Opinion
Indictment No. 42/2019 Mot. Seq. No. 1
06-13-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, v. JOSE L. MANZUETA (DOB: December 9, 1988), Defendant.
To: PUTNAM COUNTY LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC. Attorneys for Defendant Jose L. Manzueta Attn: Marisa N. Finkelberg, Esq. PUTNAM COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attn: ADA Melissa Lynch CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION Attn: Probation Officer Caroline LeVasseur PUTNAM COUNTY PROBATION DEPARTMENT Attn: Probation Officer Elaine McNamara and Probation Supervisor Amy Dehais
Unpublished Opinion
To: PUTNAM COUNTY LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant Jose L. Manzueta
Attn: Marisa N. Finkelberg, Esq.
PUTNAM COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Attn: ADA Melissa Lynch
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION
Attn: Probation Officer Caroline LeVasseur
PUTNAM COUNTY PROBATION DEPARTMENT
Attn: Probation Officer Elaine McNamara and Probation Supervisor Amy Dehais
DECISION & ORDER
HON. ANTHONY R. MOLE, JUDGE OF THE COUNTY COURT.
The following papers were read and considered on the motion (mot. seq. no. 1) of defendant JOSE L. MANZUETA, made pursuant to CPL 410.90 (1), requesting an early termination of his sentence of probation:
Papers:
Notice of Motion, Affirmation in Support, Exhibits A-L, Affirmation of Service
Upon review of the foregoing papers, the presentence investigation report (PSR) completed March 5, 2020, as well as the case file and record, the Court finds and determines as follows:
I. Background
By way of background, defendant was charged by indictment in November of 2019 with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (count one), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (count two), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seven degree (count two). The charges arose from defendant's possession and sale of 80 glassine envelopes containing heroin in the Town of Southeast on or about July 10, 2019.
Counts one and two are class B felonies and count three is a class A misdemeanor.
On January 15, 2020, defendant pled guilty to the first count: criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree in violation of Penal Law § 220.39 (1) in full satisfaction of the indictment. The plea was based upon a negotiated sentence of five years' probation. Defendant was accordingly sentenced on March 11, 2020 by the sentencing court (the Hon. James T. Rooney, J.C.C. [retired]). Defendant simultaneously acknowledged and executed a written copy of the order and conditions of probation at sentencing.
Of note, defendant was a resident of the State of Connecticut when he was sentenced. Hence, his probationary supervision was transferred to Connecticut under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (see Executive Law § 259-mm; CPL 410.80 [3]; see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-133 et seq.]).
Defendant's term of probation is set to expire on or about March 11, 2025. He now moves, pursuant to CPL 410.90 (I), for an order to terminate his sentence of probation earlier than the scheduled date of expiration. Defendant's motion is deemed fully submitted. He filed it on May 5, 2023. No response papers were filed by the People (see generally CPLR 2214 [b]; 22 NYCRR 202.7; 202.8). Because the People do not take a position, the Court assumes that they do not oppose an early termination of his sentence of probation.
CPL 410.90 (1) states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court may at any time terminate ... a period of probation ... for conviction to a crime." While defendant's notice of motion cites subdivision (1) of CPL 410.90, his application is actually predicated on subdivision (3) - which is discussed infra and applicable to the case at hand. "CPL 410.90 (3) provides [the] mechanism for favorable termination of a sentence of probation prior to its completion" (People v Weinflash, 33 A.D.3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2006]. Iv denied 8 N.Y.3d 886 [2007]).
Defendant's notice of motion sets forth a return date of June 1, 2023.
II. Discussion and Analysis
We start with the premise that "[i]f language of a statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses single definite and sensible meaning, words cannot be interpreted[,] and courts have no authority to add to the language of law" (McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 73, NY Annotations at 43 [2018 ed]; see County of Putnam, N.Y. v State of New York, 17 Mise 2d 541, 545 [Ct Cl 1959]). In adhering to longstanding principles of statutory construction, "courts are obliged to interpret a statute to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used" (People v Brown, 115 A.D.3d 155, 158 [2d Dept 2014], affd 25 N.Y.3d 247 [2015] [citations omitted]).
