Opinion
No. 33538.
March 6, 1939.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
Where there has been a confession by accused, much slighter proof of the corpus delicti is required than where the state must make out the entire case unaided by confession.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
A confession must be corroborated by such proof as will satisfy the mind that accused has confessed a real, not an imaginary crime.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
Defendant's confession that he had removed handcuffs from prisoner's arms was insufficiently corroborated to authorize conviction of aiding escape, in absence of corroborating evidence that handcuffs were removed by someone other than the prisoner.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Amite county; HON. R.E. BENNETT, Judge.
E.O. Whittington, of Liberty, for appellant.
It is well settled in this state, and in fact is the universal rule, that for a confession to have weight as evidence and to be competent for consideration by the court it must be free and voluntary without hope of reward or fear of punishment. Who can say that appellant was not placed in fear, when he was brought face to face with from fifty to one hundred men who had already beaten up the principal, James Williams, and who were waiting for him and who did whip him after he arrived at Crosby? It is an admitted fact in this record that he was whipped while he was in the custody of the officer who had him under arrest and whose duty it was under the law to guard him in his rights and protect him from violence, and there is not a word of protest raised by the officer to the treatment of this appellant but on the contrary it is shown that he joined in the treatment and brutality himself.
Whipp v. State, 143 Miss. 757; Ammons v. State, 80 Miss. 592, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 768; Johnson v. State, 107 Miss. 196, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1183; Whitley v. State, 78 Miss. 255; Reason v. State, 94 Miss. 290, 48 So. 820; White v. State, 129 Miss. 182; Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116.
W.D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
Appellant refers to certain cases which require that a confession shall be freely and voluntarily made in order to admit of its being used as evidence against the confessor. We freely concede this to be the rule. In this case, however, it was shown by the state at the preliminary inquiry that appellant's connection with the removal of the handcuffs was learned while appellant was being carried from Gloster to Crosby and at a time prior to a showing of any abuse of appellant. There is some evidence which was developed by the defendant in presenting his case on the merits, which indicated that the confession was made after appellant reached Crosby and after he had been subjected to a whipping. Thus, it will be seen that to this extent there is a conflict in the testimony. This court has, in a number of cases, said that where the evidence is conflicting on the admissibility of the confession, it will not disturb the trial court's finding, unless it appears to this court to be clearly contrary to the evidence.
Brown v. State, 142 Miss. 335, 107 So. 373; Stubbs v. State, 148 Miss. 764, 114 So. 827; Buckler v. State, 171 Miss. 353, 157 So. 353; Keeton v. State, 175 Miss. 631, 167 So. 68; Wohner v. State, 175 Miss. 428, 167 So. 622.
It occurs to the writer hereof that the only question this court can be concerned with on this appeal is whether the court's finding that the confession was admissible is against the weight of the evidence surrounding this confession. We submit that the court's ruling is supported by competent, direct evidence and that its finding was not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
This is an appeal from a conviction for aiding one who was under arrest for the commission of a felony to escape.
James Williams committed a burglary and was arrested therefor. He was handcuffed by the arresting officers and escaped from their custody with the handcuffs on him. He turned up the next day without the handcuffs, and was again arrested. The appellant was then taken into custody, charged with removing the handcuffs from Williams' arms. Over his objection, on which it will not be necessary for us to rule, a confession, said to have been made by him, that he removed the handcuffs from Williams' arms, knowing that he had committed burglary, was introduced in evidence. The record is barren of any evidence that could be considered by the jury remotely indicating how or by whom the handcuffs were removed from Williams' arms. It is true that "where there has been a confession by the accused, much slighter proof is required to establish the corpus delicti than would be necessary where the State must make out the entire case, unaided by a confession." The confession, however, must be corroborated by such proof as will satisfy "the mind that it is a real and not an imaginary crime which the accused has confessed." Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 545. This holding has been adhered to and followed in numerous decisions by this Court.
The evidence here aliunde the confession does not meet this rule. The only corroborating evidence is that the handcuffs were removed from Williams' arms, with nothing whatever that could be considered by the jury to indicate that he did not remove them himself or that it would have been impossible for him to have done so.
The appellant's request at the close of the evidence, which was in substance for a directed verdict in his favor, should have been granted. The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and the appellant will be discharged.
So ordered.