Opinion
HHDCV186092289S
09-06-2018
Charles PERSAUD v. Aretha HARRIS et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
CESAR A. NOBLE JUDGE
The defendants, Aretha Harris and John Pulcini have moved to strike the respective counts directed to them by the plaintiff, Charles Persaud, in his complaint. The complaint alleges, in separate counts, that the plaintiff was involved in two motor vehicle accidents: one on April 5, 2016, involving Harris (April accident); and the other on August 1, 2016, involving Pulcini (August accident). The plaintiff alleges injury to his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine in both accidents. In the April accident, the plaintiff separately alleges right shoulder/scapular pain; and in the August accident, he separately alleges right wrist pain and paresthesia as well as right brachial neuritis. Both defendants have moved to strike the complaint on the basis of misjoinder of the separate actions.
The plaintiff initially also sued the Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO) claiming entitlement to uninsured motorist benefits for the April accident. At argument the plaintiff and GEICO represented that the action as to GEICO would be withdrawn on the basis of representations from Harris that she was insured. GEICO had also filed a motion to strike on identical grounds as Harris and Pulcini which in light of the foregoing, will not be considered.
Practice Book § 10-39(a) provides in relevant part that a "motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest ... the joining of two or more causes of action which cannot properly be united in one complaint ..." "The exclusive remedy for misjoinder of parties is by motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCart v. Shelton, 81 Conn.App. 58, 61, 837 A.2d 872 (2004), citing Zanoni v. Hudon, 42 Conn.App. 70, 73, 678 A.2d 12 (1996). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the [trial] court must accept as true the facts alleged in the [pleadings] and construe them in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 398, 119 A.3d 462 (2015).
General Statutes § 52-97 and Practice Book § 10-21 both address the joinder of causes of action nearly identically, and provide in relevant part: "In any civil action the plaintiff may include in his complaint ... causes of action ... but, if several causes of action are united in the same complaint, they shall all be brought to recover, either ... (2) for injuries, with or without force, to person and property, or either ... or (7) upon claims, whether in contract or tort or both, arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action. The several causes of action so united shall all belong to one of these classes, and ... shall affect all the parties to the action ..." Our Supreme Court observed, in interpreting a predecessor statute, that it advances "the general policy of our law which favors as far as possible the litigation of related controversies in one action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Veits v. Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 436, 58 A.2d 389 (1948). The Supreme Court subsequently instructed in Goggins v. Fawcett, 145 Conn. 709, 710, 147 A.2d 187 (1958), that the statute must be liberally construed. The interests served by joinder of claims involving related "transactions" are judicial economy, the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and piecemeal disposition of the same issues. Jackson v. Conland, 171 Conn. 161, 166-67, 368 A.2d 3 (1976) (construing former practice book rule permitting cross claims arising out of the transaction or one of the transactions, which is subject of plaintiff’s complaint).
Guided by these principles, the court holds that Harris and Pulcini’s causes of action are properly joined. The court is mindful that there is a split of opinion among judges of the superior court regarding the interpretation of the phrase "shall affect all the parties to the action," employed in both § 52-97 and Practice Book § 10-21. Some courts adopt a strict interpretation of the phrase, holding that there must be a "commonality" between all parties such that the existence of different defendants, as is the case here, defeats joinder. Other courts construe the phrase more liberally and only require joined parties to have an interest in the outcome of each claim. See Rivera v. Schwager, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. 16-6033541-S, 2016 WL 7443905, at *3 (Nov. 22, 2016, Wiese, J.) (listing cases demonstrating split of opinion in superior court). The principles governing the court’s construction of pleadings and § 52-97 counsel adoption of the more liberal approach. Accordingly, the court finds that the injuries to the plaintiff’s cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine, alleged in the April and August accidents, affect Harris, Pulcini, and, of course, the plaintiff. Each of these defendants have a claim in the outcome of the apportionment of responsibility for the injuries, and, as articulated in Card v. State, 57 Conn.App. 134, 747 A.2d 32 (2000), a single jury may resolve the claims against "multiple defendants notwithstanding the unique circumstances creating liability on each of their parts." Orengo v. Leger, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-14-6008529 (Nov. 24, 2014, Boland J.) (59 Conn.L.Rptr. 422, 422). This finding, together with the finding that both claims qualify as a cause of action for injury to person thus falling within the ambit of § 52-97(2), mandates the holding that the two causes of action are properly joined under both § 52-97 and Practice Book § 10-21. Furthermore, the court finds that the two causes of action arise "out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action." Practice Book § 10-21(7). This is so because the word "transaction," as used in this subsection of the Practice Book, refers to "an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between themselves are altered." (Emphasis added.) DeFelippi v. DeFelippi, 23 Conn.Supp. 352, 353, 183 A.2d 630 (1962), quoting Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 560, 29 A. 76 (1893). In the present case the connection to each other is the common injuries.
For the foregoing reason the motions to strike are denied.