Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12845 No. 6937
04-21-2021
MORGAN CHARLES JETT, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Jason A. Weiner, Gazewood & Weiner, P.C., Fairbanks, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v . State , 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002). Trial Court No. 3PA-15-02419 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Jonathan A. Woodman, Judge. Appearances: Jason A. Weiner, Gazewood & Weiner, P.C., Fairbanks, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges. Judge WOLLENBERG.
Morgan Charles Jett appeals his convictions for three counts of misconduct involving a weapon and one count of misconduct involving a controlled substance. The evidence against Jett was discovered following an investigative stop. On appeal, Jett argues that this investigative stop was unlawful and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the stop.
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reject Jett's claims and affirm his convictions.
Factual and procedural background
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Jett's motion to suppress, and the following facts are based on the evidence presented at that hearing.
Shortly before 11:00 p.m. on September 27, 2015, Kelsey Munholland called the police to report that her brother, Jeffrey Munholland, was intoxicated, threatening Kelsey and her mother, and trying to break the windows of their Houston residence. Alaska State Trooper Lucas Hegg was dispatched to the residence in response to the call.
The initial radio dispatch identified the suspect simply as Jeffrey Munholland — giving no designation of "junior" or "senior." The dispatch also contained an alert that the suspect was hostile toward law enforcement and carried multiple knives on his person.
At the time Hegg responded, he believed that Jeffrey Munholland Sr. was the suspect in the disturbance. Hegg had prior experience with a Jeffrey Munholland, whom Hegg remembered being in his late thirties or forties.
It was later determined that the suspect in the disturbance was actually Jeffrey Munholland Jr., Kelsey Munholland's sixteen-year-old brother.
Alaska State Trooper Daron Cooper was dispatched by telephone to the residence as a backup officer to Hegg. Because he was dispatched by telephone, Cooper did not hear the radio broadcasts. Cooper did not know the suspect's name; he knew only that the suspect was a male.
Cooper and Hegg arrived on the scene at the same time; they parked their patrol vehicles on the street, several houses away from the reported residence, and then proceeded toward the residence on foot. The troopers turned into a driveway that they thought belonged to the Munholland residence, but was in fact the driveway of the house next door.
Cooper and Hegg were advised that the suspect had left the Munholland residence "by unknown means," so they were uncertain where he was. Cooper and Hegg saw a vehicle coming down the road toward them; they concealed themselves in the driveway and observed the vehicle. The vehicle turned into the driveway where the troopers were standing.
Cooper testified that it is not uncommon for a person who leaves the residence of a domestic disturbance to return to the home to try to tell their side of the story to the police. Accordingly, as the vehicle pulled into the driveway, Cooper identified himself as a law enforcement officer and told the male driver — who was later determined to be Jett — to stop. Hegg and Cooper testified that, if the driver identified himself and had no connection to the reported disturbance at the Munholland residence, they intended to let him leave.
When asked to identify himself, Jett gave only his first name, told the troopers he would not give them his last name, and said that he was "looking for his house." As Jett declined to give his full name, Hegg went to the rear of the vehicle to check Jett's license plate.
Jett said he was leaving and started to back up. Cooper told Jett not to back up because Hegg was behind the car, but Jett ignored Cooper and continued to drive backward toward Hegg. Jett ultimately backed out of the driveway and hit a dirt berm.
Hegg then came around the vehicle and opened the driver's side door, while Cooper stepped in to assist. As Cooper and Hegg tried to remove Jett from the vehicle, Cooper observed Jett reaching for a handgun.
The troopers restrained Jett and removed him from the vehicle. During a pat-down search, the troopers discovered metal knuckles in the pocket of Jett's pants. Once the troopers identified Jett, they learned from the dispatcher that he was a convicted felon and that he therefore could not legally possess a handgun.
The troopers arrested Jett. When Jett was remanded into custody, a small bag containing methamphetamine was found in his shirt pocket.
