Summary
holding that confession together with dismembered relics of the identified body established the corpus delicti
Summary of this case from Hodge v. StateOpinion
No. 36708.
April 12, 1948.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
Desire to anticipate, by voluntary disclosure, supposed revelations of a "lie detector" has its origin in mind and conscience of defendant and is not "undue influence" rendering confession incompetent.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
Confession which defendant approved as read to him and amended by statement that "I want to be put to death for my crime for I know I will not have any friends after this" was competent though allegedly induced by fears originating in prediction of fellow prisoner that defendant would be placed in death cell, in fact that officers present at time of confession were armed, and in alleged references to lie detector.
3. HOMICIDE.
Confession together with dismembered relies of identified body of victim were sufficient to establish corpus delicti and to justify conviction of murder.
4. HOMICIDE.
Discrepancies between confession which recited that defendant shot father in the back with a shot gun in a fit of anger aroused by father's cursing and maligning of mother and testimony in which defendant denied shooting father in back and stated that gun went off while he and father were scuffling over gun did not support contention that killing was at most only manslaughter, since if confession were true the homicide was murder and if the testimony were true the killing was an accident.
5. HOMICIDE.
In murder prosecution, where self-defense was not pleaded and neither confession nor defendant's testimony raised issue of aggression by victim, testimony that victim had reputation of being dangerous, quarrelsome, and abusive when intoxicated was properly excluded.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Neshoba County.
A.M. Warwick, of Carthage, for appellant.
The court erred in permitting witness Baxter Reeves to give evidence of what he saw as a juror at the coroner's inquest trial.
The court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged written confession of the defendant, same being not a free and voluntary confession but made as a result of fear.
White v. State, 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903; Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 110 So. 361; Boudreaux v. State, 175 Miss. 625, 168 So. 621; Gross v. State, 191 Miss. 383, 2 So.2d 818; Whip v. State, 143 Miss. 757, 109 So. 697.
The court erred in refusing to admit the testimony offered by the defendant to show that deceased had, when under the influence of liquor, the habit of being quarrelsome and abusive with and toward members of his family.
26 Am. Jur. 395, Sec. 348.
The court erred in refusing to grant peremptory instruction in favor of the defendant at the conclusion of the State's testimony and in refusing to grant the directed verdict instruction requested at the close of the trial.
Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481; Patty v. State, 126 Miss. 94, 88 So. 498; Houston v. State, 117 Miss. 311, 78 So. 182; Thornton v. State, 178 Miss. 304, 170 So. 541; Webster v. State, 194 Miss. 381, 12 So.2d 533.
Greek L. Rice, Attorney General, by Geo. H. Ethridge, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Where a confession has been introduced, it may be considered along with other evidence tending to establish the corpus delicti.
Gross v. State, 191 Miss. 383, 2 So.2d 818.
Where the defendant confessed the commission of the crime, the corpus delicti is required to be established only to a probability. Proof is sufficient where the confession and the evidence of the corpus delicti taken together established a corpus delicti beyond every reasonable doubt.
Keeton v. State, 175 Miss. 631, 167 So. 68; Brooks v. State, 178 Miss. 575, 173 So. 409; Anderson v. State, 184 Miss. 892, 186 So. 836.
The evidence is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti and also to establish beyond every reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis, the defendant's guilt of the crime charged against him.
Appellant appeals from a conviction of murder, the judgment imposing life imprisonment. The errors assigned and argued are (1) the incompetency of the defendant's confession; and (2) the inclusion of certain proffered testimony as to the personal habits and hostile traits of the deceased. Other assignments relate to the sufficiency of the testimony, all of which are bound up in the assignment number one, above referred to.
The circumstances under which the written confession was procured show no undue influence by threats, promises, or otherwise. It is alleged, however, that prior to its execution the defendant had been subjected to influences which incited him to fear, and that these remained with him when he signed the confession. These fears are asserted to have originated in the prediction of a fellow prisoner that defendant would be taken to the county jail at Jackson and placed in the "death cell"; that the officers who were among those present at the time of the confession were armed; that they so far discounted some of his recitals as to dub defendant as a "damned liar"; and that while en route to jail a Mr. King, who was not addressing the defendant, brought into the conversation the existence of "a machine that would read your mind" and produce other physiological reactions. When asked what influence this statement made upon him, the defendant testified "it scared me." It would seem that his fear was not of the machine but of its capacity to elicit truth. It was therefore a fear of the truth and its consequences. A desire to anticipate, by voluntary disclosure, the supposed revelations of a "lie detector" has its origin in the mind and conscience of the defendant, and is not an "undue influence." It should be added that the testimony shows that Mr. King and the others present denied references to the lie detector and the calling of defendant a liar. After the confesfession had been reduced to writing, it was read to the defendant who approved it and requested that the following be added, which was done before he signed it: "I want to be put to death for my crime for I know I will not have any friends after this." We conclude that the admission of the confession was not error.
The confession together with the dismembered relics of the identified body of the deceased were sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, and to justify the verdict and judgment.
We need not set out the confession in detail. Briefly summarized, the defendant confessed that the deceased, who was his father, had cursed and maligned his mother and defendant, and that thereupon "I got mad and while he was standing by the fire with his back to me, I got the shotgun, a 12-gauge gun, from the corner of the room and shot my father in the left side of the back just below or near the shoulder blade. He fell in the floor dead."
Upon the witness stand, the defendant corroborated the facts set out in the confession except that he denied he shot his father in the back, and further that his father was reaching for a knife, and while they were scuffling over the gun "it went off." These discrepancies are not material, for if the confession be true the homicide was murder; if the testimonial version be true it was an accident. Wherefore, the contention that the killing was at most only manslaughter is untenable.
The second assignment is based upon the exclusion of testimony that the deceased had the reputation among members of his family as dangerous, quarrelsome, and abusive when intoxicated. In no event would such testimony, even if relating to a general reputation, be relevant unless upon the issue of aggression. Neither the version of the confession nor that given by the testimony of the defendant made this issue relevant. Self-defense was not pleaded.
We find no error in the record.
Affirmed.