Opinion
05-05-2017
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles REED, Defendant–Appellant.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Jane I. Yoon of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Kelly Christine Wolford of Counsel), for Respondent.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Jane I. Yoon of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Kelly Christine Wolford of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 265.03[3] ), defendant contends that the firearm seized from his residence by his parole officer was the product of an unlawful search and that County Court therefore erred in refusing to suppress it. We reject that contention inasmuch as "the record supports the court's determination that the search was ‘rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty’ and was therefore lawful" (People v. Johnson, 94 A.D.3d 1529, 1531–1532, 942 N.Y.S.2d 738, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 974, 950 N.Y.S.2d 357, 973 N.E.2d 767, quoting People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794 ).
Here, the parole officer testified that he received information in a bulletin from an information-sharing collaboration of various law enforcement agencies that an individual with defendant's name was the suspect in a recent shooting of a former parolee. That information, coupled with the parole officer's knowledge of the weapons charge underlying defendant's parole status, defendant's history of gang involvement, and the current feud between the gang to which the shooting victim belonged and defendant's gang, provided the parole officer with a reasonable basis to believe that a firearm would be located in the residence (see generally People v. Rounds, 124 A.D.3d 1351, 1351, 999 N.Y.S.2d 647, lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1077, 12 N.Y.S.3d 628, 34 N.E.3d 379 ; People v. Nappi, 83 A.D.3d 1592, 1593–1594, 922 N.Y.S.2d 669, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 820, 929 N.Y.S.2d 808, 954 N.E.2d 99 ; People v. Felder, 272 A.D.2d 884, 884, 708 N.Y.S.2d 774, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 905, 716 N.Y.S.2d 646, 739 N.E.2d 1151 ). The court thus properly determined that the search initiated by the parole officer was rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer's duty "to detect and to prevent parole violations for the protection of the public from the commission of further crimes" (Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d at 181, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794 ; see Nappi, 83 A.D.3d at 1593–1594, 922 N.Y.S.2d 669 ). Contrary to defendant's further contention, the record supports the court's determination that " ‘the assistance of police officers at the scene did not render the search a police operation’ " (People v. Farmer, 136 A.D.3d 1410, 1411, 25 N.Y.S.3d 505 lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 1027, 45 N.Y.S.3d 379, 68 N.E.3d 108 ; see Rounds, 124 A.D.3d at 1351, 999 N.Y.S.2d 647 ).
Finally, to the extent that defendant challenges the credibility of the parole officer's testimony, we "afford deference to the court's determination that the parole officer's testimony was credible" (Johnson, 94 A.D.3d at 1532, 942 N.Y.S.2d 738 ), and we conclude that there is no basis on this record to disturb the court's determination.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.