Opinion
2015-06-17
John J. RUTHERFORD, appellant, v. Bankim PATEL, etc., et al., respondents.
Kahn Gordon Timko & Rodriques, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Nicholas I. Timko and Eugene Grinberg of counsel), for appellant. Fumuso, Kelly, DeVerna, Snyder, Swart & Farrell, LLP, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Scott G. Christesen of counsel), for respondent Bankim Patel.
Kahn Gordon Timko & Rodriques, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Nicholas I. Timko and Eugene Grinberg of counsel), for appellant. Fumuso, Kelly, DeVerna, Snyder, Swart & Farrell, LLP, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Scott G. Christesen of counsel), for respondent Bankim Patel.
Aaronson Rappaport Feinstein & Deutsch, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Steven C. Mandell of counsel), for respondents North Shore University Hospital and Avram Goldberg.
Geisler, Henninger & Fitzmaurice LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Tracy A. Abramson of counsel), for respondent Chirag Vasa.
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), entered October 30, 2013, which granted the separate motions of the defendant Bankim Patel, the defendants North Shore University Hospital and Avram Goldberg, and the defendant Chirag Vasa pursuant to CPLR 510 to change the venue of the action from Queens County to Nassau County.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
“To obtain a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(2), a movant is required to produce admissible factual evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that an impartial trial cannot be obtained in the county where venue was properly placed” (Pruitt v. Patsalos, 96 A.D.3d 924, 946 N.Y.S.2d 486; see Miller–Frankel v. Frankel, 93 A.D.3d 826, 827, 940 N.Y.S.2d 878; Matter of Michiel, 48 A.D.3d 687, 850 N.Y.S.2d 916; Behrins & Behrins, P.C. v. Chan, 40 A.D.3d 560, 833 N.Y.S.2d 399). A motion to change venue pursuant to CPLR 510(2) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its determination should not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion ( see Matter of Michiel, 48 A.D.3d at 687, 850 N.Y.S.2d 916; Behrins & Behrins, P.C. v. Chan, 40 A.D.3d at 560, 833 N.Y.S.2d 399). Under the circumstances of this case, including the evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff has been employed at the Supreme Court, Queens County, since 2001, first as a court officer, and more recently as a senior court clerk, the Supreme Court providently granted the motions for a change of the venue of the action from Queens County to Nassau County, in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety ( see Pruitt v. Patsalos, 96 A.D.3d at 924, 946 N.Y.S.2d 486; Miller–Frankel v. Frankel, 93 A.D.3d at 827, 940 N.Y.S.2d 878; Amann v. Caccese, 223 A.D.2d 663, 637 N.Y.S.2d 217; Milazzo v. Long Is. Light. Co., 106 A.D.2d 495, 495–496, 483 N.Y.S.2d 33; Burstein v. Greene, 61 A.D.2d 827, 402 N.Y.S.2d 227). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendants' motions were not untimely ( see CPLR 511[a]; Milazzo v. Long Is. Light. Co., 106 A.D.2d at 495–496, 483 N.Y.S.2d 33; see generally Korman v. City of New York, 89 A.D.2d 888, 453 N.Y.S.2d 452).