Opinion
B294686
07-30-2021
BALUBHAI PATEL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JULIE A. SU, as Labor Commissioner, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser and Frank A. Weiser for Plaintiffs and Appellants Balubhai Patel, DTWO & E Inc. and Stuart Union LLC. Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and Casey Raymond for Defendants and Respondents Department of Industrial Relations, Julie A. Su and Martha Huerta. Law Office of Eugene Lee and Eugene D. Lee for Defendant and Respondent Manuel Chavez.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC681074, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser and Frank A. Weiser for Plaintiffs and Appellants Balubhai Patel, DTWO & E Inc. and Stuart Union LLC.
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and Casey Raymond for Defendants and Respondents Department of Industrial Relations, Julie A. Su and Martha Huerta.
Law Office of Eugene Lee and Eugene D. Lee for Defendant and Respondent Manuel Chavez.
ROTHSCHILD, P.J.
Plaintiffs and appellants Balubhai Patel, DTWO & E Inc., and Stuart Union LLC (collectively, plaintiffs) are the losing parties in an administrative action for unpaid wages brought by their former employee, defendant and respondent Manuel Chavez. Rather than appeal the Labor Commissioner's adverse decision under the procedures established in the Labor Code, plaintiffs filed a suit under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (section 1983) alleging that defendants and respondents Julie Su (then Labor Commissioner), Martha Huerta (the hearing officer who made the adverse ruling), and the Labor Commissioner's Office violated plaintiffs' civil rights by deciding the administrative action in favor of Chavez. Plaintiffs also petitioned for a writ of mandate, asking the court to set aside the Labor Commissioner's order and hold a trial de novo. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer, finding that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by presenting their claim to the government prior to filing suit, and that plaintiffs were not eligible for a writ of mandate because they had an adequate remedy at law. We affirm. The operative complaint does not state a cause of action under civil rights law, and contrary to plaintiffs' claims, their petition for a writ of mandate was not a valid notice of appeal of the Labor Commissioner's decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2015, Chavez filed a complaint in the Labor Commissioner's Office against plaintiffs. Chavez had worked since 2002 as a property manager at a building plaintiffs owned, and he alleged that plaintiffs had paid him less than the minimum wage and had failed to provide for meal and rest periods as required by law.
DTWO & E owned the property from 2002 to 2015, and Patel owned DTWO & E and supervised Chavez. Stuart Union owned the property beginning in 2015.
On September 26, 2017, Huerta, acting as hearing officer on behalf of the Labor Commissioner, issued an order, decision or award (ODA) requiring Stuart Union to pay Chavez $33, 348.80, and requiring DTWO & E and Patel to pay Chavez $202, 294.10. In both instances, the award consisted of amounts for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, interest, and penalties.
The ODA included a notice stating that “Labor Code section 98.2[, subdivision] (b) requires that when an employer files an appeal of an order, decision or award of the Labor Commissioner, the employer shall post a bond or undertaking with the court in the amount of the ODA and the employer shall provide written notice to the other parties and the Labor Commissioner of the undertaking.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Exactly one month later, on October 26, 2017, plaintiffs filed suit in the trial court against Chavez, Huerta, Su, and the Labor Commission. The complaint, as amended, alleged causes of action for violations of their federal civil rights under sections 1981, 1982 and 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (sections 1981, 1982, and 1983). The complaint also alleged inverse condemnation and included a petition for a writ of mandate asking the court to vacate and reverse the ODA. Plaintiffs claimed that the requirement under Labor Code section 98.2 to post a bond or undertaking in order to challenge the Labor Commissioner's decision violated their First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. They also claimed that Chavez gave false testimony, that Huerta made errors in finding the facts and interpreting the law, and that defendants violated their civil rights by discriminating against them as Asian-Americans.
At the same time that they filed the complaint, plaintiffs filed a notice of intent to post a bond or undertaking pursuant to Labor Code section 98.2. Plaintiffs stated that they made the posting “under protest.” The next day, insurance companies representing plaintiffs posted bonds in the amount of the award to Chavez.
Chavez filed a special motion to strike the complaint as it pertained to him under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). The trial court granted the motion, and we affirmed. (See Patel v. Chavez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 484.) While the anti-SLAPP motion was pending, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On September 13, 2018, the trial granted Chavez's new anti-SLAPP motion to strike the amended complaint. At the same time, the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend brought by the remaining defendants on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the requirements of Government Code sections 911.2 and 915 pertaining to filing a claim for damages against the state government.
