Opinion
No. HHB CV 07-5005383-S
August 14, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case is an action by the plaintiff, Northeastern Clearing, Inc., to foreclose on a mechanic's lien that it filed on the Southington land records against property owned by the defendant, Gina Senese, located on Route 10 in Southington, CT. The plaintiff allegedly performed tree clearing and site work on the property, a six-acre lot, under contract with the defendant Applegate Estates, LLC. Plaintiff alleges it is owed $75,600.00 plus interest, costs and attorneys fees. Presently before the court is the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that judgment should enter in their favor because an error in the lien — concerning the recitation of the date work commenced — renders the lien invalid. For the following reasons, the court finds the lien to be valid. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
I
"[T]he standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 619, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). Where, however, the law is against the moving party, the motion must be denied and the case should proceed to trial. See Ranks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 326, 885 A.2d 743 (2005).
II
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants supply the court with an affidavit and exhibits, including a copy of the mechanic's lien in issue. The lien document recites that it was filed to secure indebtedness in the amount of $75,600.00 with interest "for materials and services furnished in the excavation, utility and general site work at the above-described premises commencing June 23, 2005 and completed on July 27, 2006." (Emphasis added.) Defendants also supplied the court with a brief filed in earlier proceedings in this case by the plaintiff admitting that the commencement of work date recited in the lien is incorrect. In that brief, plaintiff admits that the date recited in the lien is actually the date of an invoice for work done; that the contract was executed on May 31, 2005, and that "[w]ork for Phase I was actually completed at the site during the weeks of June 6 and June 13 . . ." Plaintiff's Brief, § III(c). Thus, the commencement date recited in the lien was incorrect. The commencement date remains unclear, but it was at least a week or two earlier than that written in the lien. Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that it made a mistake in reciting the date. It argues, however, that the defect does not render the lien invalid. The court agrees with the plaintiff, due to the particular circumstances in evidence in this case.
Earlier in the case, the defendants applied to have the lien discharged, inter alia, for the same reason advanced in the present Motion for Summary Judgment: the defective commencement date. The court that heard that application denied the request to discharge the lien, but did not decide the issue concerning the defective commencement date in its decision. Also, the burdens and standards in an application for discharge of a mechanics lien are different from those in a Motion for Summary Judgment in a foreclosure action. See General Statutes § 49-35b. Therefore, the decision on the application has no preclusive effect on the instant proceedings. See Rawling v. City of New Haven, 206 Conn. 100, 110-11, 537 A.2d 439 (1988).
Under the Connecticut mechanic's lien statutes, a contractor can put a lien on real estate for claims of more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in making repairs or improvements to the real estate affected. General Statutes § 49-33. The lien can be foreclosed on in the same manner as a mortgage. General Statutes § 43-33(i). It is an unusually powerful lien because it generally takes effect from the date of commencement of the services, rather than from the date it was filed, and thus it may take precedence over even later filed encumbrances, provided that it is filed within ninety days after the work is finished, and an action is commenced to foreclose on it within one year of filing. General Statutes §§ 49-33(b); 49-34 and 49-39. If it is not foreclosed, it becomes invalid and it is discharged as a matter of law. General Statutes § 49-39. Moreover, the statutes specially require that certain information be set forth in the lien, or it is not valid:
A mechanic's lien is not valid unless the person performing the services or furnishing the materials (1) within ninety days after he has ceased to do so, lodges with the town clerk of the town in which the building, lot or plot of land is situated a certificate in writing, which shall be recorded by the town clerk with deeds of land, (A) describing the premises, the amount claimed as a lien thereon, the name or names of the person against whom the lien is being filed and the date of the commencement of the performance of services or funrishing of materials, (B) stating that the amount claimed is justly due, as nearly as the same can be ascertained, and (C) subscribed and sworn to by the claimant, and (2) not later than thirty days after lodging the certificate, serves a true and attested copy of the certificate upon the owner of the building, lot or plot of land in the same manner as is provided for the service of the notice in section 49-35.
General Statues § 49-34 (emphasis added).
