Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-CV-00038
07-25-2022
MIGUEL MOLINA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. K. KAUFFMAN, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are partial motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Kevin Kauffman, Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon; Jill Spyker, Deputy Superintendent for Decentralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; Scott Walters, former Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; G. Ralston, Unit Manager of certain housing units (B and C Blocks) at SCI-Huntingdon; John E. Wetzel, Secretary of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Tabb Bickell, Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations for the Department of Corrections (“DOC”); and Erin Brown, Director of the Office of Population Management (“OPM”) of the DOC (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 111; Doc. 115; Doc. 118; Doc. 120). Additionally, before the Court are motions for preliminary injunction filed by pro se prisoner-Plaintiffs Vann L. Bailey, Angel Irizarry, Alexis Maldanado, and Miguel Molina. (Doc. 117; Doc. 122; Doc. 125; Doc. 153). On January 8, 2021, pro se-prisoner Plaintiffs Vann L. Bailey, Jason Cisne.Angel Irizarry, Alexis Maldanado, and Miguel Molina (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated this civil rights action by filing a complaint seeking the implementation of various measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and to address the movement and housing of inmates, the infrastructure of the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (“SCI-Huntingdon”), and the sanitary conditions of the facility. (Doc. 101; Doc. 104; Doc. 106; Doc. 108).
On February 16, 2022, Cisne filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, informing the Court that matters between Defendants and Cisne have been adjusted, compromised, and settled. (Doc. 169). Therefore, the Court dismissed Cisne's action with prejudice as to Defendants on February 24, 2022. (Doc. 177).
For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that Defendants' partial motions to dismiss be GRANTED (Doc. 111; Doc. 115; Doc. 118; Doc. 120), and that Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction be DENIED. (Doc. 117; Doc. 122; Doc. 125; Doc. 153).
I. Background and Procedural History
On January 8, 2021, Plaintiffs initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants for constitutional violations caused by the deterioration of the SCI-Huntingdon facility and by employee misconduct. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs, through counsel, filed an amended complaint on March 21, 2021, and a motion to certify the class and appoint class counsel on March 29, 2021. (Doc. 35; Doc. 43; Doc. 44). On September 28, 2021, the District Court adopted the undersigned's report and recommendation to deny Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel. (Doc. 67; Doc. 84). On October 1, 2021, the undersigned granted counsel for Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to withdraw as counsel. (Doc. 86; Doc. 88).
On October 19, 2021, the undersigned granted Plaintiffs leave to file individual amended complaints. (Doc. 91; Doc. 100). Plaintiffs filed third amended complaints on the following dates: Irizarry filed a complaint on November 12, 2021 (Doc. 101); Maldanado filed a complaint on November 16, 2021 (Doc. 104); Bailey filed a complaint on November 16, 2021 (Doc. 106); and Molina filed a complaint on November 22, 2021 (Doc. 108). Defendants filed the motion to dismiss Irizarry's complaint on November 23, 2021 (Doc. 111); the motion to dismiss Maldanado's complaint on November 29, 2021 (Doc. 115); the motion to dismiss Bailey's complaint on November 30, 2021 (Doc. 118); and the motion to dismiss Molina's complaint on December 2, 2021 (Doc. 120). On November 29, 2021, Maldanado filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 117). On December 3, 2021, Molina filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 122). On December 6, 2021, Irizarry filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 125).
On March 31, 2022, and June 6, 2022, Maldanado filed notices of change of address, notifying the Court that he has been permanently transferred from SCI-Huntingdon to SCI-Mahanoy in Frackville, Pennsylvania (Doc. 187; Doc. 190). Maldanado's transfer from SCI-Huntingdon to SCI-Mahanoy renders his motion for injunctive relief moot. Once a prisoner who is complaining of his conditions of confinement is transferred from the prison about which he is complaining, the Court cannot grant him meaningful prospective relief because he would not benefit from that relief. Thus, with limited exceptions not at issue here, Maldanado's claims for injunctive relief are moot. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “[a]n inmate's transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims”). As Maldanado is no longer housed at SCI-Huntingdon, it is recommended that his motion for preliminary injunction for relief from his conditions of confinement at that facility are DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc. 117). The undersigned notes that even if Maldanado's motion was not moot, it would fail on the merits for the reasons discussed infra.
On January 18, 2022, Molina filed the “motion for justice and fairness,” requesting the Court to direct Defendants to serve legal documents directly to SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 147). On January 28, 2022, Bailey filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 153). Irizarry and Maldanado filed motions to compel proper service, requesting that the Court direct Defendants serve legal documents directly to SCI-Huntingdon, on February 2, 2022, and February 8, 2022, respectively. (Doc. 159; Doc. 165). On April 14, 2022, the Court denied Molina, Irizarry, and Maldanado's individual motions that sought to compel Defendants to serve all correspondence intended for Plaintiffs directly to SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 147; Doc. 159; Doc. 165; Doc. 188; Doc. 189). On May 12, 2022, Maldanado filed a motion for leave of Court to file a supplemental complaint. (Doc. 190). On June 8, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of the motions to dismiss. (Doc. 196).
Maldanado seeks leave of Court to file a supplemental complaint to join John Rivello as a defendant and assert additional claims under the First and Eighth Amendments. (Doc. 190). In the proposed supplemental complaint, Maldanado sets forth the following claims: (1) On January 27, 2022, Rivello retaliated against Maldanado “by transferring him to another prison;” (2) On February 8, 2022, Ralston retaliated against Maldanado when Ralston “called [Maldanado] ‘Molina's rat' in front of other inmates, fired him from his prison job, and transferred him to another state prison;” and (3) On March 23, 2022, Maldanado was attacked by other inmates as a result of Ralston's deliberate indifference and failure-to-protect. (Doc. 190, at 5-9). For relief, Maldanado seeks declaratory judgment and monetary damages. (Doc. 190, at 9). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) governs the filing of supplemental complaints, and provides that: “On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d). The decision of whether to permit a supplemental pleading rests within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. See e.g.,Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2008); Cureton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 252 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001). Liberally construed, the proposed supplemental complaint does not violate other relevant rules such as Rule 18 and Rule 20 as the pleading sets forth claims that seem to have a connection to Maldanado's existing claims against the named Defendants. However, for the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that Maldanado's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing a single fourth amended complaint. Accordingly, it is recommended that Maldanado's motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint be DENIED. (Doc. 190).
In the interest of judicial economy and the preservation of public resources, Defendants request that the Court stay discovery until after the resolution of Defendants' motions to dismiss. (Doc. 196; Doc. 197, at 4). Defendants argue that a stay of discovery is necessary because the pending motions to dismiss are “potentially dispositive of some of the claims and allegations against these Defendants.” (Doc. 197, at 3-4). For the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motions to dismiss and that Plaintiffs be granted leave to file a single fourth amended complaint curing the deficiencies set forth herein. Thus, it is further recommended that Defendants' motion to stay discovery be DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc. 196).