On November 13, 2018, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer. The trial court later entered judgment in favor of defendants.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is interlocutory and therefore not appealable. (Vibert v. Berger (1966) 64 Cal.2d 65, 67 (Vibert).) We agree with them, however, that we must construe their notice of appeal liberally and deem it to have been an appeal from the subsequent judgment. (See id. at pp. 67-68.)
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend de novo. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1242.) To the extent plaintiffs' claims are based on state law, this means “determin[ing] whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory.” (Ibid.) In this case, however, plaintiffs have pleaded most of their claims under federal civil rights law. As to these claims, we apply a slightly different federal standard of review of a grant of a motion to dismiss. (Rubin v. Padilla (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1144.) “Under that standard, ‘dismissal is proper only where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle him to relief.”' [Citation.] Either way, we ‘ “must assume the truth of the complaint's properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. [Citation.]... In addition, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and read it in context.”' ” (Ibid.)
B. The Petition for a Writ of Mandate Was Not a Notice of Appeal
We begin with a discussion of the second cause of action, a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a trial de novo of the Labor Commission decision. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to this claim because “[a] writ of mandamus... only issues when there otherwise is no speedy and adequate remedy at law.” (County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 of Sacramento County (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 654, 672; accord, Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that they had an adequate remedy at law, in the form of an appeal under Labor Code section 98.2.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer because, in their view, the petition for a writ of mandate was a notice of appeal under Labor Code section 98.2. They argue that we must remand the case for a trial de novo pursuant to that statute. We disagree.
Plaintiffs begin with the principle that “notice[s] of appeal must be liberally construed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) They contend that their petition for a writ of mandate gave Chavez notice of their intent to challenge the Labor Commissioner's decision. The complaint stated that “[t]his writ of mandate is filed, among other authority and limited therein, pursuant to the California Labor Code and California Labor Code [s]ection[ ] 98.2.” Labor Code section 98.2 sets out the procedures for appeals of the Labor Commissioner's decisions. Plaintiffs also note that they demanded “a de novo hearing on this matter, ” the same relief provided in appeals under Labor Code section 98.2. According to plaintiffs, these factors together were sufficient to require treating their petition as a notice of appeal under Labor Code section 98.2.
Strictly speaking, title eight of the California Rules of Court does not apply to appeals to the trial court from administrative decisions, but “[h]istorically, the courts have not hesitated to apply the rules governing conventional appeals to appeals in which a trial de novo is required.” (Pressler v. Donald L. Bren Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 831, 836 (Pressler).)
We are not persuaded. The rule of liberal construction of notices of appeal typically applies where the appellant has explicitly stated his intent to appeal a trial court's decision, but either fails to specify the judgment appealed from, or purports to appeal from the wrong judgment. For example, in In re Christopher A. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1154, a case in which the trial court declared a child free from parental custody, the child's father wrote a letter to the court stating, “ ‘I want to file a [sic] appeal about that last hearing.' ” (Id. at p. 1158.) The court held that this was a sufficiently clear statement to constitute a valid notice of appeal. (Id. at p. 1161.) Similarly, where an appellant appeals from a nonappealable order such as an order sustaining a demurrer, courts routinely deem the notice to have been a valid appeal from the judgment entered thereafter, so long as “no prejudice would accrue to the respondent.” (Vibert, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 68.)
To interpret a petition for a writ of mandate as a notice of appeal would require going further than any case we are aware of in interpreting a document as a notice of appeal. We decline to do so in this case because plaintiffs' decision to file their complaint rather than a notice of appeal has prejudiced Chavez by significantly delaying the case. Labor Code section 98.2 is designed to provide speedy resolution of disputes. As our Supreme Court explained, “Public policy has long favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.' [Citation.] ‘[W]ages are not ordinary debts.... [B]ecause of the economic position of the average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages for the necessities of life for himself and his family, it is essential to the public welfare that he receive his pay' promptly. [Citation.] Requiring strict adherence to the time requirement governing appeals from decisions of the Labor Commissioner can only help to assure the achievement of this overriding goal.” (Pressler, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 837.)