Turning to the applicable statute, it states that "[t]he court shall grant a request for termination of a sentence of probation under this section when, having regard to the conduct and condition of the probationer, the court is of the opinion that: (i) the probationer is no longer in need of such guidance, training[,] or other assistance which would otherwise be administered through probation supervision; (ii) the probationer has diligently complied with the terms and conditions of the sentence of probation; and (iii) the termination of the sentence of probation is not adverse to the protection of the public" (CPL 410.90 [3] [a] [emphasis added]; see People v Pondi, 65 Misc.3d 1206[A], *1 [Co Ct, Sullivan County 2019]). Clearly, this statute is written in the conjunctive form and contains a three-factor test. Such must be applied with equal force here.
The statute, after weighing the appropriate factors, provides the Court with discretion in making the final determination upon due consideration of the enumerated factors. Unquestionably, the undersigned "has the ability to terminate the period of probation sooner in accordance with the [C]riminal [P]rocedure [L]aw, if the court is satisfied" that all three prongs of CPL 410.90 (3) (a) have been satisfied (People v Teri W., 31 N.Y.3d 124, 129 [2018], quoting Penal Law § 65.00 [3]). It is ultimately this Court's responsibility to discharge defendant from probation before completion of the term should the court find that continuous supervision is no longer necessary (see People v Rodney E., 77 N.Y.2d 672, 676 [1991]). The text, structure, and legislative history, as well as a straightforward application of canons of statutory construction, all confirm as much.
Turning to the merits of his motion, defendant's sole contention is that he is entitled to an early termination of probation inasmuch as he has substantially complied with the terms and conditions. Defendant asserts that he has had no "entanglements" with police since the underlying conviction. No hearing is warranted to decide the merits of defendant's motion based on his submissions, the record containing straightforward facts, and nonresponses from the People and the probation department(s).
A. Defendant's Submissions
In support of his motion, defendant submits, among other things, the order and conditions of probation; a summary of supervision, dated May 4, 2023, authored by probation officer Caroline LeVasseur for the Connecticut Probation Department (also known as the Court Support Services Division, Adult Probation); documentation from August 2022 reflecting defendant's worker's compensation claim stemming from work-related injuries he suffered as an asphalt laborer; documentation about a 2020 criminal case which was ultimately dismissed because the State of Connecticut declined to prosecute the matter; a discharge summary from 2021 relative to defendant's participation in outpatient treatment; a copy of his Connecticut-issued medical marijuana license; and three character reference letters supporting defendant's application.
Defendant's submissions reflect that he faced criminal charges shortly after being sentenced in this case. In May of 2020, defendant was arrested in Connecticut for operation of a drug factory (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2la-277), possession of a controlled substance within 1500 feet of a school (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2 la-279 [b]), and possession of narcotics with intent to sell (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2 la-277 [a] [1] [a]). Consequently, a violation of probation was fded in this Court in June 2020 by the Putnam County Probation Department notifying the sentencing court; whereupon, Judge Rooney adopted the recommendation to await defendant's adjudication of the new charges, prior to taking action on his alleged violation. Defendant submits a certificate of disposition from the Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury and represents that the criminal case was dismissed because the State of Connecticut declined to prosecute. Counsel's affirmation in support explains that defendant's Connecticut attorney provided "further background" upon their discussion and defendant "was not involved with or knew of any illicit activity within the [Connecticut] home" he resides at. Counsel's affirmation adds that her discussions with the Connecticut prosecutor confirm that the case was declined to be prosecuted "based on . . . discovery."
The probation summary by LeVasseur states that defendant has participated and "successfully completed" substance abuse treatment groups in 2020 and 2021; that he obtained a medical marihuana card for cannabis use; has maintained employment throughout his probationary period until he suffered work-related injuries around September of 2022; that he has been subjected to urinalysis screenings which were only positive for marihuana - noting that it has been legalized in Connecticut since July of 2022; that his Connecticut criminal case "was dismissed" without further action and there was no subsequent conviction; that defendant has reported to probation "as instructed" and there are no known instances of him possessing a firearm; and that he provided a DNA sample in July of 2022 as he was required to do. LeVasseur's summary also provides that defendant reported "supporting his dependents without issue" by working full time and/or by his workman's compensation benefits. LeVasseur's summary concludes by stating that defendant has completed over three years of his probationary supervision period without committing a violation.