In the complaints, Plaintiffs aver that the “structures, mechanical systems, and other features of the physical plant at SCI Huntingdon have fallen to disrepair.” (Doc. 101, ¶ 3; Doc. 104, ¶ 3; Doc. 106, ¶ 4; Doc. 108, ¶ 4). Plaintiffs state that, through regular inspections by facility staff and guards, the DOC knows of the prison facility's disrepair, including lack of ventilation, presence of mold and asbestos, lead-based water pipes, and inadequate mechanisms for locking cell doors to prevent rapid evacuation in case of a fire or other emergency. (Doc. 101, ¶ 6; Doc. 104, ¶ 6; Doc. 106, ¶ 5; Doc. 108, ¶ 5). Plaintiffs allege that inmates at SCI-Huntingdon are being exposed at a high rate to the COVID-19 virus due to the facility's lack of proper ventilation and overcrowding. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 147-152; Doc. 104, ¶¶ 147-152). Regarding the facility's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiffs contend that inadequate quarantine protocols, the unavailability of cleaning supplies and masks, cohort size exceeding CDC recommendations, and deficiencies in social distancing protocols have contributed to the spread of the virus. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 46-64; Doc. 104, ¶¶ 46-64). For relief, Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. (Doc. 101, at 29; Doc. 104, at 36-37; Doc. 106, at 21-22; Doc. 108, at 21-23).
The motions been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. (Doc. 111; Doc. 112; Doc. 115; Doc. 116; Doc. 118; Doc. 119; Doc. 120; Doc. 121; Doc. 122; Doc. 123; Doc. 125; Doc. 127; Doc. 130; Doc. 133; Doc. 135; Doc. 138; Doc. 139; Doc. 140; Doc. 149; Doc. 153; Doc. 154; Doc. 158; Doc. 163; Doc. 184; Doc. 186).
A. Summary of DOC's Response to COVID-19
The DOC has provided publicly available information regarding its efforts to mitigate the risk of the transmission of COVID-19. See https://www.cor.pa.gov/Pages/COVID-19.aspx (last accessed May 27, 2022).
The Court may take judicial notice of this information as it is publicly available on a governmental website. See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2017).
In March 2020, the DOC implemented a statewide quarantine of its population which included a halt to all in-person visitation. At first, SCI-Retreat, and now SCI-smithfield, served as the designated reception facility for all new male court commitments and parole violators, allowing for their quarantining and medical screening prior to their transfer to a facility. The DOC also implemented several measures to reduce its population by working with the parole board. Additionally, all individuals entering a facility are screened for flu-like symptoms. No one with a fever over 100 degrees is permitted to enter a facility. Inmates and staff are required to wear masks and are provided with cleaning materials to clean their cells. Correctional Industries continues to produce masks and anti-bacterial soap which is available to inmates. COVID-19 vaccines are available to all inmates and staff. As of August 4, 2021, for the protection of the unvaccinated portion of the SCI-Huntingdon's inmate population, they were moved to a single housing unit. See https://www.cor.pa.gov/Documents/SCI%20COVID%20Communications/HUN-Fireside-Chat-8-4-21.pdf (last visited May 27, 2022). Leadership at each facility, including SCI-Huntingdon, continue to frequently update inmates “on the latest in the ever-changing COVID-19 landscape.” See https://www.cor.pa.gov/Pages/COVID-19-SCI-Messages.aspx (last visited May 27, 2022).
As of May 27, 2022, SCI-Huntingdon houses 1,489 inmates. There are presently no active reported inmate cases of COVID-19 at the facility. Cumulatively, the institution has had 425 inmates test positive for COVID-19. A total of 9 SCI-Huntingdon inmates have died from COVID-19. SCI-Huntingdon has administered over 3,230 COVID-19 tests to inmates. See DOC COVID Dashboard, https://www.cor.pa.gov/Pages/COVID-19.aspx (last visited May 27, 2022).
II. Standards of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.s. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.s. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” BellAtlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.s. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.s. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' ....” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen.Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, at 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. Preliminary Injunction Standard
Four factors govern a district court's decision in considering a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in an even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. Grill v. Aversa, 908 F.Supp.2d 573, 591 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994); SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction seeking greater access to legal materials).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion. Such relief is extraordinary in nature and should be issued in only limited circumstances. See Am. Tel. &Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994). As a threshold matter, it is a movant's burden to show that the “preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Therefore, “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). In order to satisfy this standard, the party moving for a preliminary injunction must carry its burden of demonstrating both: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) the existence of irreparable injury from the alleged misconduct. Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989).
To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, a movant must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582-83 (3d Cir. 1980). The district court must examine the legal principles controlling the claim and the potential defenses available to the opposing party. See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 2000). A mere possibility that the claim might be defeated does not preclude a finding of probable success if the evidence clearly satisfies the essential prerequisites of the cause of action. Highmark, 276 F.3d at 173.
Next, “[a] preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent future irreparable harm.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis in original). A preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury.” Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). “[T]he irreparable harm must be actual and imminent, not merely speculative.” Angstadt ex rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch., 182 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable-not merely serious or substantial,' and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.'” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for injunctive relief is in danger of suffering irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued. If the record does not support a finding of both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits, then a preliminary injunction cannot be granted. Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1123 (3d Cir. 1987); see Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987)).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A).With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are further instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity ... in tailoring any preliminary relief.
§ 3626(a)(2).
A prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must “be viewed with great caution” because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the “intractable problems of prison administration.” Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, it is well-settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, where the requested preliminary injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582.
III. Discussion
A. Motions to Dismiss
Although Plaintiffs filed individual amended complaints in response to the Court's order, it is clear that in liberally construing each complaint, Plaintiffs each present three causes of action for relief that are substantially similar. (Doc. 101; Doc. 104; Doc. 106; Doc. 108). The counts can be split into two groups, one containing allegations from the complaints filed by Molina and Bailey and the other containing allegations from the complaints filed by Irizarry and Maldanado. (Doc. 101; Doc. 104; Doc. 106; Doc. 108).