A grand jury indicted Jett on one count of third-degree misconduct involving a weapon (for being a felon in possession of a concealable firearm) and one count of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (for possessing methamphetamine). The State also charged Jett with two misdemeanors — one count of fourth-degree misconduct involving a weapon (for possessing metal knuckles) and one count of fifth-degree misconduct involving a weapon (for failing to immediately inform a peace officer that he possessed a concealed firearm).
AS 11.61.200(a)(1) and former AS 11.71.040(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2015), respectively.
AS 11.61.210(a)(4) and AS 11.61.220(a)(1)(A)(i), respectively.
Prior to trial, Jett filed a motion to suppress evidence of the gun, knuckles, and methamphetamine, arguing that the troopers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him, and, in the alternative, that they lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Jett's motion.
Jett proceeded to a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court found him guilty on all counts.
Jett now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Why we reject Jett's claim that he was subjected to an invalid investigative stop
On appeal, Jett renews his claim that the troopers lacked reasonable suspicion to subject him to an investigative stop and that, as a result, all evidence seized pursuant to the stop should have been suppressed.
Although the State argued in the trial court that the troopers' initial contact with Jett was merely a request for information and not an investigative stop, the trial court disagreed, finding that the whole encounter between the troopers and Jett — from the moment the troopers yelled at Jett to stop — constituted an investigative stop. On appeal, the State does not dispute this characterization of the stop.
A police officer is authorized to perform an investigative stop when the officer "has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred." In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement, the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the investigative stop.
Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976).
Id. at 45 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Jett contends that because Trooper Hegg had prior experience with the elder Munholland, Hegg "was presumably able to recognize him through that prior experience." Accordingly, Jett argues that he should have been "immediately visually excluded" as the suspect in the domestic disturbance — and because he was not otherwise behaving in a dangerous manner, there was no basis for subjecting him to an investigative stop.
But this argument was not raised in the trial court, so the testimony on this point was not meaningfully developed. Hegg testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was "familiar" with the adult Munholland, but there was no further testimony about his level of familiarity with Munholland, and whether he would have been able to immediately recognize that Jett was not Munholland. Jett's argument rests solely on a presumption that Hegg remembered the adult Munholland's appearance and would have been able to tell on sight that Jett was not Munholland. But this presumption is not self-evident on the record before us, particularly given that we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978).
Indeed, Jett's argument appears to be inconsistent with his attorney's position in the trial court. In the trial court, Jett's attorney conceded that, given the recent report of a domestic disturbance at the Munholland residence, the initial stop of Jett would have been valid had it occurred in the proper driveway — i.e., the driveway of the Munholland residence. Thus, Jett's attorney implicitly acknowledged that Hegg would not have been able to immediately rule out Jett as the suspect.
See, e.g., Skjervem v. State, 215 P.3d 1101, 1105 (Alaska App. 2009) (holding that the police were justified in initially detaining and questioning the driver of a car in the driveway of a residence where the officers believed a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred).
Accordingly, the trial court stated on several occasions (with the defense attorney's agreement) that the real question was whether the stop was invalidated by the fact that it occurred in the wrong driveway.
Jett only cursorily raises this claim on appeal. Jett argues that "[t]here was simply no basis to conduct an investigatory stop of [him] in the wrong driveway." But he does not further discuss this point or cite to any legal authority in support of this claim.
The trial court concluded that the troopers made a reasonable mistake with respect to the location of the stop, and that they credibly believed they were in the driveway of the Munholland residence. The court also found that the troopers were "pretty near the actual residence" and that they were responding to a potentially dangerous situation.
We have previously held that a reasonable mistake as to the facts establishing reasonable suspicion or probable cause will not invalidate the stop. Jett does not discuss these cases, nor does he address the trial court's ruling or explain why it is incorrect.