Defendant, in addition, highlights that he successfully completed a substance and alcohol evaluation, along with the recommended treatment, as a required condition of his probation. Last, the Court has read and considered the three reference letters in support, apparently submitted by defendant's friends. In sum and substance, each letter speaks highly of defendant's character and casts him in a positive light.
B. The PSR
Next, the Court reviewed and considered the PSR because, among other things, the undersigned was not the sentencing judge. The PSR reflects that defendant had drug charges pending in New Jersey since 2012 for which he "need[ed] to appear ... so that the matter [could] be resolved." The PSR also reflects that defendant was unemployed at the time and used marihuana two to three times a day by smoking "a joint" in order to "self-medicate." In addition, the PSR reflects that defendant's New York state driver's license was suspended since June of 2019 due to his "failure to pay child support" for his children.
As to the charges in the indictment, the PSR reflects that a confidential informant ("CI") had purchased heroin from defendant in July of 2019, whereafter, the CI informed law enforcement authorities about defendant's illicit transaction. The PSR states that the CI "subsequently purchased" 80 glassine envelopes containing heroin from defendant for $640 which resulted in the indictment. The PSR further reflects that defendant stated during his probation interview that he had never sold drugs before, that he "found the heroin in Connecticut," and that he sold the drugs because he "needed money and . . . was doing someone a favor by bringing the heroin to New York." While the probation officer noted in the PSR that defendant admitted wrongdoing and expressed remorse, defendant's explanation of committing the crime consisted of an "improbable account" since he claimed that he found the heroin in Connecticut and then "decided to do someone a favor by travelling to New York in order to sell it."
Defendant also underwent a Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction (COMPAS) assessment - which assessed he was "at medium risk of recidivism." In the PSR, the probation officer also provided the following assessment in his evaluative analysis: "The presence of a heroin dealer in a community is a clear threat to the protection of the public. Given his lack of gainful employment resulting in an inability to support his children, the defendant may be tempted to return to the heroin trade. It is unclear as to whether community[-]based supervision will be able to prevent this outcome." All things considered, the probation officer recommended that defendant be sentenced to five years of probation, inclusive of conditions that he be subject to drug testing, undergo an evaluation to ascertain if he has a substance use disorder, and seek and maintain suitable employment.
C. The Court's Findings and Determination
Initially, the undersigned has considered defendant's current "conduct and condition" as compared to his status in 2019 when he committed the crime (CPL 410.90 [3] [a]). The undersigned notes that defendant's progress and cooperation with probation is commendable since he has been a law-abiding citizen during his term of probation. Not to be overlooked is the fact that he is doing exactly what he should be doing.
By completing a substance and alcohol evaluation, defendant has shown himself to be motivated in his treatment. That, however, was a mandatory condition of probation. Another was maintaining a steady job which defendant has also done. Moreover, he should be proud of financially supporting his children, which he had previously failed to do.
But abiding by his probationary conditions and accomplishing those things does not, in and of itself, provide a firm basis to end probation - which has tremendously benefitted defendant. Defendant has served over three years of a five-year probation sentence. This Court opines that supervisory services are still necessary for defendant under all of the relevant circumstances (compare People v Pondi, 65 Misc.3d 1206[A] at *2-3).
Again, a judge must grant early termination if he or she "is of the opinion" that a defendant does not need the guidance, training, or other assistance provided by probation; the probationer has diligently complied with the terms and conditions of probation; and termination is not adverse to the protection of the public (CPL 410.90 [3] [a]). As said above, the guiding statute essentially provides this Court considerable discretion in deciding defendant's motion (see generally People v Teri W., 31 N.Y.3d at 129-130).
This Court concludes that termination from probation in this case would be inappropriate (see People v Muro, 2003 NY Slip Op 51114[U], *2 [Dist Ct, Suffolk County 2003]). While defendant has satisfied the second prong of the statute insofar that he has assiduously cooperated and complied with his terms and conditions of probation, the Court is not of the opinion that defendant has met the first and third prongs of CPL 410.90 (3) (a).
