Opinion
No. 1:21-cv-01512-DAD-SAB
2022-07-06
RIGHT TO LIFE OF CENTRAL CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff, v. Rob BONTA, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California, Defendant.
Denise M. Harle, Pro Hac Vice, Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, GA, Kevin Hayden Theriot, Pro Hac Vice, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ, Christiana Michelle Holcomb, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff. Kristin A. Liska, Office of the Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, Rita B. Bosworth, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
Denise M. Harle, Pro Hac Vice, Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, GA, Kevin Hayden Theriot, Pro Hac Vice, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ, Christiana Michelle Holcomb, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Kristin A. Liska, Office of the Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, Rita B. Bosworth, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Dale A. Drozd, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the court on a motion to transfer venue filed on behalf of defendant on October 29, 2021 and a motion for a preliminary injunction filed on behalf of plaintiff Right to Life of Central California ("Right to Life" or "plaintiff") on November 23, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 21, 25.) Pursuant to General Order No. 617 addressing the public health emergency posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the pending motions were taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 26.) For the reasons explained below, the court will deny defendant's motion to transfer venue and grant plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. BACKGROUND
On October 13, 2021, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against defendant seeking to enjoin enforcement of SB 742, a California urgency statute that became effective October 8, 2021 and is codified in California Penal Code § 594.39. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 56–58.) SB 742 makes it
unlawful to knowingly approach within 30 feet of any person while a person is within 100 feet of the entrance or exit of a vaccination site and is seeking to enter or exit a vaccination site, or any occupied motor vehicle seeking entry or exit to a vaccination site, for the purpose of obstructing, injuring, harassing, intimidating, or interfering with that person or vehicle occupant.
Cal. Penal Code § 594.39(a). Plaintiff alleges that because SB 742 defines "harassing" as used in the provision as "knowingly approaching, without consent, within 30 feet of another person or occupied vehicle for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with, that other person in a public way or on a sidewalk area," SB 742 violates plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 60, 83.) Specifically, plaintiff asserts the following five causes of action in its complaint: (1) a First Amendment freedom of speech claim; (2) a First Amendment free exercise of religion claim; (3) a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim; (4) a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim; and (5) a First Amendment expressive association claim. (Id. at 11–18.)
On October 20, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 11), which the court granted, in part, on October 30, 2021 (Doc. No. 22 ("TRO").) In the TRO, the court ordered that, pending a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, "[d]efendant and any person acting in concert with him shall be restrained and enjoined from enforcing SB 742's prohibition on ‘harassing’ as that term is defined in California Penal Code § 594.39, as applied to Right to Life and its agents, and facially as to any speaker." (Doc. No. 22 at 27.)
On November 23, 2021, plaintiff filed the pending motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to extend the temporary injunctive relief provided in the TRO throughout the duration of this lawsuit by converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 25.) On December 7, 2021, defendant filed an opposition to the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 28.) On December 14, 2021, plaintiff filed its reply thereto, reiterating that it does not seek a change in the substantive scope of the TRO but "simply asks the court to temporally extend the existing injunction to protect itself and other California speakers throughout the litigation." (Doc. No. 29 at 5.)
This action is one of three separate lawsuits currently pending against defendant in which the constitutionality of SB 742 is being challenged. A few days before plaintiff filed its complaint initiating this action, three anti-abortion activists (unrelated to plaintiff Right to Life) sued defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that SB 742 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and violates the California Constitution. See Aubin et al. v. Bonta , No. 5:21-cv-07983-NC (N.D. Cal. 2021). The plaintiffs in Aubin had concurrently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the enforcement of SB 742 it its entirety. (Aubin , Doc. No. 3.) The next day, a pro-vaccine activist sued defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, similarly alleging that SB 742 violates his free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and violates the California Constitution. See Gupta v. Bonta , No. 2:21-cv-08104 (C.D. Cal. 2021). The plaintiff in Gupta did not seek a temporary restraining order, but he did file a motion for a preliminary injunction and noticed that motion for hearing in mid-November 2021. (Gupta , Doc. No. 17.) In both Aubin and Gupta , the parties had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (Aubin , Doc. Nos. 9, 10; Gupta , Doc. No. 29.) In this case, the parties have not both consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (Doc. Nos. 10, 18.)
Defendant contends that all three cases are related and has sought to have all three cases venued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and assigned to the same judge. In this action, on October 29, 2021, defendant filed the pending motion to transfer venue, requesting that this court transfer this case to the Northern District of California. (Doc. No. 21.) On November 23, 2021, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendant's motion to transfer, and on November 30, 2021, defendant filed his reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 24, 27.)
Defendant also filed a motion to transfer venue in the Gupta action, seeking transfer of that case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. (Gupta , Doc. No. 27.) The court in Gupta granted defendant's motion to transfer that case to the Northern District of California. (Doc. Nos. 36, 37.) However, once the case was transferred to the Northern District of California, the Clerk of the Court for that district filed a notice stating the following: "As the parties’ consent form refers to a specific magistrate judge in the Central District (ECF No. 29), Plaintiffs/Defendants shall file a consent or declination to proceed before a magistrate judge generally or specific to [the randomly-assigned] Magistrate Judge Thomas S. Hixson ...." Gupta v. Bonta , No. 3:21-cv-09045-EMC (Doc. No. 40) (C.D. Cal. 2021). Because both parties did not thereafter consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the case was reassigned to a district judge, not to Magistrate Judge Nathanial M. Cousins, the judge assigned to Aubin. In addition, in Aubin , defendant filed an administrative motion requesting that the court relate the Gupta and Aubin cases, but the court denied that motion. (Aubin , Doc. No. 22, 27.) Thus, the Aubin and Gupta cases remain pending before two different judges in the Northern District.