See Brown v. State, 127 P.3d 837, 846 (Alaska App. 2006) (upholding an investigative stop of a vehicle containing a person who a probation officer mistakenly believed to be a probationer he supervised because the record adequately supported the trial court's ruling that the officer's mistake was reasonable under the circumstances); Brockway v. State, 2011 WL 563082, at *3 (Alaska App. Feb. 16, 2011) (unpublished) (upholding the trial court's finding of probable cause where the officer had a reasonable belief at the time of the traffic stop that the commercial vehicle was overweight, even though it was later determined that the truck's weight was under the relevant threshold); Rodgers v. State, 2006 WL 894431, at *2-3 (Alaska App. Apr. 5, 2006) (unpublished) (upholding a traffic stop, notwithstanding the trial court's finding that the defendant had properly stopped at the stop sign, because the court's finding that the police officer had a reasonable belief that defendant had not stopped was supported by the record); see also Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014) (recognizing that a "search or seizure may be permissible even though the justification for the action includes a reasonable factual mistake"). Cf. State v. Campbell, 198 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Alaska App. 2008) (upholding the trial court's finding that the arresting officer's belief concerning the time of sunset was unreasonable — and therefore the officer's stop of the vehicle for failing to illuminate its headlights was impermissible).
The State argues that there is no evidence that the troopers unreasonably did, or failed to do, something with respect to the identification of the driveway. In particular, the State notes that there is no indication that the troopers overlooked something that would have identified the Munholland property (like a visible house number). The photographs in the record support the State's position.
Under these circumstances, we have no reason to revisit the judge's ruling that the troopers made a reasonable mistake with respect to the identification of the Munholland property. Accordingly, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for the investigative stop.
See Garhart v. State, 147 P.3d 746, 752 (Alaska App. 2006) (holding that appellant's failure to address substance of trial court's ruling constitutes waiver of that claim for appeal).
Why we conclude that the investigative stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged
Jett next argues that the investigative stop was unconstitutionally prolonged because the troopers did not terminate the stop as soon as they determined that Jett was not the suspect in the domestic disturbance.
An investigative stop "must be temporary and [must] last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." An initially valid investigative stop "becomes unreasonable — and thus constitutionally invalid — if the duration, manner, or scope of the investigation" exceeds the bounds of what is reasonable in light of the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. If the reasonable suspicion that justified an initial investigative stop is dispelled, law enforcement officers are required to produce a separate, independent justification for continued detention or questioning of the person initially stopped: either probable cause to arrest the person for a crime, or reasonable suspicion that satisfies the Coleman test.
Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 625 (Alaska App. 2008) (alteration in Brown) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
Id. (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 500).
Skjervem, 215 P.3d at 1105.
Here, the trial court concluded that "there was adequate reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to try to figure out who Mr. Jett was and, after that, Mr. Jett's actions led to the detention."
We agree that Jett's conduct following the initial stop justified its continuation. When the troopers asked Jett to identify himself, he gave only a single name, "Morgan." When Hegg stepped behind Jett's vehicle to retrieve his license plate number and verify his identity, Jett drove backward toward Hegg, even after Cooper informed Jett that Hegg was standing behind his vehicle. At that time, the troopers were still seeking to confirm Jett's identity to ensure that he was not connected to the domestic disturbance. Jett's conduct in response to their inquiry — backing up toward a law enforcement officer behind his car — presented a sufficient justification for prolonging the investigative stop and detaining Jett.
Jett again argues that, because Hegg had previous contact with the adult Jeffrey Munholland, whom the troopers believed at the time to be the suspect in the reported domestic disturbance, Hegg "would have been able to rapidly determine" that the driver of the vehicle was not the Jeffrey Munholland involved in the domestic disturbance. Jett further contends that, once it became evident that Jett was not Jeffrey Munholland, "Mr. Jett should have been free to go."