First, defendant requires continued guidance and assistance from the Connecticut Probation Department - who take no position on this application and, notably, did not recommend that his probation end early. Nevertheless, the Court believes that defendant is still in need of supervisory services (compare e.g. People vPondi, 65 Mise 3d 1206[A] at *2-4). Continued monitoring would better ensure that defendant presents a minimal risk of reoffending. Thus, the Court opines that leaving supervision in place remains the prudent cautionary measure (see People v Muro, 2003 NY Slip Op 51114[U] at *2; People v Ulerie, 2007 NY Slip Op 34155, *6-7 [Sup Ct, Kings County, 2007]).
Secondly, based on the explicit language of CPL 410.90 (3) (a) (iii), a probationary "sentence must not be terminated if termination will be adverse to the protection of the public" (People v Thatcher, 75 Mise 3d 1219[A], *2 [City Ct, City of Poughkeepsie 2021] [emphasis added]). To that end, public safety still remains paramount from this Court's perspective.
Here, defendant's motion papers advance nothing about the continued safety and protection of the general public - simply highlighting that he has complied in all respects with his probationary supervision. Though respecting defendant's personal belief, the Court is unpersuaded given the serious nature of his violative, felonious conduct and his purported justification for doing so. The Court underscores that he admitted his guilt and was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree - a serious drug felony (see generally People v Stabler, 153 A.D.3d 1447, 1447 [3d Dept 2017] [where the County Court had denied the defendant's motion to terminate probation based on a conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree]).
That defendant's appeal was dismissed by the Third Department as moot because her term of probation had expired during the pendency of the appeal (People v Stabler, 153 A.D.3d 1447, 1447 [3d Dept 2017]).
While defendant's past does not hold significant weight, it still matters in the undersigned's view. It is precisely defendant's offending conduct that put him in this position and gives the Court pause in prematurely granting his application. He made the poor choice of selling a considerable amount of a dangerous controlled substance. His reason or excuse for doing so in his probation interview seems questionable. His conduct in spreading the distribution of a narcotic drug potentially endangered the health, safety, and well-being of a small community. The Court is not satisfied that defendant does not pose at least some risk to the public.
All in all, this Court is unconvinced by defendant's submissions. The undersigned does not perceive that he no longer poses a risk to the public. At most, defendant's submissions could arguably support the conclusion that he now presents less of a risk to the public from 2019. The undersigned cannot conclude with certainty that terminating defendant's sentence of probation is not adverse to the protection of the public, as contemplated by CPL 410.90 (3) (a) (iii). The Court thus finds that an early termination of defendant's probationary supervision is adverse to protecting the public (see People v Thatcher, 75 Misc.3d 1219[A] at *2-3).
Finally, notwithstanding defendant's compliance with his probationary conditions, the undersigned remains "mindful of the finality" of terminating probation (People v Ulerie, 2007 NY Slip Op 34155 at *7 ["once a court terminates probation, the court lacks jurisdiction to resentence a defendant should he or she commit another crime or violate any condition previously imposed by the court"]). Stated differently, "[o]nce a sentence of probation is terminated, the sentence effectively expires[,] and the court is without authority to impose any other sentence" (People v John P., Jr., 294 A.D.2d 951, 952 [4th Dept 2002] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v A.L., 78 Misc.3d 1239[A], *2 [Sup Ct, New York County 2023]). Prematurely ending probation at this juncture would prevent the Court from making any other orders in monitoring defendant should he commit a future crime or violation. The Court expects, and hopes, that defendant will successfully complete the remainder of his probationary term without issue.
III. Conclusion
Given the nature of the violative conduct, the seriousness of defendant's offense, and the potential risks associated with removing him from probation's supervision, the Court cannot definitively conclude that the protection of the public would not be adversely impacted by granting his application. Completing his probation will ensure defendant's continued compliance and protect the public. Therefore, defendant's motion for an early termination of his sentence of probation is denied in all respects (see People v A.L., 78 Misc.3d 1239[A] at *2; People v Weitz, 37 Misc.3d 445, 446-460 [Sup Ct, New York County 2012]; People v Thatcher, 75 Misc.3d 1219[A] at *2-3; People v Muro, 2003 NY Slip Op 51114[U] at *2).
Any other relief not expressly addressed herein is likewise denied. Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the motion of defendant JOSE L. MANZUETA, made pursuant to CPL 410.90 (3), requesting an early termination of his sentence of probation, is DENIED.
This constitutes the final opinion, decision, and order of this Court.