Approximately two months after this court issued the TRO in this action, the court in Aubin issued an order granting the motion for a temporary restraining order in that case, concluding that because "the prohibition on approaching with the purpose of harassing is not functionally severable from the remainder of SB 742, the statute must be enjoined in its entirety." (Aubin , Doc. No. 28 at 1–2.) While plaintiff's motion to transfer venue has been pending in this court, the litigation in Aubin has progressed with the parties in that case filing cross-motions for summary judgment, which that court took under submission following a hearing on April 27, 2022. Meanwhile, in Gupta , the court deferred ruling on the pending motion for a preliminary injunction in that case and stayed those proceedings because "TROs have been issued in the Right to Life and Aubin cases, both of which provide protection for [plaintiff]," and "both Right to Life and Aubin are more advanced in litigation." (Doc. No. 56.)
ANALYSIS
A. Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), "a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought" for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). " Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’ " Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) ). "A motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) requires the court to weigh multiple factors in its determination whether transfer is appropriate in a particular case." Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc. , 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). "The primary factors to be considered are convenience of witnesses and parties and concerns for judicial economy (including duplicative effort, waste of time and money)." Cochran v. NYP Holdings, Inc. , 58 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd , 210 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2000). Other factors include plaintiff's choice of forum, administrative considerations, and the respective parties’ contacts with the forum. See Jones , 211 F.3d at 498–99 ; Rubio v. Monsanto Co. , 181 F. Supp. 3d 746, 759 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
Here, defendant urges the court to transfer this case to the Northern District of California primarily because, according to defendant, the transfer would be in the "interests of justice," "avoid inconsistent results," and "conserve judicial resources." (Doc. No. 21 at 11–14.) Specifically, defendant contends that "it is much more efficient for one judge to manage all cases concerning the same issue, as it will conserve judicial resources necessary to research issues, manage the schedule, and conduct legal analysis in these cases," and "[d]enying the transfer would simply require two (or more) judges to do the work that could be done by one." (Id. at 13.)
Although defendant's arguments may have been persuasive at the time defendant filed his motion to transfer on October 29, 2021, the circumstances have since changed so significantly that a transfer now would be inconsistent with the interest of judicial economy. Notably, defendant's efforts to relate the Aubin and Gupta cases and to have those cases assigned to the same judge have failed. Those two cases remain pending before two different judges in the Northern District of California, in part, because the parties in Gupta did not both consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. The court is also not persuaded by defendant's prediction in his reply brief that "even if [the] plaintiffs in either [Right to Life or Gupta ] do not consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the cases will go to a single district judge upon almost certain consolidation." (Doc. No. 27 at 7.) Moreover, even if this action were transferred to the Northern District and assigned to the same judge as the Gupta action, the fact remains that the proceedings in Gupta are stayed and a ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction in that case has been deferred until after the court in Aubin decides the pending cross-motions for summary judgment and until after this court rules upon the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. Transferring this action, with plaintiff's pending motion for a preliminary injunction, will not conserve any judicial resources, particularly given that the undersigned issued the TRO in this case, and the court in Gupta did not similarly issue a temporary restraining order or otherwise engage with the substantive issues presented in that case.
In light of these case-specific circumstances, the court concludes that a transfer of this action to the Northern District of California at this time is not appropriate. Accordingly, the court will deny defendant's motion to transfer venue of this action.
B. Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
"The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’ " Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky , 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack , 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) ("After Winter , ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’ ") (quoting All. for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell , 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) ). The Ninth Circuit has also held that an "injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates ... that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor." All. for Wild Rockies , 632 F.3d at 1134–35 (quoting Lands Council v. McNair , 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc ), overruled on other grounds by Winter , 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365 ). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proof as to each of these elements. See Klein v. City of San Clemente , 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009) ; Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige , 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief."). Finally, an injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter , 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365.
The Ninth Circuit has found that this "serious question" version of the circuit's sliding scale approach survives "when applied as part of the four-element Winter test." All. for the Wild Rockies , 632 F.3d at 1134. "That is, ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 1135.
Because the same legal standard applies to temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, in issuing the TRO, the court determined that plaintiff had satisfied these requirements. (Doc. No. 22 at 9–26.) In particular, the court found that plaintiff had "shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment freedom of speech claim," had "shown a likelihood that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested injunctive relief," and had "satisfied its burden to show that the balance of the equities and public interest weighs in its favor in this case." (Doc. No. 22 at 22, 23, 26.)
In moving for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff argues that for the same reasons the court issued the TRO, the court should likewise grant the requested preliminary injunction, which does not expand the substantive scope of the injunctive relief provided for and granted in the TRO. (Doc. Nos. 25-1 at 5–6; 29 at 5.) In his opposition to plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, defendant reiterates the arguments he advanced in opposing plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order—arguments the court already considered and rejected in the TRO. (Doc. No. 28.) Defendant does not advance any new or materially different arguments in opposing the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. (Compare Doc. No. 28 with Doc. No. 15.) Accordingly, the court incorporates the TRO's analysis and conclusions in their entirety herein and will grant plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above:
1. Defendant's motion to transfer venue (Doc. No. 21) is denied;
2. Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 25) is granted. The court orders that:
a. Defendant and any person acting in concert with him shall be restrained and enjoined from enforcing SB 742's prohibition on "harassing" as that term is defined in California Penal Code § 594.39, as applied to Right to Life and its agents, and facially as to any speaker;
3. No bond shall be required to be posted by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ; and
4. This preliminary injunction is effective immediately and shall remain in full force and effect through the date on which judgment, if any, as to the defendant is entered in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.