Opinion
03-03-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Henry SMITH, Also Known as Pops, Appellant.
Craig Meyerson, Latham, for appellant. P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Vincent Stark of counsel), for respondent.
Craig Meyerson, Latham, for appellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Vincent Stark of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, P.J., GARRY, EGAN JR., ROSE and CLARK, JJ.
EGAN JR., J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Breslin, J.), rendered May 30, 2014 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
In late March 2013 or early April 2013, Tyson Ruecker, a detective assigned to the Community Response Unit of the Albany Police Department, was approached by a confidential informant (hereinafter CI)—with whom Ruecker had worked extensively for approximately 18 months—and given information regarding a potential drug "target" known as "Pops." According to the CI, Pops was selling drugs out of a basement apartment located on Madison Avenue in the City of Albany. Based upon the information provided by the CI, which included, among other things, a physical description of Pops, as well as information derived from another detective who was familiar with defendant, Ruecker showed the CI a single photo of defendant and asked the CI if he recognized the individual depicted therein. In response, the CI indicated that the person in the photo was "the individual that he kn[e]w as Pops." The photo identification of defendant occurred on April 4, 2013. With the CI's assistance, a controlled buy then was arranged for the afternoon of April 12, 2013, at which time the CI purchased a quantity of a substance from defendant that field tested positive for crack cocaine.
Defendant thereafter was indicted and charged with one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Prior to trial, defendant requested a Wade hearing to challenge the CI's pre-buy identification of him as the individual known to the CI as Pops. The People opposed defendant's request for a Wade hearing, arguing that the CI's identification was merely confirmatory, but consented to a Rodriguez hearing to establish the CI's familiarity with defendant. Supreme Court conducted a Rodriguez hearing, at which Ruecker was the sole witness to appear and testify, and thereafter concluded that the People had demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the CI's identification of defendant was merely confirmatory. Accordingly, Supreme Court denied defendant's motion to suppress the pretrial identification. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and thereafter was sentenced to eight years in prison followed by three years of postrelease supervision. This appeal by defendant ensued.
Although defendant initially argued that Supreme Court erred in refusing to charge criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree where the defense of agency had been submitted to the jury, defendant conceded in his reply brief that the Court of Appeals considered and rejected this very argument in People v. Davis, 14 N.Y.3d 20, 896 N.Y.S.2d 707, 923 N.E.2d 1095 (2009). As defendant acknowledges that Davis is controlling on this point, no further discussion of this issue is required.
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Initially, we reject defendant's claim that the alleged lack of specificity in the indictment relative to the time of the underlying drug transaction deprived him of the ability to prepare an adequate defense. "The purpose of an indictment is to provide a defendant with fair notice of the charges against him or her, and of the manner, time, and place of the conduct underlying the accusations, so as to enable the defendant to answer the charges and prepare an adequate defense" (People v. Williams, 132 A.D.3d 785, 785–786, 17 N.Y.S.3d 509 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 293, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 461 N.E.2d 1256 [1984] ). Although an indictment must contain, among other things, "[a] statement in each count that the offense charged therein was committed on, or on or about, a designated date, or during a designated period of time" (CPL 200.50[6] ), the statute itself "does not require [that] the exact date and time" be set forth (People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d at 294, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 461 N.E.2d 1256 ). Accordingly, when time is not an essential element of the crime charged, "the indictment ‘may allege the time in approximate terms' " (People v. Slingerland, 101 A.D.3d 1265, 1266, 955 N.Y.S.2d 690 [2012], lv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 1104, 965 N.Y.S.2d 800, 988 N.E.2d 538 [2013], quoting People v. Watt, 81 N.Y.2d 772, 774, 593 N.Y.S.2d 782, 609 N.E.2d 135 [1993] ; see People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d at 295, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 461 N.E.2d 1256 ). Further, "[a] mistake with respect to date, time or place is a technical defect rather than a jurisdictional defect vital to the sufficiency of the indictment" (People v. Dudley, 28 A.D.3d 1182, 1183, 816 N.Y.S.2d 253 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lvs. denied 7 N.Y.3d 788, 791, 821 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821, 854 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 [2006] ).
Here, the indictment alleged that the underlying drug transaction occurred "at approximately 4:16 p.m." on April 12, 2013; the CI testified at trial that he was involved in a controlled buy operation, which included being searched and provided with a recording device, beginning at approximately 4:30 p.m. on that date, and Ruecker testified that he believed that the controlled buy took place "a little after" 6:00 p.m. on that date. Time is not an essential element of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (see Penal Law § 220.39[1] ; People v. Slingerland, 101 A.D.3d at 1266, 955 N.Y.S.2d 690 ), and we are not persuaded that the less than two-hour discrepancy at issue deprived defendant of the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense (see People v. Miller, 226 A.D.2d 833, 834, 640 N.Y.S.2d 904 [1996], lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 939, 647 N.Y.S.2d 172, 670 N.E.2d 456 [1996] ).