1. Irizarry and Maldanado
In the complaints filed by Irizarry and Maldanado, the causes of action are: Count i against all Defendants for “infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment By Prolonged Confinement Under inhumane Conditions;” Count ii against all Defendants for “Deliberate Indifference to Risk of Deadly Infection;” and Count III against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman for “Negligence.” (Doc. 101, at 27-28; Doc. 104, at 34-35). In the partial motions to dismiss, Defendants raise three arguments for dismissal of the complaints: (1) Count I should be dismissed with respect to Defendants Bickell, Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, Ralston, and Brown for lack of personal involvement; (2) Count II should be dismissed with respect to all Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) Count III should be dismissed because Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman are entitled to sovereign immunity. (Doc. 116, at 4; Doc. 121, at 4). In opposition, Irizarry and Maldanado argue that the complaints are “rife with clear constitutional violations” and set forth facts that establish Defendants' personal involvement regarding their Eighth Amendment claims, including Defendants' control over the conditions of confinement at SCI-Huntingdon and mental and physical health issues inmates have “unduly suffered.” (Doc. 139, at 1; Doc. 140, at 1).
a) Count I should be dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
Defendants assert that Defendants Bickell, Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, Ralston, and Brown should be dismissed from Count I because Irizarry and Maldanado fail to assert facts that establish their personal involvement in any of the alleged violations. (Doc. 112, at 6-8; Doc. 116, at 5-7). Specifically, Defendants argue that complaints' allegations fail to establish Defendants' awareness of any specific issues or ability to rectify any such deficiencies. (Doc. 112, at 7-8; Doc. 116, at 6-7). Defendants state that “Wetzel is the only individual whom [Irizarry and Maldanado] claim[] had any authority to rectify these issues.” (Doc. 112, at 8; Doc. 116, at 7). In opposition, Irizarry and Maldanado argue that Defendants Spyker, Walters, Kauffman, Bickell, Brown, and Wetzel are responsible for the care of inmates at SCI-Huntingdon and failed to fulfill their duties in maintaining humane conditions at SCI- Huntingdon. (Doc. 139, at 5; Doc. 140, at 5-6).
Section 1983 provides that persons acting under color of state law may be held liable if they deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1998); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Individual liability can be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct, and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fishser, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.... Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Such allegations, however, must be made with appropriate particularity in that the complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and personal responsibility. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Subsequent knowledge of an incident is insufficient to demonstrate that a state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 (the after-the-fact submission of a grievance is “simply insufficient” to establish a defendant's knowledge of an underlying constitutional violation at the time it occurred); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (Grievance Coordinator and Superintendent's involvement in review and denial of grievance insufficient to establish personal involvement). Alleging a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Rode, 845 F.2d 1208.
Count I of the complaints state an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants for “infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by prolonged confinement under inhumane conditions.” (Doc. 101, at 27; Doc. 104, at 34). The complaints states:
All defendants caused [Irizarry and Maldanado] to be confined under dangerous, harmful, and inhumane conditions at SCI Huntingdon in violation of rights protected by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, with reckless disregard for and deliberate indifference to those rights, and without any rational connection to advancement of any legitimate penological or state interest.
(Doc. 101, ¶ 167; Doc. 104, ¶ 167).
The complaints name Defendants Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, Ralston, Wetzel, Bickell, and Brown, however, there are no allegations of their personal involvement beyond the fact that they “knew of the decrepit and life threatening state” of the SCI-Huntingdon facility. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 147-152; Doc. 104, ¶¶ 147-152). For instance, Irizarry and Maldanado do not provide any basis to show how Defendants were responsible for the deteriorating conditions at SCI-Huntingdon or that they were involved in the decision not to improve such conditions. See Molina v. Harry, No. 3:18-CV-1391, 2019 WL 3958422, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2019) (plaintiff failed to allege any defendants were personally responsible for or had any control over cell conditions are SCI-Camp Hill); see also Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Opposing the motions to dismiss, Irizarry and Maldanado argue that “[a]lthough the complaint does not allege[] that any of the Defendants caused or were directly involved in subjecting [Irizarry and Maldanado] to these conditions, it does state that Defendants ‘knew' of these conditions and ‘failed to act' or were ‘deliberately indifferent' to [Irizarry and Maldanado]'s situation.” (Doc. 139, at 4; Doc. 140, at 4). While Irizarry and Maldanado's responses may raise an allegation of facts here, the complaints do not sufficiently allege Defendants' personal involvement, as Irizarry and Maldanado fail to allege that any of Defendants' actions helped to create the allegedly adverse conditions at SCI-Huntingdon or that they had the power to remedy the conditions. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (noting that supervisory liability cannot be based solely on respondeat superior and must be based on personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence); Cook v. Condo, No. 1:21-CV-361, 2021 WL 5585914, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2021)
Furthermore, “a claim of constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the named defendant was the prison warden or a prison supervisor when the incidents set forth in the complaint occurred.” Rainey v. Link, No. 3:20-CV-58, 2021 WL 666968, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2021) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). For example, Irizarry and Maldanado's attempts to hold Wetzel, Secretary of the DOC, liable for the actions of his subordinates is essentially an assertion of respondeat superior liability, which seeks to hold Wetzel liable based on his supervisory role. (Doc. 101, ¶ 17; Doc. 104, ¶ 17). In addition, the complaints argue that Bickell was personally involved because his “responsibilities include oversight of the OPM, for which he sets policy to determine which inmates are assigned to which prison on the basis of computerized analysis through the automated decision support system.” (Doc. 101, ¶ 151; Doc. 104, ¶ 151). This ground of constitutional liability based upon a defendant's supervisory position has been squarely rejected by the courts. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Defendants move for partial dismissal of Count I as to Defendants Bickell, Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, Ralston, and Brown, submitting that “Defendant Wetzel is the only individual whom [Irizarry and Maldanado] claim[] had any authority to rectify these issues.” (Doc. 112, at 8; Doc. 116, at 7). However, the undersigned finds that Irizarry and Maldanado's complaints are bereft of any allegations identifying how any Defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations alleged in Count I. (Doc. 101, ¶ 167; Doc. 104, ¶ 167).
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss and that the claims in Count I be dismissed without prejudice to all Plaintiffs collectively filing a fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 111; Doc. 115).
b) Count II should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Defendants argue that Count II of the complaints must be dismissed because “[Irizarry and Maldanado] ha[ve] not, and cannot, demonstrate that the Defendants consciously ignored the threat posed by the COVID-19 virus, [they] cannot establish the subjective prong for an Eighth Amendment claim.” (Doc. 112, at 11; Doc. 116, at 11). In addition, Defendants state “[t]he DOC does not dispute that COVID-19 poses a serious risk; however, it is disputed that [Irizarry and Maldanado] ha[ve] plausibly alleged that any of the named Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to that risk generally, let alone to any specific risk to [them].” (Doc. 112, at 12; Doc. 116, at 12). Defendants submit that “there is no indication that Defendants have any reason to believe the measures employed by the DOC, and particularly within SCI-Huntingdon, are inadequate.” (Doc. 112, at 11; Doc. 116, at 11).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, which includes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by prison officials. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Although the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and harsh. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Prison officials must, however, provide prisoners with adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and take reasonable measures to guarantee their personal safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1993).
