Opinion
Civil Action 4:23-CV-00841
06-30-2023
GARY-JON ROGERS, Plaintiff, v. LYCOMING COUNTY TAX CLAIM BUREAU, et al., Defendants.
MARIANI, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiff Gary-Jon Rogers (“Rogers”), commenced by the filing of a complaint on May 22, 2023. (Doc. 1). Before the Court is a motion for preliminary injunction filed by Rogers on May 24, 2023, requesting that the Court enjoin Lycoming County Tax Claim Bureau from collecting on or liquidating his two properties located in Lycoming County. (Doc. 5). On June 2, 2023, Rogers filed an amended complaint against Defendants Lycoming County Tax Claim Bureau, Lycoming County Treasurer Cindy Newcomer, Lycoming County Delinquent Tax Collector Brook E. Wright, Lycoming County Tax Collector Jessica S. Williams, Lycoming County Tax Collector Kamala Paulhamua, and County of Lycoming (collectively, “Defendants”), challenging the tax collection authority of the Lycoming County Tax Claim Bureau. (Doc. 9).
For the following reasons, it is recommended that the motion for preliminary injunction be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
I. Background and Procedural History
On May 22, 2023, Rogers, proceeding Pro se, filed the instant action against Defendants. (Doc. 1). Concurrently filed with the complaint, Rogers filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which the Court granted on June 8, 2023. (Doc. 2; Doc. 6). On May 24, 2023, Rogers filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the tax sale of his properties and any further attempts to collect or liquidate the properties. (Doc. 5). Having conducted the statutorily-mandated screening of Rogers's initial complaint, the undersigned found that Rogers failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and granted Rogers leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). On June 23, 2023, Rogers filed the amended complaint. (Doc. 9).
Liberally construing the amended complaint, Rogers asserts that he owns two properties in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, which are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Lycoming County Tax Bureau. (Doc. 9, at 2). Rogers brings suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a), 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Doc. 9, at 1). Rogers contends he is removed from any and all obligations, performances, or duties to the “administrative state,” and Lycoming County lacks the vested interest or authority to subject Rogers to taxing rules, regulations, statutes, and procedures. (Doc. 9, at 3-7). Rogers avers that the taxes imposed on his properties are unlawful as against him and that Defendants' attempts to impose taxes amounts to fraud. (Doc. 9, at 7-9). In addition to alleging violations of his constitutional rights, Rogers appears to allege a civil conspiracy existed. (Doc. 9, at 7). The amended complaint lacks specificity as to some of the claims Rogers intends to bring against Defendants, including the specific taxes or tax provisions at issue, when Defendants' challenged conduct occurred, and facts supporting the individual Defendants' liability. (Doc. 9). As relief, Rogers seeks to prevent Defendants from taxing/or possessing his two real properties located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 9, at 21). Rogers also seeks the recovery of all tax dollars and other monetary damages, as well as an injunction requiring Defendants to remove his two properties from the Lycoming County Tax Bureau's property records. (Doc. 9, at 21-22).
II. Legal Standard
A. Statutorily-Mandating Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court is statutorily required to review the complaint of a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis prior to service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards). in performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' ....” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK MetalsCorp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed Pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A Pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. Preliminary Injunction Standard
Four factors govern a district court's decision in considering a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in an even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. Grill v. Aversa, 908 F.Supp.2d 573, 591 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994); SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction seeking greater access to legal materials).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion. Such relief is extraordinary in nature and should be issued in only limited circumstances. See Am. Tel. &Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994). As a threshold matter, it is a movant's burden to show that the “preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Therefore, “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). in order to satisfy this standard, the party moving for a preliminary injunction must carry its burden of demonstrating both: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) the existence of irreparable injury from the alleged misconduct. Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989).
To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, a movant must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582-83 (3d Cir. 1980). The district court must examine the legal principles controlling the claim and the potential defenses available to the opposing party. See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 2000). A mere possibility that the claim might be defeated does not preclude a finding of probable success if the evidence clearly satisfies the essential prerequisites of the cause of action. Highmark, 276 F.3d at 173.
