Opinion
Nos. 75-144, 75-197 and 75-482
Decided July 7, 1976.
Parent and child — Child support agreement — Statutory modification of age of majority — Prospective application only.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in case No. 75-144.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in case No. 75-197.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in case No. 75-482.
Effective January 1, 1974, the age of majority in this state was changed from 21 to 18 years of age by the amendment of R.C. 3109.01 which reads:
"All persons of the age of eighteen years or more, who are under no legal disability, are capable of contracting and are of full age for all purposes."
The three consolidated actions arise out of pre-1974 divorce decrees which incorporated separation agreements providing for the support of minor children by their father. In each action, the continuing jurisdiction of the court was invoked either by the father ceasing support payments or by moving for an order terminating payments to any child over the age of 18 after January 1, 1974.
In Rosenfeld, the divorce decree provides for support until the child "* * * reaches the age of 21 years, marries or otherwise becomes duly emancipated, whichever eventually occurs first." The trial court entered judgment for the husband, finding that the minor children had become "emancipated" by virtue of the amendment to R.C. 3109.01. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, holding that the amendment to R.C. 3109.01, "* * * in effect lowered the age of emancipation * * * and thereby extinguished the obligation of a husband to continue making these payments when the children in question reach the age of eighteen."
The decree in Pappas provides for support until the "* * * minor children become emancipated." The trial court entered judgment for the husband, finding that under R.C. 3103.03 , the child "is now emancipated by operation of law and the obligation for his support is terminated." The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, and certified the cause to this court as being in conflict with the Rosenfeld decision.
R.C. 3103.03 and 3109.01 were amended by the same Act. R.C. 3103.03 now reads, in part:
"The husband must support * * * his minor children * * *.
"Notwithstanding Section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, the parental duty of support to children shall continue so long as the child continuously attends on a full-time basis any recognized and accredited high school, even when such child has attained the age of majority. Such duty of support shall continue during seasonal vacation periods."
The decree in Kacik provides for support until the "* * * children attain their majority, marry, become members of the Armed Forces, or otherwise become duly emancipated, and until further order of the court." The trial court entered judgment for the husband, finding that the support of children over 18 years of age is a matter beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of Rosenfeld, and certified its judgment to this court as being in conflict with the Pappas decision.
Shapiro, Kendis Assoc. Co., L.P.A., and Mr. Sheldon E. Baskin, for appellee Bernard S. Rosenfeld.
Messrs. Snyder, Neff Chamberlin, Mr. Owen C. Neff and Mr. Edward J. Kirk, for appellant Marcia Rosenfeld.
Messrs. Tyack, Scott Colley, Mr. Paul Scott, Mr. Thomas M. Tyack and Mr. G. Gary Tyack, for appellee Ann M. Pappas. Mr. Stuart A. Benis and Mr. William S. Lazarow, for appellant Theodore C. Pappas.
Mr. Timothy J. Koral, for appellee Leonard J. Kacik.
Messrs. Lograsso Longley, Mr. Peter P. Lograsso, Messrs. Loveland Callard and Mr. James H. Callard, for appellant Dorothy M. Kacik.
The sole factor and consideration which distinguishes these cases from the analysis in Nokes v. Nokes (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 1, decided this day, is that such support order was formulated by incorporating parental separation agreements into the divorce decree.
Inasmuch as under Ohio law, a separation agreement of the parties loses its nature as a contract the moment it is adopted by the court and incorporated into a decree of divorce, we find that such distinguishing factor is of insufficient force to prevent the application hereto of the principles enunciated in Nokes.
Therefore, in light of Nokes, the judgment in case No. 75-197 is affirmed and the judgments in cases Nos. 75-144 and 75-482 are reversed.
Judgment affirmed in case No. 75-197.
Judgments reversed in cases Nos. 75-144 and 75-482.
O'NEILL, C.J., POTTER, STERN, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.
CORRIGAN and CELEBREZZE, JJ., dissent.
POTTER, J., of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting for HERBERT, J.
I dissent from the judgments herein for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Nokes v. Nokes (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 1, 9, decided this day.