“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. Therefore, conditions of imprisonment violate the Eighth Amendment only if they, “alone or in combination . . . deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). Such necessities include “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). However, “[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination' when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.” Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) and Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
“A claim of inhumane prison conditions may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where the prison official ‘deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' and ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so, thereby exposing the inmate to a substantial risk of serious damage to [his] future health.' ” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225 (quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 335 (3d Cir. 2016)). Such a claim contains two requirements: an objective and subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prisoner asserting a claim that their conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment must allege (1) that objectively, they were “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) that the defendant prison official personally knew of the substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety and failed to “respond [ ] reasonably to the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 844-45. Notably, deliberate indifference requires more than mere negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Furthermore, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
Count II of the Irizarry and Maldanado's complaints states an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants for “deliberate indifference to risk of deadly infection.” (Doc. 101, at 28; Doc. 104, at 35). The complaint states:
All defendants caused [Irizarry and Maldanado] to be exposed to the coronavirus unnecessarily be depriving [them] of the benefit of simply prophylactic measures such as masking and social distancing, by housing him at a facility whose physical layout impedes social distancing and whose staff culture condones insubordination, in violation of rights protected by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, with reckless disregard and deliberate indifference to those rights, and without any rational connection to advancement of any legitimate penological or other state interest.(Doc. 101, ¶ 170; Doc. 104, ¶ 170).
First, Defendants do not dispute that “COVID-19 poses a serious risk.” (Doc. 112, at 12-13; Doc. 116, at 12); see also Dixon v. United States, No. 20-5994, 2020 WL 3249231, at *3 (D.N.J. June 16, 2020) (concluding that the inmate-plaintiff could meet the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim “because COVID-19 is a very contagious virus that can cause serious health complications or death in vulnerable people”). However, Defendants argue that Irizarry and Maldanado fail to establish the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim because “[v]arious proactive preventative steps have been implemented statewide to stop the spread of the virus, demonstrating a high degree of care and aggressive response to this pandemic.” (Doc. 112, at 13; Doc. 116, at 11-12). The Court agrees with Defendants that Irizarry and Maldanado have failed to allege facts suggesting that Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to the risk posed by COVID-19. See Wilkins v. Wolf, No. 1:20-CV-2450, 2021 WL 1578250, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2021) (dismissing prisoner's claims concerning DOC defendants' alleged inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic). As noted supra, the DOC has adopted detailed preventative steps to mitigate the risk to inmates and staff and to control the spread of COVID-19 through the state correctional institutions. The Court may take judicial notice of this information, as it is publicly available on a governmental website. See Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 205. “A review of these steps suggests that DOC officials, including Defendants, have not acted unreasonably with respect to the threat posed by COVID-19 and instead have instituted measures to safeguard the entire inmate population, including Plaintiff.” Bevins v. Kauffman, No. 1:20-CV-02012, 2021 WL 322168, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021). Therefore, Irizarry and Maldanado's allegations do not satisfy the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim.
Next, Defendants argue that the complaints do not, and cannot, establish the subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim because “there is no indication that Defendants have any reason to believe the measures employed by the DOC, and particularly within SCI-Huntingdon, are inadequate.” (Doc. 112, at 11; Doc. 116, at 11). The Court agrees with Defendants that, based on the myriad of steps taken by the DOC and implemented at each facility, Irizarry and Maldanado have failed to plead that Defendants were aware of the substantial risk COVID-19 posed to inmates and failed to take reasonable steps to abate that risk. Even taking the facts in the light most favorable to Irizarry and Maldanado, the Court cannot find that they have satisfied the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. The Court reaches this conclusion in part based on the review of the DOC's detailed mitigation efforts in response to the COVID-19 pandemic designed to reduce the spread of the virus throughout the system and institutions to protect the inmate population as well as staff. As discussed supra, these steps include efforts to limit the introduction of the virus from sources outside of its facilities, inside the facility, as well as strategic management of the inmate population to allow for testing of inmates and staff having COVID-19 symptoms or suspected of being exposed to someone who has tested positive for COVID-19. The DOC's actions are a reasonable response to the danger created by COVID-19 within the prison setting.
Further, the DOC's response to the pandemic, as well as the practices employed by SCI-Huntingdon, demonstrate that Defendants did not ignore or fail to reasonably respond to the substantial risk posed by COVID-19. Even though 425 inmates at SCI-Huntingdon tested positive for the virus, and 9 inmates have died, this does not demonstrate that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk that COVID-19 poses. As noted in Farmer, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” 511 U.S. at 844-45.
While the Court understands Irizarry and Maldanado's significant and legitimate concerns regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, it agrees with the numerous courts throughout the nation that have concluded that similar allegations do not support a plausible inference that officials have demonstrated deliberate indifference to inmates' Eighth Amendment rights. See, e.g.,Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (granting defendants' motion to stay the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction on the basis that, inter alia, the plaintiff's had not demonstrated that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk posed by COVID-19 because the correctional facility had “implemented many measures to curb the spread of the virus”); Bevins, 2021 WL 322168, at *5; Wilkins, 2021 WL 1578250, at *6-7 (finding that inmate-plaintiff had failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim regarding an alleged inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic); Walker v. United States, No. 3:21-CV-1881, 2022 WL 1472872, at *7 (M.D. Pa. May 10, 2022) (same); Wylie v. Bonner, No. 2:20-CV-2593, 2021 WL 261280, at *4-6 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2021) (finding that inmate plaintiff had failed to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim because he failed to allege that staff knew of and disregarded the risks posed by COVID-19); Shokr v. LeBlanc, No. 20-CV-488, 2020 WL 8093228, at *4 (M.D. La. Dec. 14, 2020) (concluding that the inmate-plaintiff had failed to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim because measures were being taken to combat the COVID-19 virus); Kesling v. Tewalt, 476 F.Supp.3d 1077, 1086-88 (D. Idaho 2020) (concluding that inmate-plaintiff's amended complaint failed to set forth a plausible Eighth Amendment claim when prison officials had developed and instituted policies to curb the spread of COVID-19); McKissic v. Barr, No. 1:20-CV-526, 2020 WL 3496432, at *6 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2020) (concluding that inmate-plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim where defendants had taken “significant measures ... to secure prisoner safety and prevent infection” and the plaintiff's “speculation about the mere possibility that he will become infected does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation”). Indeed, “the Eighth Amendment does not require perfection on the part of prison officials.” See Wylie, 2021 WL 261280, at *6.
The Court is sympathetic to the fact that Irizarry and Maldanado contracted COVID-19, however, the complaints are devoid of allegations that Irizarry and Maldanado experienced any specific serious symptoms upon contracting COVID-19. Irizarry and Maldanado submit a conclusive statement that after contracting COVID-19, they “developed long-term physical and mental disabilities ....” (Doc. 101, ¶ 149; Doc. 104, ¶ 149). This allegation is not sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference. From the complaints, as pled, the Court “cannot conclude that, when faced with a perfect storm of a contagious virus and the space constraints inherent in a correctional facility, [Defendants] here acted unreasonably by ‘doing their best.' ” See Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2020). Therefore, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim in Count II.
c) Count III should be dismissed because Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Defendants argue that Irizarry and Maldanado's negligence claims against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman at Count III of the complaints are barred because Defendants are protected by sovereign immunity. (Doc. 112, at 15; Doc. 116, at 14). Defendants argue that Wetzel and Kauffman were acting within the scope of their employment when the alleged events took place, their actions do not fall within any exceptions to such immunity, and thus Wetzel and Kauffman are immune from Irizarry and Maldanado's negligence claims. (Doc. 112, at 13-15; Doc. 116, at 14). Irizarry and Maldanado do not provide any response to Defendants' assertion of statutory sovereign immunity.
