821396, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 587314 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2019) (collecting cases). There is no dispute that the waiver rule was firmly established, readily ascertainable, and regularly followed at the time of the default. See Leake v. Dillman, 594 Fed.Appx. 756, 758-59 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The requirement that Petitioner must meaningfully develop his arguments on appeal and cite to appropriate authorities has been stated in unmistakable terms by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and is embodied in the state's rules of appellate procedure.”). Thus, the claim is procedurally defaulted.
This Court cannot consider this claim unless Mr. Ryan establishes cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse the default. Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 375 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating that federal courts may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner can demonstrate “cause” to excuse the default and “actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.). Mr. Ryan has not met this burden. As a result, it is recommended that Claim Four be denied because it is procedurally defaulted and federal review is barred.
E. Certificate of Appealability
Section 102 of AEDPA, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253, governs the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. Applying that standard here, the undersigned concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether each of Mr. Ryan's claims should be dismissed. For these reasons, it is recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the instant habeas petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. It is also recommended that there is no basis upon which to grant a certificate of appealability.
Any party is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Mr. Ryan, because he is a non-electronically registered party, may file written objections to this Report and Recommendation by June 21, 2021, and Respondents, because they are electronically registered parties, may file written objections by June 18, 2021. The parties are advised that failure to file timely and specific objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).