Opinion
Submitted May 31, 2000
July 24, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mastro, J.), dated September 8, 1999, which granted the separate motions of the defendant and third-party defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Bosco, Bisignano Mascolo, Staten Island, N.Y. (James Maleady of counsel), for appellants.
Mendes Mount, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Kevin J. Philbin of counsel), for defendant third-party plaintiff-respondent.
Squires, Cordrey Noble, New York, N.Y. (Stephen M. Krudsen of counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent.
Before: LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., DANIEL W. JOY, WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
It is well settled that in order to impose liability on an owner of real property when a plaintiff slips and falls on a patch of ice, a plaintiff must demonstrate either that the owner created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence (see, Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836; Marasia v. Noyl Coram, Inc., 260 A.D.2d 607; Davis v. City of New York, 255 A.D.2d 35 6; Sellet v. United Artists Theaters, 251 A.D.2d 488). Here, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the existence of the ice on which the plaintiff slipped and fell or that the defendant had created the icy condition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and third-party complaint (see, Kimmel v. Ground Round, 272 A.D.2d 449 [2d Dept., May 15, 2000]).