In Count III, Irizarry and Maldanado bring a state-law negligence claim against Wetzel and Kauffman in their “official capacities;” not their individual capacities. (Doc. 101, at 28; Doc. 104, at 35). Commonwealth parties acting within the scope of their employment generally are immune from suit except when immunity is explicitly waived. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310; 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521, 8522(a). Pennsylvania's General Assembly has carved out certain limited exceptions from its grant of sovereign immunity to Commonwealth actors. See generally 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521, 8522. Section 8522(b) of Title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provides ten narrow categories where the state has waived its sovereign immunity for claims involving negligent conduct by Commonwealth parties. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), (b).
Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman are entitled to sovereign immunity as to Irizarry and Maldanado's state law claims as it is beyond dispute that: “The Department of Corrections is an agency of the Commonwealth and the defendants, as employees of an agency of the Commonwealth, are entitled to the protection afforded by sovereign immunity.” McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F.Supp.2d 499, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing Maute v. Frank, 657 A.2d 985, 986 (1995) (state prison officials enjoy sovereign immunity); Robles v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 718 A.2d 882, 884 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1998) (same)), aff'd, 35 Fed.Appx. 357 (3d Cir. 2002). Moreover, sovereign immunity:
stems from the familiar proposition that the Commonwealth and its employees and officials enjoy broad immunity from most state law claims, immunity that is expressly embraced by statute, which provides that: “it is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit
except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310; see also Moore v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. Cmwlth. 56, 538 A.2d 111, 115 (Pa. Commw. 1988) (“In other words, if the Commonwealth is entitled to sovereign immunity under Act 152, then its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties are likewise immune”). This grant of immunity “applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and individual capacities, so long as the employees are ‘acting within the scope of their duties.' ” Larsen v. State Employees' Ret. Sys., 553 F.Supp.2d 403, 420 (M.D. Pa. 2008) Conduct of an employee is within the scope of employment if “ ‘it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform; [and] it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits ....' ” Brautigam v. Fraley, No. 09-1723, 2010 WL 480856, *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2010) (Rambo, J.)
Thomas v. Shutika, No. 4:12-CV-692, 2014 WL 2514817, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2014).
Therefore, subject only to ten statutory exceptions, none of which Irizarry and Maldanado argue has any application here, this sovereign immunity bars state law tort claims like those alleged here since Commonwealth employees are immune from liability even for intentional torts. McGrath, 67 F.Supp.2d at 511; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), (b). Accordingly, it is recommended that Count III of the complaints be dismissed with prejudice because sovereign immunity bars state law negligence claims like those alleged here against Wetzel and Kauffman.
2. Bailey and Molina
In the complaints filed by Bailey and Molina, the causes of action are: Count I against all Defendants for “Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment By Prolonged Confinement Under Inhumane Conditions;” Count II against all Defendants for “Deliberate Indifference to Risk of Deadly Infections, Toxins, and Mesothelioma exposure Caused by Asbestos;” and Count III against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman for “Negligence.” (Doc. 106, at 18-20; Doc. 108, at 19-21). In the motions to dismiss, Defendants raise three arguments for dismissal of the complaints: (1) Count I should be dismissed with respect to Defendants Bickell, Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, Ralston, and Brown for lack of personal involvement; (2) Count II should be dismissed with respect to all Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) Count III should be dismissed because Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman are entitled to sovereign immunity. (Doc. 119, at 4; Doc. 121, at 4). In opposition, Bailey and Molina argue that the complaints are “rife with clear constitutional violations” and set forth facts that establish Defendants' personal involvement regarding their Eighth Amendment claims, including Defendants' control over the conditions of confinement at SCI-Huntingdon, Defendants' reckless behavior at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and mental and physical health issues inmates have “unduly suffered.” (Doc. 133, at 1; Doc. 135, at 1).
a) Counts I and II should be dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
Defendants argue that Counts I and II of the complaints filed by Bailey and Molina should be dismissed with respect to Defendants Bickell, Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, and Ralston for lack of personal involvement. (Doc. 119, at 5; Doc. 121, at 5). Defendants argue that the allegations fail to establish Defendants' awareness of any specific issues or ability to rectify any such deficiencies. (Doc. 119, at 5-6; Doc. 121, at 5-6). Defendants state that “Wetzel is the only individual whom [Plaintiffs] claim[] had any authority to rectify these issues.” (Doc. 119, at 6; Doc. 121, at 6). In opposition, Bailey and Molina argue that Defendants Spyker, Walters, Kauffman, Bickell, Brown, and Wetzel are responsible for the care of inmates at SCI-Huntingdon and failed to fulfill their duties in maintaining humane conditions at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 133, at 6; Doc. 135, at 6).
As discussed above, a defendant in a Section 1983 civil rights action “cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” Baraka, 481 F.3d at 210. Alleging a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Rode, 845 F.2d 1208. Count I of the complaints state an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants for “infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by prolonged confinement under inhumane conditions.” (Doc. 106, at 18; Doc. 108, at 19). The complaints states:
All defendants caused [Bailey and Molina] to be confined under dangerous, harmful, and inhumane conditions at SCI Huntingdon in violation of rights protected by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, with reckless disregard for and deliberate indifference to those rights, and without any rational connection to advancement of any legitimate penological or state interest.
(Doc. 106, ¶ 77; Doc. 108, ¶ 77).
Count II is brought against all Defendants for “deliberate indifference to risk of deadly infections, toxins, and mesothelioma exposure caused by asbestos,” and states:
All defendants caused [Bailey and Molina] and other members of the inmate population to be exposed to Asbestos, black mold spores, lead/metal contaminated water, and no ventilation unnecessarily by depriving them the benefit of prophylactic measured such as conducting Asbestos clean-up and removal, black mold clean-up and removal, and the right to drink clean water, by housing them at a facility who Physical Plant has deteriorated upon restoration, in violation of rights protected by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, with reckless disregard for and deliberate indifference to those rights, and without any rational connection to advancement of any legitimate penological or other State interest.
(Doc. 106, ¶ 80; Doc. 108, ¶ 80).
