Opinion
No. 123935.
November 21, 2003.
Leave to Appeal Denied.
No. 123935. This order does not constitute approval of either the determination of the Genesee Circuit Court or the Court of Appeals that under MRE 607 defense counsel was not permitted on direct examination to elicit from a witness testimony concerning her plea agreement. Rather, MRE 607 states, "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness." Accordingly, defense counsel should have been allowed on direct examination to elicit from the witness testimony concerning her plea agreement because such testimony was relevant to her credibility. Further, the Court of Appeals panel's discussion of the federal RICO statute, 18 USC 1961 et seq., and burdens of proof thereunder, have no relevance to MCL 750.159(i)(1). Moreover, the panel's inclusion of a discussion of the federal statute, even as purported "legislative history" of our statute, is contrary to our canons of statutory construction. Where, as here, the statute is unambiguous, the appellate court must assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the statute must be enforced as written. Stated differently, a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent. People v. Phillips, 469 Mich 390 (2003); Gilbert v. Second Injury Fund, 463 Mich 866 (2000); People v. Davis, 468 Mich 77 (2003); Dan De Farms, Inc v. Sterling Farm Supply, Inc, 465 Mich 872 (2001); DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394 (2001); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675 (2001); State Farm Fire Cas Co v. Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142 (2003). Consequently, future courts and parties are well-advised to look to the expressly defined terms of our statute rather than to the federal RICO statute for guidance. Reported below: 256 Mich App 212.
CAVANAGH, J. I would deny leave to appeal without further comment.
I concur in the denial because I am not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
I would deny leave to appeal. Also, I agree that on direct examination defense counsel should have been allowed to elicit from the witness testimony concerning her plea agreement because it was relevant to her credibility. However, I disagree that the Court of Appeals discussion of the federal RICO statute has no relevance in this case. It was appropriate for the panel to apply Michigan's statutory definitions of "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity," and to consider the federal statute for guidance on how the evidence was relevant. People v. Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 219-220 (2003).
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 USC 1961 et seq.