Despite the warning in the statute threatening invalidity absent compliance with the requirements of the statute, our Appellate Courts have not always demanded strict compliance, and have used an equitable test instead, particularly in cases of mistake:
It is well established that a mechanic's lien "will not be valid unless the person having such claim shall, within a stated time, lodge with the town clerk of the town in which said building is situated a certificate in writing, describing the premises, the amount claimed as a lien thereon, and the date of the commencement of the services or the furnishing of materials. General Statutes §§ 4135, 4136." Tramonte v. Wilens, 89 Conn. 520, 523, 94 A. 978 (1915). We also have repeatedly stated, however, that, although a mechanic's lien is in derogation of the common law, we do not compel a strict construction of its requirements. Wilcox v. Woodruff, 61 Conn. 578, 585, 24 A. 1056 (1891). "We have long endorsed a policy favoring liberal construction of claimed inadequacies in certificates of mechanic's liens in order to achieve the remedial purposes of the mechanic's lien statutes." J.C. Penney Properties, Inc. v. Peter M. Santella Co., 210 Conn. 511, 514, 555 A.2d 990 (1989). We recognize that the remedial purpose of mechanic's lien law is "to furnish security for a contractor's labor and materials" and that this beneficent purpose requires "a generous construction." Seaman v. Climate Control Corp., 181 Conn. 592, 597, 436 A.2d 271 (1980); see J.C. Penney Properties, Inc. v. Peter M. Santella Co., supra, 210 Conn. at 514, 555 A.2d 990 (generous construction requires only reasonable compliance with statutory provisions).
"In accordance with this policy, our courts have been liberal in validating liens despite claimed errors on the face of the lien certificate where the mistake was made in good faith and no resulting prejudice was claimed. See, e.g., H S Torrington Associates v. Lutz Engineering Co., [ 185 Conn. 549, 555-56, 441 A.2d 171 (1981)] (copy of certificate served on owner by a subcontractor failed to state its intent to file a lien); Morici v. Jarvie, 137 Conn. 97, 102, 75 A.2d 47 (1950) (misstatement of amount due); Pierce, Butler Pierce Mfg. Corporation v. Enders, 118 Conn. 610, 615, 174 A. 169 (1934) (subcontractor mislabeled as contractor and agent); Burque v. Naugatuck Lumber Co., 113 Conn. 350, 353, 155 A. 414 (1931) (defect in description); Peck v. Brush, 89 Conn. 554, 556-57, 94 A. 981 (1915) (inclusion of extra land in certificate); Westland v. Goodman, 47 Conn. 83, 86 (1879) (erroneous date of completion of work)." J.C. Penney Properties, Inc. v. Peter M. Santella Co., supra, 210 Conn. at 515, 555 A.2d 990; see also Halsted Harmount Co. v. Arick, 76 Conn. 382, 387, 56 A. 628 (1904); Nichols v. Culver, 51 Conn. 177, 180 (1883); Marston v. Kenyon, 44 Conn. 349, 356 (1877). As we have reasoned many times, "we do not think a court of equity can be called upon to declare [a] lien utterly void upon the motion of persons who have lost nothing by [the] mistake. Marston v. Kenyon, supra, at 356.
Therefore, "[w]here the misstatement of the claim is intentional, that is, where the statement of the claim is intentionally false, or where it is fraudulent, the lien will be void; but where it is the result of a mistake, the misstatement of the claim will not invalidate the lien. We apprehend that it would be impossible to differentiate between the mistake in the statement of the claim and the mistake in the description of the property [**817] claimed to be covered by the lien." Tramonte v. Wilens, supra, 89 Conn, at 524, 94 A. 978; see also Rose v. Persse Brooks Paper Works, 29 Conn. 256, 266 (1860) (mistake as to claim will be treated like mistake as to description of property). Where, however, there has been "no attempt to give an accurate and true description, then . . . the certificate ought to be held void, as no better than a total omission to attempt to comply with its provisions." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tramonte v. Wilens, supra, 89 Conn. at 525, 94 A. 978.
First Constitution Bank v. Harbor Village, L.P., 230 Conn. 807, 815-17 (1994).
Employing these equitable tests, the court finds that the defendants have presented no evidence of intentional misrepresentation by the plaintiff in mistakenly reciting the date of commencement of services. Also, there is no persuasive evidence of prejudice to the defendants by plaintiff's use of the older date in the lien. To the contrary, this appears to be a good faith mistake by the plaintiff in stating the date of the commencement of services. Also, this is not a case where the plaintiff has completely failed to supply a commencement date. It did supply a commencement date. There was a mistake in the date only. Thus, the equities tip in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, there is no reason to invalidate the lien.
Nevertheless, defendants point out that a seemingly contrary decision on similar facts was reached by a different Superior Court Judge in the case of Systematics, Inc. v. Forge Square Associates, L.P., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-88-525662 (February 17, 1995, Spallone, J.). In that case, the court held that a mechanic's lien with an incorrect commencement date was invalid in a priority fight between a mechanic's lien holder and a mortgage holder that filed its deed earlier. That case is distinguishable. In that case, the court was resolving priority issues. The instant case is resolving validity issues. Moreover, that case did not cite or employ the controlling equity tests prescribed by our Supreme Court in First Constitution Bank v. Harbor Village, L.P. Therefore, it is not germane to the resolution of those tests. For these reasons, the court finds the decision in the Systematics case to be inapposite.
III
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds the mechanic's lien in issue in this case to be valid, and it denies the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment accordingly.