The complaints name Defendants Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, Ralston, Wetzel, Bickell, and Brown, however, there are no allegations of their personal involvement beyond the fact that they “knew of the decrepit and life threatening state” of the SCI-Huntingdon facility. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 56-66; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 56-66). Bailey and Molina do not provide any basis to show how Defendants were responsible for the deteriorating conditions at SCI-Huntingdon or that they were involved in the decision not to improve such conditions. See Molina, 2019 WL 3958422, at *2 (plaintiff failed to allege any defendants were personally responsible for or had any control over cell conditions are SCI-Camp Hill); see also Baraka, 481 F.3d at 210 (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Opposing the motions to dismiss, Bailey and Molina argue that “[a]lthough the complaint does not allege[] that any of the Defendants caused or were directly involved in subjecting [Bailey and Molina] to these conditions, it does state that Defendants ‘knew' of these conditions and ‘failed to act' or were ‘deliberately indifferent' to [Bailey and Molina]'s situation.” (Doc. 133, at 5; Doc. 135, at 5). While Bailey and Molina's responses may raise an allegation of facts here, a careful review of the amended complaints confirms that they do not allege that Defendants personally directed the actions that allegedly violated Bailey and Molina's rights or that Defendants personally witnessed, condoned, or acquiesced in those actions.
In addition, as discussed supra, “a claim of constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the named defendant was the prison warden or a prison supervisor when the incidents set forth in the complaint occurred.” Rainey, 2021 WL 666968, at *4 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). For example, Bailey and Molina's attempts to hold Wetzel, Secretary of the DOC, liable for the actions of his subordinates is essentially an assertion of respondeat superior liability, which seeks to hold Wetzel liable based on his supervisory role. (Doc. 106, ¶ 22; Doc. 108, ¶ 22). The complaints also argue that Bickell was personally involved because his “responsibilities include oversight of the OPM, for which he sets policy to determine which inmates are assigned to which prison on the basis of computerized analysis through the automated decision support system.” (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 23, 6566; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 23, 65-66). Personal involvement under § 1983 cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Defendants move for partial dismissal of Counts I and II as to Defendants Bickell, Kauffman, Walters, Spyker, Ralston, and Brown, submitting that “Defendant Wetzel is the only individual whom [Bailey and Molina] claim[] had any authority to rectify these issues.” (Doc. 119, at 5-6; Doc. 121, at 5-6). However, the undersigned finds that Counts I and II of Bailey and Molina's complaints are devoid of allegations identifying how any Defendants were personally involved in the constitutional deprivations alleged in Counts I and II. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 77, 80; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 77, 80).
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss and that the claims in Count I and II of Bailey and Molina's complaints be dismissed without prejudice to all Plaintiffs collectively filing a fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 118; Doc. 120).
b) Count III should be dismissed because Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Defendants argue that Bailey and Molina's negligence claims against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman at Count III of the complaints are barred because Defendants are protected by sovereign immunity. (Doc. 119, at 8; Doc. 121, at 8). Defendants argue that Wetzel and Kauffman were acting within the scope of their employment when the alleged events took place, their actions do not fall within any exceptions to such immunity, and thus Wetzel and Kauffman are immune from Bailey and Molina's negligence claims. (Doc. 119, at 7; Doc. 121, at 7). Bailey and Molina do not provide any response to Defendants' assertion of statutory sovereign immunity. In Count III, Bailey and Molina bring a state-law negligence claim against Wetzel and Kauffman in their “official capacities;” not their individual capacities. (Doc. 106, at 19; Doc. 108, at 20).
As discussed supra, Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman are entitled to sovereign immunity as to Bailey and Molina's state law claims as it is beyond dispute that: “The Department of Corrections is an agency of the Commonwealth and the defendants, as employees of an agency of the Commonwealth, are entitled to the protection afforded by sovereign immunity.” McGrath, 67 F.Supp.2d at 511 (citing Maute, 657 A.2d at 986 (state prison officials enjoy sovereign immunity); Robles, 718 A.2d at 884 (same)). Therefore, subject only to ten statutory exceptions, none of which Bailey and Molina argue has any application here, this sovereign immunity bars state law tort claims like those alleged here since Commonwealth employees are immune from liability even for intentional torts. McGrath, 67 F.Supp.2d at 511; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), (b). Accordingly, it is recommended that Count III of the complaints be dismissed with prejudice because sovereign immunity bars state law negligence claims like those alleged here against Wetzel and Kauffman.
B. Motions for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction set forth substantially similar allegations and requests for relief such that the undersigned will address the motions collectively. (Doc. 117; Doc. 122; Doc. 125; Doc. 153). in support of the motions for preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs state that they “will suffer irreparable harm through unnecessary exposure to mold, asbestos, and the risk of injury or death by fire during the litigation of this matter unless preliminary injunctive relief is granted.” (Doc. 122, ¶ 16; Doc. 125, ¶ 16; Doc. 153, ¶ 16). Further, Plaintiffs claim that a preliminary injunction is necessary “to avert future loss of life at SCI-Huntingdon.” (Doc. 123, at 5; Doc. 127, at 5; Doc. 154, at 5). Plaintiffs request the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing, after which the requested preliminary injunction would be issued with instructions that include the replacement of manual locks on cells with an electrical locking system capable of quick release, the leasing of portable HVAC equipment to provide ventilation to all occupied cell blocks, a mandatory mold and asbestos clean-up of the entire facility, and the replacement of all lead-based pipes with non-lead-based pipes. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 18-21; Doc. 125, ¶¶ 18-21; Doc. 153, ¶¶ 18-21). In opposition, Defendants assert: (1) it is unlikely Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits; (2) Plaintiffs cannot establish they will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) granting preliminary injunction will result in an even greater harm to Defendants; and (4) Plaintiffs cannot establish it would be in the public interest for the Court to grant the requested relief. (Doc. 130, at 6-13; Doc. 138, at 6-13; Doc. 158, at 6-13). As observed previously, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, one that should be ordered only in limited cases upon a compelling showing. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 F.3d at 1426-27. That showing has not been made in this case.
At the onset, the scope of Plaintiffs' requests far exceeds the appropriate reach of a preliminary injunction, as granting the requested relief would do more than “preserve the relative positions of the parties.” Walker v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 21-2756, 2021 WL 5741502, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2021) (quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S.Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018)). The purpose of a preliminary injunction “is not to conclusively determine the rights of the parties . . . but to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.” Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (citing Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). Here, though worded differently, Plaintiffs' motions and complaints seek the same injunctive relief: an Order directing the DOC and SCI-Huntingdon administrators to renovate the prison facility and improve the living conditions of its inmates. (Doc. 101, at 29; Doc. 106, at 21-22; Doc. 108, at 21-23; Doc. 122, ¶¶ 18-21; Doc. 125, ¶¶ 18-21; Doc. 153, ¶¶ 18-21); see Walker, 2021 WL 5741502, at *1. Thus, the record supports denying the relief sought in Plaintiffs' motions.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy their burden under the preliminary injunction standard.
