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upholding a traffic stop, notwithstanding the trial court's finding that the defendant had properly stopped at the stop sign, because the court's finding that the police officer had a reasonable belief that defendant had not stopped was supported by the record
Summary of this case from Jett v. StateOpinion
Court of Appeals No. A-8841.
April 5, 2006.
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Winston S. Burbank, Judge. Trial Court No. 4FA-03-3600 Cr.
Bethany P. Spalding and S. Tye Menser, Assistant Public Defenders, Fairbanks, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Jill S. Dolan, Assistant District Attorney, and Jeffrey A. O'Bryant, District Attorney, Fairbanks, and Gregg D. Renkes and David W. Márquez, Attorneys General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kemone D. Rodgers was pulled over for failing to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of Turner Street and 15th Avenue in Fairbanks. Rodgers's encounter with the police ultimately resulted in his conviction for driving under the influence.
During the criminal proceedings, Rodgers asked the district court to suppress all evidence arising from the traffic stop. Rodgers argued that the police officer who conducted the stop lacked reasonable suspicion that Rodgers had in fact run the stop sign.
District Court Judge Winston S. Burbank held an evidentiary hearing on Rodgers's suppression motion. At this hearing, the judge heard testimony from both Rodgers and the arresting officer, Fairbanks Police Sergeant Dan Welborn. In addition, Judge Burbank reviewed the videotape from the video camera that was mounted on Sergeant Welborn's patrol vehicle.
This camera had been running during this incident. The videotape (which this Court has also reviewed) shows Rodgers's car traveling at essentially a constant speed through the dog-leg intersection of Turner Street and 15th Avenue. However, this does not resolve the issue of whether Rodgers failed to stop at the stop sign — because the stop sign in question is set back about ten feet from the intersection. The videotape does not clearly show the movement (or non-movement) of Rodgers's vehicle at the location of the stop sign.
After the videotape was played at the evidentiary hearing, Welborn testified that his vantage point was different from the video camera's, and that the videotape did not show everything that he had personally observed.
Rodgers, for his part, testified that he did stop at the stop sign, and that he then proceeded forward to the real intersection of the two streets, where he yielded to oncoming traffic but did not completely stop.
In his ruling on the suppression motion, Judge Burbank declared that it was "very difficult to determine" from the videotape whether Rodgers had stopped at the stop sign. Based on this fact, and based on Rodgers's testimony, Judge Burbank found that Rodgers did indeed stop at the stop sign. However, the judge further found, based on the videotape and the testimony, that "[Welborn's] belief that Rodgers had failed to stop at the stop sign, although in error, was reasonable." Based on this finding, Judge Burbank upheld the traffic stop and denied Rodgers's suppression motion.
In our first decision in this case, Rodgers v. State, 111 P.3d 358 (Alaska App. 2005), we noted that the State had never asserted that Rodgers's purported act of running the stop sign had provided Welborn with reasonable suspicion of the existence of an imminent public danger, or reasonable suspicion that serious harm to persons or property had recently occurred. Thus, under Alaska law, even if Welborn had reasonable suspicion that Rodgers had just run a stop sign, this would not be sufficient to justify the traffic stop. Id. at 359.
Relying on Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976).
We further noted, however, that the traffic stop would be justified if Welborn had probable cause to believe (not just reasonable suspicion) that Rodgers had run the stop sign. Id.
Because we could not tell whether Judge Burbank employed a "probable cause" analysis when he made his ruling, we remanded Rodgers's case to the district court. Id. On remand, Judge Burbank found that the facts known to Welborn established probable cause to believe that Rodgers had run the stop sign. Based on this finding, Judge Burbank again upheld the traffic stop.
The parties have now filed supplemental briefs in response to Judge Burbank's additional findings, and we accordingly resume our consideration of Rodgers's case.
In his supplemental brief, Rodgers notes that Judge Burbank's written decision does not recapitulate the evidence in the case. That is, Judge Burbank's written decision does not specifically explain why the judge concluded that Welborn had probable cause to believe that Rodgers had run the stop sign. For this reason, Rodgers asserts that Judge Burbank's decision fails to conform to Alaska Criminal Rule 12(d), which declares that a court must "state its essential findings on the record" if a suppression motion requires the court to resolve disputed factual issues.
If the decision on remand were Judge Burbank's sole ruling on the suppression motion, it would not comply with Criminal Rule 12(d). But earlier, when Rodgers's suppression motion was first litigated, Judge Burbank issued a four-page decision in which he reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing and explained his conclusions (1) that Rodgers had indeed stopped at the stop sign, but (2) that Welborn had good reason to believe that Rodgers had failed to stop.
In our first decision in this case, we directed Judge Burbank to decide whether Welborn's "good reason" was sufficiently strong to constitute probable cause (and not just reasonable suspicion). Under these circumstances, Judge Burbank's decision on remand was the resolution of a legal issue, not a factual issue. He was applying a legal test to the facts that he had already found during the initial litigation. It was therefore not necessary for him to recapitulate the factual discussion contained in his initial decision.
Turning to the merits of Judge Burbank's decision, we agree with him that the evidence established probable cause to believe that Rodgers failed to stop at the stop sign.
"Probable cause" is defined as "reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient . . . to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed". State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627, 631 (Alaska App. 1990). The test for probable cause does not require the officer to have knowledge of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Indeed, probable cause can exist "even though the facts known to the officer [can] also be reconciled with [the suspect's] innocence." Grier, 791 P.2d at 632 n. 3.
Quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76; 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311; 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 165; 45 S.Ct. 280, 289; 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).
McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 130 (Alaska 1971).
Thus, it was not necessary for Sergeant Welborn's observations to conclusively establish that Rodgers had run the stop sign. Rather, the question is whether Welborn's observations would warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that Rodgers had committed this traffic infraction.
As we have explained, the videotape is inconclusive as to whether Rodgers failed to stop at the stop sign, because the stop sign is set so far back from the intersection. But the videotape does show that Rodgers's vehicle traveled at a constant speed through the intersection. At the evidentiary hearing, Welborn testified that he was familiar with this intersection, and that Rodgers did not stop where motorists normally stop. Moreover, Welborn testified that he had a good view, not only of the intersection itself, but also of the intersecting street back to the stop sign. Based on this view, Welborn testified that he personally had no doubt that Rodgers had failed to stop at the stop sign.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Judge Burbank's ruling, we agree that it is sufficient to establish probable cause for the traffic stop. Accordingly, the judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.
See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978).