Next, “[a] preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent future irreparable harm.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis in original). A preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury.” Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). “[T]he irreparable harm must be actual and imminent, not merely speculative.” Angstadt ex rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch., 182 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable-not merely serious or substantial,' and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.'” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for injunctive relief is in danger of suffering irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued. If the record does not support a finding of both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits, then a preliminary injunction cannot be granted. Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1123 (3d Cir. 1987); see Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987)).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are further instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity ... in tailoring any preliminary relief.
A prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must “be viewed with great caution” because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the “intractable problems of prison administration.” Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, it is well-settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, where the requested preliminary injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582.
III. Discussion
A. Amended Complaint
Initially, the undersigned finds that the Court lack subject matter jurisdiction over Rogers's amended complaint that is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Rogers's claims clearly related to the real estate taxes assessed on his properties located in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, and to the upcoming judicial tax sale of his properties. (Doc. 9). Rogers alleges that the laws authorizing Lycoming County to impose real estate taxes on his properties are inherently constitutionally deficient. (Doc. 9, at 14-18). As such, the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, applies to this case since “the effect of the [plaintiff's] lawsuit is to challenge the ‘assessment, levy or collection' of a tax.” Dommel Properties, LLC v. Jonestown Bank and Trust Co., No. 1:11-CV-2316, 2013 WL 1149265, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013); see also Himchak v. Kane, No. 1:14-CV-1640, 2015 WL 1321609, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2015). To the extent Rogers is challenging the Lycoming County tax system and the fact that the tax bureau assessed his properties with respect to real estate taxes, the undersigned finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a challenge under the TIA. Rogers is essentially seeking this Court to declare Defendants' assessment of real estate taxes on his properties as unconstitutional.
In Gass v. County of Allegheny, PA, 371 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2004), the Third Circuit stated:
The Tax Injunction Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Although the express language of the Tax Injunction Act only refers to injunctive actions, the Supreme Court has held that the Tax Injunction Act also prohibits federal courts from issuing declaratory judgments
holding state tax laws unconstitutional. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982).
The TIA applies to Rogers's case. See Dommel Properties, 2013 WL 1149265, at *7.; Agarwal v. Schuykill Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, No. 3:09-CV-1921, 2010 WL 5175021, at *13-14 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 5175003 (M.D. Pa. Dec.15, 2010), affirmed by 442 Fed.Appx. 733 (3d Cir. 2011). “Because the TIA applies to [Rogers's] suit, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear [his] claims against the county Defendants if the available state remedies are ‘plain, speedy and efficient.'” Dommel Properties, 2013 WL 1149265, at *7 (citations omitted). “The Tax Injunction Act divests federal courts of jurisdiction only if the state fails to provide a ‘plain, speedy and efficient' remedy in its court.” Gass, 371 F.3d at 137. The Third Circuit construes narrowly the “plain, speedy and efficient” exception to the TIA. Gass, 371 F.3d at 137. Also, the Third Circuit has held that “Pennsylvania provides a ‘plain, adequate and complete' remedy for § 1983 Plaintiffs challenging state taxation policies.” Gass, 371 F.3d at 138 (quoting Balazik v. Cty. of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1995)).
“The Tax Injunction Act does not require that the state courts provide a favorable substantive outcome; instead, it only requires access to the state courts and an opportunity for meaningful review.” Gass, 371 F.3d at 139. Here, Rogers is required to pursue his statutory and administrative remedies under state law to challenge the assessment of real estate taxes on his properties. Gass, 371 F.3d at 139. Citing the United States Supreme Court in Rosewell v. La Salle Nat. Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 & n. 29 (1981), the court stated that “‘first and foremost', the [Tax Injunction] Act was designed to prohibit federal judicial interference with local tax collection.” Gass, 371 F.3d at 140.
Pennsylvania state courts provide Rogers with “plain, speedy and efficient” remedies to raise all of his challenges, including the constitutional ones, to the assessment of real estate taxes on his properties in Lycoming County. See Himchak, 2015 WL 1321609, at *13; Church of the Overcomer v. Cty. of Delaware, No. 12-CV-7032, 2013 WL 5942378, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2013) (“[T]he Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held unambiguously that Pennsylvania's state courts provide a ‘plain, speedy and efficient' remedy for challenges to a county's assessment of real property taxes.” (citing Hill v. Carpenter, 323 Fed.Appx. 167, 171 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gass, 371 F.3d at 137-38)).
