Opinion
B307888 B307891
01-27-2022
MANUEL CHAVEZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STUART UNION LLC, Defendant and Appellant. MANUEL CHAVEZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BALUBHAI PATEL et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Frank A. Weiser for Defendant and Appellant Stuart Union LLC (case No. B307888) and for Defendants and Appellants Balubhai Patel and DTWO&E, Inc. (case No. B307891). Law Office Eugene Lee and Eugene D. Lee for Plaintiff and Respondent Manuel Chavez (case Nos. B307888 and B307891).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County; Nos. 20STCP02510, 20STCP02511 Clerk's Entries of Judgment. Affirmed (case No. B307888 and case No. B307891).
Frank A. Weiser for Defendant and Appellant Stuart Union LLC (case No. B307888) and for Defendants and Appellants Balubhai Patel and DTWO&E, Inc. (case No. B307891).
Law Office Eugene Lee and Eugene D. Lee for Plaintiff and Respondent Manuel Chavez (case Nos. B307888 and B307891).
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
Appellants Balubhai Patel, DTWO&E, Inc., and Stuart Union LLC challenge two judgments of the superior court in connection with a wage claim their former employee, respondent Manuel Chavez, filed against them with the California Labor Board. We affirm.
The Labor Commissioner resolved Chavez's claims in his favor and issued an order awarding him approximately $235,000 in unpaid wages, penalties, and interest. Pursuant to Labor Code section 98.2, appellants could have, "[w]ithin 10 days after service of notice of . . . [the] award . . . [sought] review by filing an appeal to the superior court, where the appeal shall be heard de novo." (Lab. Code, § 98.2, subd. (a).) Appellants did not file such a notice of appeal. Instead, appellants sued Chavez and two Labor Commission officials, alleging a federal civil rights cause of action and seeking $10 million in damages. Appellants' complaint also contained a petition for a writ of mandate "vacating and reversing the [Labor Commissioner's decision]." The trial court dismissed the lawsuit against Chavez under the anti-SLAPP statute, and we affirmed that dismissal on appeal. (Patel v. Chavez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 484, rehg. den. May 15, 2020, review den. Aug. 12, 2020, cert. den. (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1735.) The trial court later dismissed the lawsuit against the remaining defendants following their successful demurrer, a decision we also affirmed. Crucially, in doing so, we rejected appellants' argument that their request for a writ of mandate was actually a section 98.2 notice of appeal that would entitle appellants to a trial de novo before the superior court. (Patel v. Su (Jul. 30, 2021, B294686) [nonpub. opn.], at p. 1, rehg. den. Aug. 26, 2021, review den. Nov. 17, 2021 ["contrary to plaintiffs' claims, their petition for a writ of mandate was not a valid notice of appeal of the Labor Commissioner's decision"].)
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references and citations are to the Labor Code.
It bears mention that appellants argued their writ cause of action was a section 98.2 appeal in the anti-SLAPP appeal as well. In an unpublished portion of our decision in that appeal, we held that "even if the second cause of action were an appeal from an administrative award-and we do not conclude that it is-it still is not a legally viable claim against Chavez," the only defendant at issue in the anti-SLAPP appeal, because Chavez cannot" 'vacat[e] and revers[e] the [Labor Commissioner's decision], '" the relief Patel sought through that cause of action. (Patel v. Chavez (Apr. 30, 2020, B291695) [nonpub. opn.], at p. 17.) We did not reach the issue of whether the cause of action could be a section 98.2 notice of appeal.
Where, as here, no timely section 98.2 notice of appeal from a Labor Commissioner's decision is filed, that decision is "deemed the final order" from the proceedings, triggering the Labor Commissioner's obligation under section 98.2, subdivision (e) to "file . . . a certified copy of the final order with the clerk of the superior court of the appropriate county." (§ 98.2, subd. (e).) That code section further requires that "[j]udgment shall be entered immediately by the court clerk in conformity [with the order the Labor Commissioner files with the court]." (Ibid.) Pursuant to these provisions, the Labor Commissioner filed its decisions in this matter with the trial court, and the clerk entered judgments against appellants "in conformity therewith." (Ibid.)
The instant appeal challenges these judgments. Appellants argue that the superior court did not provide any notice to them before the clerk entered the challenged judgments, and thus denied appellants due process. But appellants have not cited any cases nor provided any cogent argument why notice is required before a clerk, acting pursuant to section 98.2, subdivision (e), may enter a judgment executing an unappealed and unappealable Labor Commission decision. At that point in the process for adjudicating claims submitted to the Labor Commission, appellants had already received all the due process to which they were entitled via the Labor Commission hearing and the opportunity-even if they did not avail themselves of it- to properly appeal the Labor Commissioner's decision and receive a trial de novo in the superior court. (See Palagin v. Paniagua Construction, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 124, 138 (Palagin) [the administrative hearing before the Labor Commission provides an employer "a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the employee's wage claim" such that a trial de novo is not necessary to satisfy due process].) Appellants do not contend that they were denied proper notice of the Labor Commission hearing or the resulting award-nor could they, as the award formed the basis for appellants' separate failed civil rights action and writ petition, as well as two related (and unsuccessful) appeals. The clerk's entries of judgment were thus ministerial acts, formalizing a final administrative award of which appellants were well aware and have been actively challenging for years.
Nor do appellants challenge the constitutionality of section 98.2 itself.
Notice is essential to due process in that it facilitates meaningful participation in proceedings. The notice required by due process is notice "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [Citations.] . . . [Citations.] But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the constitutional requirements are satisfied." (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314-315.) Appellants have participated in the proceedings to the extent permitted under the applicable statutory scheme. (See Palagin, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 138.) By the time the clerk performed the ministerial act of entering judgments consistent with the Labor Commissioner's award-which, again, appellants had chosen not to challenge through the proper channels-there was nothing left to participate in. Appellants have cited no basis on which they might have any further right to challenge the clerk's entries of judgment. This is one of the many ways in which the notice cases cited by appellants are entirely inapposite; in all of those cases, notice of the action at issue was necessary so that the noticed individual could participate in or challenge the noticed action. (See, e.g., Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 86 [notice of lawsuit resulting in default judgment against appellant]; Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams (1983) 462 U.S. 791, 794-795 [notice of tax sale of appellant's property].) At the time the clerk entered the judgments, there was nothing that appellants could participate in, nor any procedural vehicles through which they could properly challenge the judgments. Appellants have thus failed to carry their burden of "affirmatively demonstrate[ing] error." (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685.)
Appellants next argue that by entering the challenged judgments, the trial court violated section 98.2. They note that, at the time the judgments were entered, the California Supreme Court had not yet denied appellants' petition seeking review of the decision in which we concluded appellants' writ of mandate request was not a section 98.2 appeal. According to appellants, until the high court affirmed or declined to review our conclusion in this regard, the Labor Commissioner's award could not be deemed unappealed under section 98.2, subdivision (d), and thus the clerk's entries of judgment pursuant to section 98.2, subdivision (e) were premature and improper. We see numerous problems with this argument, but need not consider them further, because appellants' petition for review has since been denied, a fact of which we may properly take judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) Thus, even if appellants were correct that the court erred in entering the judgments before their petition for review was denied-and we do not hold that it did-appellants have not shown that they suffered any prejudice from such hypothetical error.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed in case Nos. B307888 and B307891.
Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal in case Nos. B307888 and B307891.
We concur: CHANEY, J. CRANDALL, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.