Opinion
CV065007678.
12-12-2012
Caitlin RILEY et al. v. Nicholas O'DELL et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FREDETTE, J.
At issue before the court is whether to grant (1) the defendants' motion to dismiss; (2) the named plaintiffs' motion to set aside; and (3) the named plaintiffs' motion to add beneficiaries. The court: (1) denies the motion to dismiss; (2) grants the motion to set aside; and (3) denies the motion to add beneficiaries.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The named plaintiffs, Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley, beneficiaries of the estate of Daniel Riley, bring this wrongful death action against the defendants, Nicolas O'Dell and Thomas Bouley, seeking money damages for injuries arising from the alleged suicide of Daniel Riley while he was being held in custody at the Union Avenue Detention Center in New Haven. Presently before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the named plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the estate, lack standing to assert claims on behalf of the estate. Also before the court are parallel motions filed by the named plaintiffs seeking to set aside a previous court order granting a motion to substitute Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley as plaintiffs in place of the administratrices of the estate, and a motion to add Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley as party plaintiffs.
Six defendants have filed appearances in this matter, including the state of Connecticut and five judicial marshals: Thomas Bouley, More Gunn, Kelly Moye, Nicolas O'Dell and William Scozzafava. O'Dell and Bouley will be referred to as the defendants, however, because this is their motion to dismiss.
The dispositive issues presented by the instant motions are: (1) whether this court was without subject matter jurisdiction to grant the motion to substitute the beneficiaries of the estate as plaintiffs in place of the administratices of the estate; and (2) whether the beneficiaries of an estate may be added as party plaintiffs. Before addressing the merits of these motions, however, a recitation of the relevant history of litigation between the parties is necessary.
On November 15, 2006, Josephine Perrone and Gail Perrone, administratices of the estate of Daniel Riley, commenced this action in the Superior Court by service of process. Thereafter, on February 18, 2011, Josephine Perrone and Gail Perrone filed a motion, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-107 and Practice Book § 9-18, requesting that Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley be substituted as " party plaintiff[s] in the place of Josephine Perrone and Gail Perrone." Motion to Substitute Beneficiaries as Party Plaintiffs, February 18, 2011, at 1. This motion was seemingly filed because Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley were minors at the outset of this litigation, but later were of legal age to bring this suit. On August 13, 2012, the motion to substitute was granted by this court.
By letter dated July 29, 2005, the administratices previously filed a claim with the state claims commissioner, seeking permission to bring a wrongful death action against the state. See generally Perrone v. State, 122 Conn.App. 391, 988 A.2d 256 (2010). Nevertheless, that claim was ultimately dismissed by the claims commissioner and is irrelevant to the present motions. Id.
The motion to substitute actually refers to General Statutes § 57-107; however, this appears to be a typographical error. General Statutes § 52-107 provides: " The court may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court may direct that such other parties be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the court, on his application, shall direct him to be made a party."
Practice Book § 9-18 provides, in relevant part: " The judicial authority may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party."
While this filing is labeled a " motion to substitute, " both General Statutes § 52-107 and Practice Book § 9-18 relate to motions to intervene. See, e.g., Fortier v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 0475096 (February 24, 2005, Corradino, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 849, 849-50). Despite this ambiguity, however, the text of the motion clearly requests that Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley be substituted as plaintiffs " in the place of Josephine Perrone and Gail Perrone.
The operative complaint is dated August 14, 2012. In counts one and two, the complaint sets forth violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count three sounds in intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each count is directed at five judicial marshals, including the defendants, who were allegedly responsible for monitoring and treating the decedent while he was in custody. Although Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley are now the named plaintiffs in this matter, the complaint refers only to Josephine Perrone and Gail Perrone as plaintiffs.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: " Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
To be clear, while the state has filed an appearance in this action, the only count directed towards the state was dismissed. Perrone v. State, supra, 122 Conn.App. at 392 n. 1.
On September 12, 2012, the defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss and a memorandum in support. As stated previously, the defendants maintain that this action must be dismissed on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the named plaintiffs, as beneficiaries, lack standing to assert claims on behalf of the estate. In response, on October 10, 2012, the named plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the court's August 13, 2012 order. Filed along with the motion to set aside is a motion to add the beneficiaries as party plaintiffs. Subsequently, on October 16, 2012, the defendants filed an objection to both the motion to vacate and motion to add beneficiaries. This matter was heard at short calendar on November 26, 2012.
LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since the named plaintiffs' standing is being challenged within the context of a motion to dismiss, it is useful at the outset to articulate the relevant principles of this procedural vehicle. " A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). " [J]urisdiction over the person, jurisdiction over the [subject matter], and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment are three separate elements of the jurisdiction of a court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bridgeport Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 401, 21 A.3d 451 (2011). " [B]ecause the issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction it may be a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss ... [S]ee Practice Book § 10-31(a)(1)." (Citation omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012).
ANALYSIS
I.