As we noted earlier, this argument assumes a great deal — that Hegg remembered clearly what the elder Munholland looked like; that he could clearly identify Jett in the late evening; and that Hegg could see Jett at all from where he was initially positioned, near the passenger side of Jett's vehicle where Jett's girlfriend was sitting. In fact, it was only when Jett was eventually removed from his vehicle that Cooper was actually able to personally identify him as Jett, someone with whom Cooper had previous contact.
The troopers stopped Jett at approximately 11:00 p.m. in late September in Houston. Hegg testified that it was "dark" out, and Cooper testified that it was "nighttime" and that they had their flashlights out.
Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's conclusion that the troopers' investigative stop of Jett was not unreasonably prolonged.
Whether facts known to the dispatchers about the suspect in the Munholland disturbance should have been imputed to the troopers on the scene
Finally, Jett argues that, even if the information known to the on-scene troopers was sufficient to justify the stop and detention of Jett, additional information known to the dispatchers should have been imputed to the troopers. Jett contends that, if imputed, the dispatcher's additional information would have dispelled the troopers' reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him.
Hegg and Cooper testified that, at the time they responded to the domestic disturbance call, they knew only that the suspect had left the residence of the disturbance by "unknown means." Hegg testified that he heard the radio dispatch indicating that the suspect's name was Jeffrey Munholland, but Cooper — who was dispatched by telephone — testified that he knew only that the suspect was male. As we noted earlier, Hegg was familiar with the adult Munholland, and he believed this person was the suspect.
But according to the 911 call, and two computer-aided dispatch printouts admitted at the evidentiary hearing, Kelsey Munholland reported that the suspect in the disturbance (her brother) was actually sixteen years old. Jett also introduced an audio recording of radio traffic from that night, in which another trooper can be heard broadcasting that the suspect, Munholland, "may be sixteen years old."
In addition, the computer-aided dispatch printouts show that Kelsey Munholland reported, at one point, that her brother had returned to his trailer next door and had no access to a vehicle.
After listening to the recording at the evidentiary hearing, Hegg and Cooper both acknowledged that such a report was made. But they testified that they never heard that part of the radio traffic. The trial court found the troopers' testimony on this point credible.
Cf. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that, while an officer "is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest," the officer "may not choose to ignore information that has been offered to him or her," nor "may the officer conduct an investigation in a biased fashion or elect not to obtain easily discoverable facts" (internal quotations and citations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020).
On appeal, Jett does not challenge the trial court's finding that the troopers were unaware of the alleged suspect's age. Rather, he argues that, as a matter of law, the information known to the dispatchers should have been imputed to the troopers on the scene and that, if it had been, there would have been "no basis for any more than a cursory stop of Mr. Jett, long enough to confirm that he was nowhere near age 16."
To support his argument that the information available to the dispatchers should have been imputed to the troopers on the scene, Jett cites to a single case, State v. Prater. In Prater, we held that "an investigative stop made in objective reliance on a police dispatcher's bulletin is justified if the dispatcher who broadcast the bulletin possessed reasonable suspicion of imminent public danger justifying the stop." This is an application of what is commonly called the "collective knowledge doctrine." Under this doctrine, law enforcement officers are permitted to act on the directive or request of other law enforcement officers, even without personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to the requisite level of suspicion, "provided that the law enforcement officer or agency issuing the directive or request has the requisite factual basis for the requested action." This doctrine is intended to enable the police to act promptly on requests from other members of law enforcement without the need to "cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information."
State v. Prater, 958 P.2d 1110 (Alaska App. 1998).
Id. at 1113 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985)).
Hurlburt v. State, 425 P.3d 189, 196 (Alaska App. 2018).
Id.; see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231; 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(j), at 844-45 (6th ed. 2020).