3. Success on the Merits
In the complaints, Plaintiffs plead two counts against all Defendants for Eighth Amendment violations and one count against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman for negligence under state law. (Doc. 101, at 27-29; Doc. 106, at 18-20; Doc. 108, at 19-21). First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide adequate living conditions at SCI-Huntingdon, which has enhanced the diagnoses of cancer and the spread of COVID-19 throughout the institution. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 167, 170; Doc. 106, ¶¶ 77, 80; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 77, 80). Specifically, Plaintiffs state that the facility's ventilation system no longer functions, the kitchen and cell walls are colonized by mold, asbestos, and leadbased water pipes, the plumbing fixtures are deteriorated and require replacement, the cells do not have medical emergency call buttons, the tiers on some cell blocks are unstable and in danger of collapse, and the cell locking mechanism is defective and may prevent rapid evacuation in case of a fire or other emergency. (Doc. 101, ¶ 6; Doc. 106, ¶¶ 6-11; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 6-11). Plaintiffs aver that their injuries were caused by Defendants' “failure to maintain the physical plant at SCI Huntingdon, transfer of [Plaintiffs] into the prison despite its decrepit state and with deliberate disregard for the inevitability of exposure of a toxic substance that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to [their] future health, and failure to follow mandatory procedures to lessen the risk of contamination.” (Doc. 123, at 5; Doc. 127, at 5; Doc. 154, at 5). Due to the antiquated condition of SCI-Huntingdon, Irizarry further argues that “SCI-Huntingdon routinely rails to implement DOC's quarantine procedures,” resulting in insufficient social distancing, poor ventilation, and inadequate personal hygiene facilities. (Doc. 127, at 5-6; Doc. 149, at 1-2).
First, as discussed supra, the undersigned found that the complaints lack personal involvement and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood to succeed on the merits. Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “necessarily precludes a finding that [the p]laintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, which is required before a court may grant preliminary injunctive relief.” See Woodson v. Colajezzi, No. 12-973, 2012 WL 4932022, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2012); see also Allah v. Beasely, No. 3:18-CV-2047, 2019 WL 4511693, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2019). Nevertheless, because it is recommended that the Court grant Plaintiffs leave to file a single, fourth amendment complaint, the undersigned will address Plaintiffs' allegations.
a) Eighth Amendment claims
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner must demonstrate both objective and subjective proof: (1) that he or she has been subjected to an objectively “serious” deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” or a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his or her health; and (2) that prison officials knew of and were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation or risk to the inmate's health or safety. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359-60 (3d Cir.1992); Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2015). “[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Mere negligence or inadvertence will not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard and cannot constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
Here, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently described the conditions of confinement to establish the first prong of the Eighth Amendment claim, an objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation. Plaintiffs assert numerous unconstitutional conditions of confinement allegations regarding SCI-Huntingdon, including lack of fire protection and ventilation and exposure to mold, asbestos, and contaminated drinking water. (Doc. 101, ¶ 6; Doc. 106, ¶¶ 611; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 6-11). However, to the extent Plaintiffs allege discomfort in the cells, they do not meet the requirements for a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Hill v. Smith, No. 4:05-CV-1724, 2005 WL 2666597, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2005) (finding presence of mice and cockroaches in USP-Lewisburg cells does not present health hazard to satisfy Eighth Amendment claim). Further, although “inmates have a right to be free from extreme hot and cold temperature,” and to a minimal level of cleanliness within their cells, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Peterkin v. Jeffes, 661 F.Supp. 895, 904 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
In order to state a claim for which relief may be granted, Plaintiffs must allege facts demonstrating that each Defendant was deliberately indifferent to the conditions of their confinement. “[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. “A prison official is deliberately indifferent if the official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.' ” Parkell, 833 F.3d at 335 (quoting Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 229 (quotation omitted)). Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated “by showing that the risk of harm was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past such that the defendants must have known about the risk.” Parkell, 833 F.3d at 335 (quoting Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev.Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted in original)). The plaintiff must show that the officials were aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and that they also drew the inference. Parkell, 833 F.3d at 335 (quotation and alteration marks omitted in original).
Here, Plaintiffs make no factual allegations as to what Defendants did, or failed to do, to create the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. First, Plaintiffs have not described the length or degree of their exposure to the alleged unhealthy conditions or the effect of the conditions on them. See Burke v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-7870, 2018 WL 770787, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2018). Furthermore, while Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “knew of the life threatening state of the edifice, the plumbing, the wiring, the ventilation, the mold and asbestos” and “allowed” Plaintiffs to live in poor conditions at SCI-Huntingdon, such conclusory allegations may not be the basis of a claim. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 147-152; Doc. 106, ¶¶ 56-66; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 56-66); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations). Plaintiffs do not establish that Defendants were aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and that they also drew the inference.
In addition, regarding Defendants' response to COVID-19 and Irizarry's legitimate concerns regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, the undersigned agrees with the numerous courts throughout the nation that have concluded that similar allegations do not support a plausible inference that officials have demonstrated deliberate indifference to inmates' Eighth Amendment rights. See, e.g.,Swain, 958 F.3d at 1089 (granting defendants' motion to stay the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction on the basis that, inter alia, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk posed by COVID-19 because the correctional facility had “implemented many measures to curb the spread of the virus”); Bevins, 2021 WL 322168, at *5 (concluding that inmate-plaintiff had failed to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim because measures were being taken to combat the COVID-19 virus at SCI-Huntingdon).
Plaintiffs rely on the Eleventh Circuit decision in Swain to argue that the Court “has the option to order a similar evaluation by independent experts here.” (Doc. 149, at 7; Doc. 184, at 7; Doc. 186, at 7). In Swain, the Eleventh Circuit considered a prisoner-plaintiffs' § 1983 claims that defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments through their purportedly deliberate indifference to the COVID-19 risks affecting the jail detainees. 958 F.3d at 1085. The court granted a motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction, which required the defendants to employ a myriad of safety measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at a detention facility in South Florida, finding that the district court “incorrectly collapsed” the subjective and objective components of stating an Eighth Amendment claim. Swain, 958 F.3d at 1085, 1088. More specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court “treated the increase in COVID-19 infections as proof that the Defendants deliberately disregarded an intolerable risk,” an approach that “likely violated the admonition that resultant harm does not establish a liable state of mind.” Swain, 958 F.3d at 1089. The court also held that the plaintiffs “offered ‘little evidence' to suggest that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent,” and that the evidence supports the conclusion that the Defendants “are taking the risk of COVID-19 seriously.” Swain, 958 F.3d at 1089. The Swain court concluded that the provisions of the preliminary injunction (e.g., specifying specific measures which county jail officials must take, such as requiring that soap and masks be provided) were illustrations of a scenario where the district court designated itself as a de facto “super-warden” and incorrectly required those officials to, in effect, obtain a “permission slip” from the Court before taking action at the jail. 958 F.3d at 1090.