In the present case, the defendants argue that the named plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the estate, lack standing to bring this wrongful death action. The defendants further assert that, since the motion to dismiss challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, any exercise of jurisdiction regarding the named plaintiffs' motions must be deferred until the court rules on the motion to dismiss. It is well settled that " [o]nce the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before [the court] can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n. 6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003). Implicit in the defendants' argument, however, is that the named plaintiffs were properly inserted into the case in the first place. Accordingly, the threshold issue is whether this court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction when it granted the motion to substitute the beneficiaries of the estate as plaintiffs in place of the administratices of the estate.
" If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Luster v. Luster, 128 Conn.App. 259, 265, 17 A.3d 1068, cert. granted on other grounds, 302 Conn. 904, 23 A.3d 1243 (2011). In the context of a wrongful death action, our Appellate Court has observed that " General Statutes § 52-555 creates a cause of action that may be maintained only by an executor or administrator of an estate ... Death, at common law, is not a recoverable element of damage ... It is only by reason of statute that a death action is maintainable in Connecticut ... This statute provides for the bringing of such an action by either an executor or an administrator; it does not confer on anyone else, including the parents of a decedent, any right to bring such an action individually ... Under ... § 52-555, standing to bring a wrongful death action is thus conferred only upon either an executor or an administrator." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 3 Conn. .App. 598, 600, 490 A.2d 1024, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 807, 494 A.2d 904 (1985).
General Statutes § 52-555 provides, in relevant part: " (a) In any action surviving to or brought by an executor or administrator for injuries resulting in death, whether instantaneous or otherwise, such executor or administrator may recover from the party legally at fault for such injuries just damages together with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital and nursing services, and including funeral expenses, provided no action shall be brought to recover such damages and disbursements but within two years from the date of death, and except that no' such action may be brought more than five years from the date of the act or omission complained of."
At oral argument, the defendants argued that Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, supra, 3 Conn.App. at 598, precluded the named plaintiffs from seeking to set aside the court's order granting the underlying motion to substitute. Nevertheless, the court in Isaac merely held that an administratrix may not be substituted as party plaintiff in a wrongful death action after the expiration of the time limitation set forth in § 52-555. Id., at 601-02. In contrast, in the present case, the threshold issue is whether the court, improperly and without subject matter jurisdiction, granted the underlying motion to substitute. Accordingly, Isaac is distinguishable on its facts from the present case.
In light of § 52-555 and Isaac, it is clear that beneficiaries lack, standing to bring wrongful death actions on behalf of an estate. Thus, it is submitted that this court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction when it granted the underlying motion to substitute the beneficiaries of the estate, Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley, as plaintiffs in the place of the administratrices of the estate, Josephine Perrone and Gail Perrone.
The relevant inquiry now becomes whether the court may set aside its order granting the underlying motion to substitute. " [A] trial court has inherent authority to open and modify a judgment it rendered without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is void ab initio and is subject to both direct and collateral attack ... It is an acknowledged principle of ... every court in the world, that not only the decisions, but everything done under the judicial process of courts, not having jurisdiction, are, ipso facto, void ... If a court has never acquired jurisdiction over a defendant for the subject matter, ... any judgment ultimately entered is void and subject to vacation or collateral attack." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broaca v. Broaca, 181 Conn. 463, 467-68, 435 A.2d 1016 (1980).
Since the court possesses inherent authority to open and modify judgments rendered without jurisdiction, the named plaintiffs' motion to set aside the court's August 13, 2012 order is granted. As a result, the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as moot. (See also, DiLieto v. County Obstetrics and Gynecology Group et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury, Docket No. CV-07-0150435 (January 31, 2000, Sheldon, J.) (" [A] series of decisions from our Appellate Court have established that in spite of the ‘ decide jurisdiction first’ rule, a case can be saved from dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the granting of a proper motion to substitute." Although procedurally different from the situation in DiLieto, the plaintiffs' position is even stronger in the case at bar, since it is unquestioned that the proper parties commenced this lawsuit.).
II.
The remaining issue is whether Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley may be added as party plaintiffs. Research revealed no Connecticut cases addressing the precise issue of whether the beneficiaries of an estate may be added as plaintiffs to a wrongful death action previously brought by the administratrices of the estate. It is well settled, however, that under § 52-555 a wrongful death action is maintainable only by the administrator or executor of a decedent's estate. See, e.g., Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 58, 444 A.2d 225 (1982). Since beneficiaries lack standing to bring claims arising from our wrongful death statute, it is submitted that the named plaintiffs' motion to add beneficiaries should be denied.
The named plaintiffs' motion to add beneficiaries requests that Caitlin Riley and Dylan Riley be added as party plaintiffs " in the place of" the administrators. Motion to Add Beneficiaries as Party Plaintiffs, October 10, 2012, at 1. In light of the named plaintiffs' argument at short calendar, however, this appears to be a typographical error. Moreover, it would be absurd to conclude that the named plaintiffs are both: (1) asking the court to set aside its order granting the underlying motion to substitute; and (2) requesting that the court grant an identical motion to substitute. ---------
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court should: (1) denies the defendants' motion to dismiss; (2) grants the named plaintiffs' motion to set aside; and (3) denies the named plaintiffs' motion to add beneficiaries.