Indeed, Rogers does not allege that he even attempted to bring suit in Lycoming County regarding the collection of real estate taxes or the judicial tax sale of his properties. Nor does Rogers allege that the procedures provided by the state court are inadequate or inefficient. Pennsylvania law allows a city to expose a tax delinquent property to a tax sale. See 53 P.S. § 7283(a). In Dommel Properties, the court stated:
Pennsylvania law sets forth a scheme by which real estate tax sales may be held to satisfy delinquent tax debts. See generally 72 [Pa.C.S.] § 5860.101 et seq. Pennsylvania law requires that tax claim bureaus must, within 30 days of sale, give notice to owners that the property was sold, and that the owner “may file objections or exceptions with the court relating to the regularity and procedures followed during the sale” within 30 days after the court has made a confirmation nisi of the tax claim bureau's consolidated return. § 5960.607(a.1)(1).Dommel Properties, 2013 WL 1149265, *7
Taxpayers are permitted to object regarding “whether the [Tax Claim] Bureau complied with the procedures delineated by the legislature to bring a delinquent tax property to a public sale and the return and confirmation thereof.” Appeal of Yardley, 646 A.2d 751, 755 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); see 72 P.S. § 5860.607(d). Thus, Rogers has not pursued his state court remedies, which clearly are available to him and adequate. Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claims under the TIA.
As stated, Rogers has the opportunity to request the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas to review the collection of real estate taxes and the tax sale of his properties, but he has failed to pursue his state court remedies. Regardless, these procedures satisfy the process due in the situation of a tax sale. See Reisinger v. Luzerne Cty., 712 F.Supp.2d 332 (M.D. Pa. 2010), affirmed 439 Fed.Appx. 190 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 241-42 (2006)). As such, Rogers is required to pursue his statutory and administrative remedies under Pennsylvania law in the state courts, not in federal court. See Gass, 371 F.3d at 141.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Rogers's amended complaint, in its entirety, without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Since the undersigned finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Rogers's amended complaint and his present claims under the Tax injunction Act, the undersigned does not further discuss whether Rogers has stated any cognizable constitutional claims, such as his Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process claims, his equal protection claim, and his state law claims. See Himchak, 2015 WL 1321609, at *16 (citing Church of the Overcomer, 2013 WL 5942378, *2; Gass, 371 F.3d at 141 n.3).
B. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
In his motion for preliminary injunction, Rogers requests that the Court enjoin “any attempts on further proceedings to collect on or liquidate the two properties that are before this court.” (Doc. 5, at 1). Rogers attaches to his motion two documents from the Lycoming County Tax Claim Bureau directing Rogers to pay delinquent estate taxes. (Doc. 5-1). The notices warn Rogers that his properties are about to be sold without his consent for delinquent taxes, but explains that the sale of Rogers's properties “may, at the option of the Bureau, be stayed if the Owner thereof or any lien creditor of the Owner, on or before the date of sale, enters into an agreement with the Bureau to pay taxes, claims and costs in installments in the manner provided by said Act, and the agreement is entered into.” (Doc. 5-1).
As noted above, a preliminary injunction may only issue in exception and extraordinary circumstances. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 F.3d at 1426-27. In this case, because the amended complaint has failed to establish a basis for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Rogers's claims, the Court likewise lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested preliminary injunction. See Kistler v. Lackawanna Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, No. 3:17-CV-01672, 2017 WL 9532897, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-1672, 2017 WL 4684588 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2017); Greene v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 789 F.Supp.2d 582, 584-85 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Williams Field Servs. Co., LLC v. Kalmanowicz, No. 3:11-CV-1634, 2011 WL 3876411, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011). Accordingly, it is recommended that Rogers's motion for preliminary injunction be DENIED. (Doc. 5).
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Rogers's motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 5) be DENIED;
2. This action (Doc. 9) be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and
3. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.