As of the date this opinion is filed, nearly four years have passed since Huerta issued the ODA in favor of Chavez on September 26, 2017. Chavez has been dismissed from the case following his successful anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiffs ask us to remand the case to the trial court and drag Chavez back into litigation in a trial de novo. This is the same result plaintiffs could have achieved years ago if they had simply filed a straightforward appeal under Labor Code section 98.2. To order a trial de novo now would reward plaintiffs for filing a meritless civil rights claim, frustrating the policy of speedy payment of wages in cases before the Labor Commissioner.
The law gives plaintiffs a great deal of latitude in their pleadings: “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) Under this rule, a court may excuse a plaintiff with a valid cause of action for trespass who sues under a theory of conversion (see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1565-1566), or who fails to prove breach of contract but establishes evidence under theories of quasi-contract and tort (see Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932, 936-940). In cases like these, the label of the cause of action does not affect the trial of the case, and the defendant is not prejudiced. That is not the case here because the multi-year delay in the resolution of the case does prejudice Chavez, and it would not provide “substantial justice between the parties” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452) to construe plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate as a notice of appeal.
C. Civil Rights Claims for Damages
In addition to their petition for a writ of mandate, plaintiffs alleged violations of federal civil rights laws under sections 1981, 1982, and 1983. In their demurrer to these causes of action, defendants alleged that plaintiffs “fail to state a cause of action upon which relief for damages can be granted because [they] have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by first filing a claim with the State Board of Control, as required by Government Code section 915.” The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on this basis.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff's failure to present a claim against the state government to the Department of General Services prior to filing suit would indeed be fatal. (See Gov. Code, § 915, subd. (a).) Compliance with this requirement is “a procedural condition precedent; that is to say, the timely filing of a written claim with the proper officer or body is an element of a valid cause of action against a public entity.” (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 374; accord, Gov. Code, § 945.4.) Plaintiffs did not allege that they complied with these requirements.
We agree with plaintiffs, however, that this was not a valid basis for sustaining the demurrer as to their civil rights claims. Notice-of-claim statutes such as Government Code section 915 are preempted in cases where a plaintiff seeks relief under the Civil Rights Act in state court. (See Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 153.) As our Supreme Court has explained, “the California remedy of recourse to the Tort Claims Act need not be first sought before a plaintiff is free to invoke the Civil Rights Act” by filing suit in state court under section 1983. (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842.)
Nevertheless, this is not the end of our inquiry. “If [an] appealed judgment or order is correct on any theory, then it must be affirmed regardless of the trial court's reasoning, whether such basis was actually invoked.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201; accord, Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 330 [“it is judicial action, and not judicial reasoning or argument, which is the subject of review; and, if the former be correct, we are not concerned with the faults of the latter”].) This principle is particularly apt where we are addressing a purely legal question of a demurrer, which we review de novo in any event. (See City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 870.) It would be a waste of judicial resources to reverse the trial court where the record shows as a matter of law that the trial court's judgment was correct, albeit on a theory the parties did not address below.
For this reason, we requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether the complaint fails to state a claim because the defendants are absolutely immune for their alleged misconduct under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. We conclude that the answer to that question is yes, and on that basis, we affirm the trial court's decision sustaining the demurrer as to the civil rights causes of action to the extent that they seek damages.
Judicial immunity “bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be.” (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851, fn. omitted (Howard).) An extension of this doctrine, known as quasi-judicial immunity, “extend[s] absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” (Id. at pp. 852-853.) The doctrine applies in cases brought under section 1983, and it affords protection to hearing officers acting in a judicial function in administrative proceedings. (See Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 665, 670-671.)
Plaintiffs' allegations fall squarely within the realm of quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiffs allege that “the ODA was rendered with perjured testimony, illegally applied... Labor Code [s]ection 558.1 retroactively to Patel, accepted [Chavez's] testimony and claims even though he produced false personal identification, and si[m]ilarly situated parties are treated differently before the Labor Commissioner and Huert[a].” In other words, plaintiffs allege that Huerta decided the case wrongly, making incorrect factual findings, misapplying the law, and treating plaintiffs differently than other similarly situated parties. Quasi-judicial immunity applies because Huerta's actions “relat[ed] to a function normally performed by a judge.” (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 851, fn. 3.) This analysis applies to plaintiffs' allegations of racial discrimination as well as to their section 1983 claim. All of the allegations in the complaint that could be construed as racial discrimination were actions Huerta took in performing the functions of a judge.
D. Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
In their supplemental briefing, plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to their claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. In Pulliam v. Allen (1984) 466 U.S. 522, the United States Supreme Court held that judicial immunity does not bar plaintiffs from seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief in cases brought under the Civil Rights Act. (Id. at pp. 541-542.) In 1996, Congress overruled the Court in part by amending section 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” (Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 (Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c) (Oct. 19, 1996) 110 Stat. 3847, 3853).) Plaintiffs argue that because Congress did not amend sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act in the same way, injunctive and declaratory relief are still available for its claims under those sections. They argue further that, although section 1983 provides judicial immunity from claims of injunctive relief, it does not provide quasi-judicial immunity to non-judges acting in a judicial capacity. We are not aware of any California court cases addressing the latter question. Courts in other jurisdictions have reached different conclusions, with some holding that section 1983 provides quasi-judicial immunity against injunctive claims (see Roth v. King (D.C. Cir. 2006) 449 F.3d 1272, 1286-1287), and others disagreeing (see Simmons v. Fabian (Minn.Ct.App. 2007) 743 N.W.2d 281, 285).
We need not decide this question because even if we assume plaintiffs are correct, their complaint does not state a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief. The references to injunctive and declaratory relief in plaintiffs' complaint are minimal. In the body of each of their causes of action for civil rights violations, plaintiffs assert “that they are also entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief against Su and Huert[a], ” but they do not explain the basis for this claim, nor do they request any specific relief. We requested supplemental briefing regarding whether plaintiffs had stated a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, and if not, whether they could amend their complaint to state a claim. In their letter brief, plaintiffs claim that they are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy various violations of their constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In light of these violations, plaintiffs contend that the ODA must “be declared null and void as a matter of law and enjoined under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
In other words, the declaratory and injunctive relief plaintiffs seek is a reversal of the ODA. But neither declaratory nor injunctive relief is available for that purpose. A party may seek declaratory relief to challenge a rule, regulation, or a generally applicable standard of an administrative agency, but “an action for declaratory relief does not lie to review an administrative decision.” (Californians for Native Salmon etc. Assn. v. Department of Forestry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1419, 1428.) Similarly, it is hornbook law that “[a] party seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate remedy at law.” (Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1564; accord, 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Provisional Remedies, § 294.) In this case, plaintiffs had a remedy at law in the form of an appeal under Labor Code section 98.2. They complain that the requirement that they post a bond made it difficult for them to file such an appeal, but this requirement does not violate due process because an employer who is indigent may obtain a waiver of the requirement. (See Williams v. Freedomcard, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 609, 614; Burkes v. Robertson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 334, 343.)
It is not much of an exaggeration to say that all of plaintiffs' efforts in this case have been devoted to circumventing the requirements for filing an appeal under Labor Code section 98.2. Their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are no more successful than their other efforts.
E. Inverse Condemnation
The final cause of action in plaintiffs' complaint is for inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' adverse actions constitute a wrongful taking in violation of article I, section 19 of the California Constitution. The trial court dismissed the claim because plaintiffs failed to follow the notice of claim requirement, but Government Code section 905.1 provides that inverse condemnation claims are not subject to the notice of claim requirements.
Nevertheless, this cause of action also fails because a claim of inverse condemnation does not lie for the kind of conduct alleged here. As the Supreme Court explained in Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, “an ‘inverse condemnation' action may be pursued when the state or other public entity improperly has taken private property for public use without following the requisite condemnation procedures-as when the state, in constructing a public project, occupies land that it has not taken by eminent domain, or when the state takes other action that effectively circumvents the constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid before private property is taken for public use.” (Id. at p. 377.) Courts have been reluctant to extend the application of the doctrine outside this context, however. Inverse condemnation “never was intended, and never has been interpreted, to impose a constitutional obligation upon the government to pay ‘just compensation' whenever a governmental employee commits an act that causes loss of private property.” (Id. at p. 378.) We will not now extend the doctrine radically to encompass an adverse decision of an administrative official after a hearing in which plaintiffs had an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses against them.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
We concur: CHANEY, J. CRANDALL, J.[*]
[*]Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.