As to the issue of whether Supreme Court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the CI's identification of him without conducting a Wade hearing, "a Wade hearing is not required when the witness is so familiar with the defendant that there is little or no risk that police suggestion could lead to a misidentification" (People v. Casanova, 119 A.D.3d 976, 980, 988 N.Y.S.2d 713 [2014] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v. Boyer, 6 N.Y.3d 427, 432, 813 N.Y.S.2d 31, 846 N.E.2d 461 [2006] ; People v. Rodriguez, 79 N.Y.2d 445, 453, 583 N.Y.S.2d 814, 593 N.E.2d 268 [1992] ; People v. Hines, 132 A.D.3d 1385, 1386, 17 N.Y.S.3d 551 [2015], lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 1109, –––N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d –––– [2016] ; People v. Sanchez, 75 A.D.3d 911, 912, 905 N.Y.S.2d 692 [2010], lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 895, 912 N.Y.S.2d 583, 938 N.E.2d 1018 [2010] ). Where, as here, the People assert that the pretrial identification was merely confirmatory, the People bear the burden of "prov [ing] the witness's sufficient familiarity with the defendant at a Rodriguez hearing" (People v. Sanchez, 75 A.D.3d at 912, 905 N.Y.S.2d 692 ). "Although the People are not obligated to call the identifying witness at [the] Rodriguez hearing" (People v. Graham, 283 A.D.2d 885, 887, 725 N.Y.S.2d 145 [2001], lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 940, 733 N.Y.S.2d 379, 759 N.E.2d 378 [2001] ), they nonetheless must come forward with "sufficient details of the extent and degree of the protagonists' prior relationship" with one another (id. at 887, 725 N.Y.S.2d 145 ; see People v. Carter, 57 A.D.3d 1017, 1018, 868 N.Y.S.2d 378 [2008], lvs. denied 12 N.Y.3d 781, 781, 879 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58, 906 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 [2009] ). Relevant factors to be considered in this regard include "the number of times the witness saw the defendant prior to the crime, the duration and nature of those encounters, time periods and setting of the viewings, time between the last viewing and the crime, and whether the two individuals had any conversations" (People v. Sanchez, 75 A.D.3d at 912, 905 N.Y.S.2d 692 ; accord People v. Casanova, 119 A.D.3d at 980, 988 N.Y.S.2d 713 ; see People v. Coleman, 73 A.D.3d 1200, 1202, 903 N.Y.S.2d 431 [2010] ).
Here, Ruecker testified that the CI provided him with a physical description of Pops ("[e]lderly black male, bald, sometimes wearing glasses, approximately [5 feet 10 inches tall], [weighing] over 200 [pounds]"), together with a phone number for Pops and the location of the basement apartment from which Pops was selling drugs. According to Ruecker, the CI had known Pops for approximately six weeks prior to bringing Pops to the attention of law enforcement, during which time the CI had driven a number of people to meet Pops in order to buy drugs. The CI informed Ruecker that he was present for some of the actual drug transactions, which occurred either in the identified basement apartment or a nearby parking lot, and that he had interacted with Pops "several" times during that six-week period. When pressed as to the precise number of occasions upon which the CI and Pops met during that time period, Ruecker testified that the CI drove other people to Pops' location to purchase drugs on "[a]pproximately four occasions."
Upon reviewing Ruecker's testimony at the Rodriguez hearing—specifically with respect to the CI's detailed physical description of Pops and the number of occasions upon which they met within the relatively short period of time preceding the controlled buy—we are satisfied that the People established that the CI's relationship with defendant was "more than fleeting or distant" (People v. Coleman, 73 A.D.3d at 1202, 903 N.Y.S.2d 431 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). Accordingly, as the record supports a finding that the CI's pre-buy identification of defendant as the individual known to him as Pops was confirmatory in nature (see People v. Colon, 307 A.D.2d 378, 379–380, 763 N.Y.S.2d 850 [2003], lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 619, 767 N.Y.S.2d 402, 799 N.E.2d 625 [2003] ), we cannot say that Supreme Court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress without conducting a Wade hearing. Defendant's remaining contentions, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
PETERS, P.J., GARRY, ROSE and CLARK, JJ., concur.