United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1290, 1299 (9th Cir. 1976), quoted in Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231. We note that we have never adopted the so-called "horizontal collective knowledge" doctrine, in which knowledge is imputed from one law enforcement officer to another, even in the absence of any direct communication or request for action. Hurlburt, 425 P.3d at 196; see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(j), at 841-42 (6th ed. 2020 (distinguishing the situation "where action was requested but the underlying factual basis was not communicated, . . . from the situation in which neither the request nor a factual basis is communicated, but the officer making the Terry stop later relies upon the fact that a fellow officer possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion at the time the stop occurred").
Jett asks this Court to apply this doctrine — which is traditionally used to support the reasonableness of a search or seizure — to conclude that the stop in this case was unreasonable. Jett argues that "[i]f dispatcher knowledge of information not within an officer's knowledge justifies the officer's stop of a suspect, provided that knowledge is sufficient to establish that the dispatcher has a reasonable suspicion of imminent public danger, then the converse must also be true." Jett does not cite any cases, in this jurisdiction or in any other, to support this proposition.
Indeed, as we noted above, information about the suspect's age was broadcast over the radio; the problem was that the troopers on the scene did not receive it.
But the Second Circuit rejected a similar argument in United States v. Valez. Valez was mistakenly arrested under suspicion of selling drugs. Shortly after his arrest, a different officer arrested the actual seller. Relying on the collective knowledge doctrine, Valez argued that the subsequent arrest of the actual seller nullified any probable cause to believe that Valez was the seller from the moment the actual seller was arrested, regardless of whether Valez's custodial officer was aware of the subsequent arrest. Valez argued that any evidence obtained from him after the actual seller was arrested was the fruit of an illegal arrest.
United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id.
The Second Circuit rejected this argument, explaining:
The rule that permits courts to assess probable cause to arrest by looking at the collective knowledge of the police force — instead of simply looking at the knowledge of the arresting officer — should not affect the law of mistaken arrest. The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to
arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superiors or associates. This rationale does not support Valez's view that facts known to some members of the police force which exonerate an arrestee are ipso facto imputed to the arresting officer. Rather, the issue is whether the failure to communicate these facts to the arresting officer rendered the mistaken arrest unreasonable.Although the Second Circuit was speaking about arrests, the same reasoning would apply in the investigative stop context presented by this case. The issue is whether the failure of the dispatcher or another trooper to timely or adequately communicate additional facts to the arresting officer, or for the arresting officer to hear those facts, rendered the mistaken stop unreasonable.
Id. at 28 (internal citation omitted).
See, e.g., United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 420 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Unreasonable delays by issuing officers in updating the information contained in police bulletins or flyers . . . may render illegal stops and searches pursuant to those bulletins."); see also Phelan v. Village of Lyons, 531 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the officer's failure to read the vehicle description in the third line of the report generated when he ran a routine license plate check was unreasonable and as a result, there was no probable cause for the traffic stop since simply reading that line would have alerted the officer to the fact that the vehicle was not stolen).
Jett never made this type of argument in the trial court. As a result, the evidence that might be necessary to decide such a claim — i.e., the testimony of the 911 dispatcher, or the trooper who broadcast the information that the suspect may be sixteen years old; the reasons why there were two different computer-aided dispatch reports related to this case; and/or testimony by the troopers or other law enforcement officers about their practices for transmitting, and ensuring the receipt of, critical information in a timely manner — was not presented. More importantly, Jett never asked the trial court to rule on whether law enforcement had acted unreasonably in failing to ensure the proper communication of all relevant information.
Under these circumstances, we reject Jett's claim.
See Pierce v. State, 261 P.3d 428, 431 (Alaska App. 2011) ("[A] litigant must not only tell the court what they want, but must also explain — unless it is already apparent — why, under the facts of the case and pertinent law, the court is authorized to grant the relief the litigant is seeking." (emphasis in original)); see also Quince v. State, 572 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Md. App. 1990) (declining to speculate about the order in which the dispatcher received information, or whether the dispatcher should have ascribed a different meaning to the information that was communicated to the on-scene officer, where neither the dispatcher nor the complainant was called as a witness). --------
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.