Opinion
01-02-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Mark A. ROUNDS, Defendant–Appellant.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester, Harter Secrest & Emery LLP (Maura McGuire of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester, Harter Secrest & Emery LLP (Maura McGuire of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, VALENTINO, WHALEN AND DeJOSEPH, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3] ), defendant contends that the weapon seized from his residence was the product of an illegal search and that Supreme Court therefore erred in refusing to suppress it. We reject that contention. The search was conducted by parole officers “in furtherance of parole purposes and related to [their] dut[ies] as ... parole officer[s]” (People v. Johnson, 63 N.Y.2d 888, 890, 483 N.Y.S.2d 201, 472 N.E.2d 1029 [internal quotation marks omitted], rearg. denied 64 N.Y.2d 647, 485 N.Y.S.2d 1030, 474 N.E.2d 261 ; see People v. Davis, 101 A.D.3d 1778, 1779, 957 N.Y.S.2d 803, lv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 1060, 962 N.Y.S.2d 611, 985 N.E.2d 921 ; People v. Scott, 93 A.D.3d 1193, 1194, 940 N.Y.S.2d 411, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 967, 950 N.Y.S.2d 119, 973 N.E.2d 217, reconsideration denied 19 N.Y.3d 1001, 951 N.Y.S.2d 477, 975 N.E.2d 923 ). The parole officers had a reasonable basis to believe that a gun would be located in the residence based on the suspicious nature of defendant's statement that he had been shot in the foot by an unknown assailant at his residence, and based on the fact that no evidence of a third-party shooter was uncovered during the police investigation (see People v. Nappi, 83 A.D.3d 1592, 1594, 922 N.Y.S.2d 669, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 820, 929 N.Y.S.2d 808, 954 N.E.2d 99 ; see generally People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794 ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that the parole officers received assistance from a police officer at the scene did not render the search a police operation requiring a search warrant (see Davis, 101 A.D.3d at 1779, 957 N.Y.S.2d 803 ; Nappi, 83 A.D.3d at 1594, 922 N.Y.S.2d 669 ; People v. Johnson, 54 A.D.3d 969, 970, 864 N.Y.S.2d 132 ).
We reject defendant's further contention that the court erred in failing to suppress the statements he made to a police officer at the hospital, prior to receiving Miranda warnings. Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant was not in custody when he made those statements (see People v. Drouin, 115 A.D.3d 1153, 1155–1156, 982 N.Y.S.2d 226, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 1019, 992 N.Y.S.2d 802, 16 N.E.3d 1282 ; see generally People v. Forbes, 182 A.D.2d 829, 829–830, 583 N.Y.S.2d 14, lv. denied 80 N.Y.2d 895, 587 N.Y.S.2d 926, 600 N.E.2d 653 ). We therefore reject defendant's further contention that the post-Miranda statements should be suppressed as fruit of the unlawful pre-Miranda questioning (see People v. Adelman, 1 A.D.3d 1029, 1030, 767 N.Y.S.2d 368 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.