Here, Plaintiffs' requests in the motions for preliminary injunction are similar to the measures in the preliminary injunction that was stayed in Swain. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 18-21; Doc. 125, ¶¶ 18-21; Doc. 153, ¶¶ 18-21). Recently, other appellate courts have issued opinions staying preliminary injunctions on rationales similar to the ones articulated in Swain. See generally Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 801, 803 (5th Cir. 2020) (staying preliminary injunction entered against the executive director of the Texas prison system and the warden of one of its prisons for the elderly and infirm, noting that the preliminary injunction created an “administrative nightmare,” and explaining that “the incidence of diseases or infections, standing alone, do not imply unconstitutional confinement conditions, since any densely populated residence may be subject to outbreaks”); Marlowe v. LeBlanc, 810 Fed.Appx. 302, at *305-07 (5th Cir. 2020) (staying district court's preliminary injunction entered against Louisiana's prison system officials in a lawsuit filed by a diabetic who is “particularly vulnerable to the virus's effects”; noting that given the many prevention measures taken by the prison, “an increase in infection rate alone is insufficient to prove deliberate indifference”; and holding that the harm to the state's interest in administering its prison system is “particularly acute” because the preliminary injunction “interferes with the rapidly-changing approach” that the state has “used to respond to the pandemic so far”); cf. Roman v. Wolf, No. 20-55436, 2020 WL 2188048, at *1 (9th Cir. May 5, 2020) (staying preliminary injunction except for paragraph requiring substantial compliance with CDC Guidelines at ICE immigration detention facility in Adelanto, California).
Similar to the prisoner-plaintiffs in Swain that failed to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to establish a liable state of mind. The existence of COVID-19 infections at SCI-Huntingdon may not be treated as proof that Defendants were deliberately indifferent. Swain, 958 F.3d at 1089. Without any evidence of actual knowledge that Defendants intentionally disregarded an intolerable risk created by the alleged conditions of SCI-Huntingdon, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the existence of a serious constitutional deprivation redressable under Farmer. 511 U.S. at 834. The Supreme Court has explained that “a resultant harm does not itself establish a liable state of mind.” Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F.Supp.3d 476, 507 (D.N.J. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted”)).
After considering the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. Assuming arguendo the existence of mold, asbestos, poor ventilation, etc., at SCI-Huntingdon, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence from which the undersigned can reasonably conclude that such conditions are the cause of Plaintiffs' and other inmate's medical ailments. Sanders v. Beard, No. 3:09-CV-01384, 2010 WL 2853357, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:09-CV-1384, 2010 WL 2853261 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (denying injunctive relief where plaintiffs failed to present evidence that existence mold or other environmental factors at SCI-Smithfield is the cause of plaintiffs' symptoms). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claims.
b) Negligence claim
Plaintiffs also bring a state-law negligence claim against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman in their official capacities for allowing SCI-Huntingdon to physically deteriorate and become uninhabitable. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 173-74; Doc. 106, ¶¶ 83-84; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 83-84). As discussed supra, Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman are entitled to sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs' state law claims as it is beyond dispute that: “The Department of Corrections is an agency of the Commonwealth and the defendants, as employees of an agency of the Commonwealth, are entitled to the protection afforded by sovereign immunity.” McGrath, 67 F.Supp.2d at 511 (citing Maute, 657 A.2d at 986 (state prison officials enjoy sovereign immunity); Robles, 718 A.2d at 884 (same)). Therefore, subject only to ten statutory exceptions, none of which Plaintiffs have argued has any application here, this sovereign immunity bars state law tort claims like those alleged here since Commonwealth employees are immune from liability even for intentional torts. McGrath, 67 F.Supp.2d at 511; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), (b).
Nevertheless, apart from Plaintiffs' broad assertions of culpability, Plaintiffs do not plead facts to establish that Defendants were negligent in allowing the conditions at SCI-Huntingdon to deteriorate or become uninhabitable for inmates. a likelihood of success on the merits requires “a showing significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs do not proffer facts to establish that SCI-Huntingdon is deteriorating or is otherwise unsafe to house inmates. Furthermore, as discussed above, the only allegation as to Defendant' state of mind is that they “allowed” Plaintiffs to live in poor conditions at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 101, ¶¶ 173-74; Doc. 106, ¶¶ 83-84; Doc. 108, ¶¶ 83-84). Accordingly, it is not likely that Plaintiffs' negligence claims will prevail on the merits.
4. Irreparable Harm
In addition, without diminishing Plaintiffs' complaints, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs have not shown immediate irreparable harm justifying a preliminary injunction. See e.g.,Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 346 Fed.Appx. 749 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying inmate request for injunction for failure to demonstrate irreparable harm); Rush v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 287 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). In this regard, when considering this benchmark standard for a preliminary injunction, it is clear that: “Irreparable injury is established by showing that plaintiff will suffer harm that ‘cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial.” Messner v. Bunner, No. 07-CV-112, 2009 WL 1406986, at *4 (May 19, 2009) (quoting Instant Air Freight Co., 882 F.2d at 801 (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm”)). In this context, the word irreparable has a specific meaning and connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, [or] atoned for ....” Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). To satisfy the exacting standard of a preliminary injunction, the injury or threat of injury must be both “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, (1941); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947). Thus, an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury ....” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted). Therefore, where an inmate plaintiff is alleging that damages may be an adequate remedy, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate since the inmate has not shown that he faces immediate, irreparable harm. Rivera, 346 Fed.Appx. at 750; Rush, 287 Fed.Appx. at 142.
Although Plaintiffs have detailed examples of the alleged conditions at SCI-Huntingdon, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that they are likely to suffer immediate irreparable injury. For example, Molina and Bailey assert that “[n]umerous of inmates have been diagnosed with cancer and are losing their health and even their lives, because the defendants cannot or will not conduct a full mold and asbestos clean-up.” (Doc. 123, at 8; Doc. 154, at 8). Irizarry states that he and other inmates “are contracting Covid-19 at SCI Huntingdon, and are now experiencing long-term effects and others have lost their lives because the defendants cannot or will not enforce preventative measures there.” (Doc. 127, at 7). The harm Plaintiffs describe is remote and speculative. “Speculative injury does not constitute a showing of irreparable harm.” Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980). Furthermore, given the assertion that prisoners incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon have suffered for many years, the undersigned cannot find that Plaintiffs have shown that they face immediate irreparable harm. (Doc. 123, at 8; Doc. 127, at 7-8; Doc. 154, at 8).
Despite this, Plaintiffs contend that “[w]ithout immediate injunctive relief, irreparable harm will be done to [Plaintiffs] and hundreds of other inmates boused a[t] SCI Huntingdon.” (Doc. 123, at 8; Doc. 127, at 8; Doc. 154, at 8). Plaintiffs state that “loss of life and health are irreparable.” (Doc. 123, at 8; Doc. 127, at 8; Doc. 154, at 8). However, Here, Plaintiffs make no factual allegations describing the length or degree of their exposure to the alleged unhealthy conditions or the effect of the conditions on them. See Burke, 2018 WL 770787, at *4. Absent additional information regarding the frequency, duration, or health risks associated with the conditions at SCI-Huntingdon, the alleged conditions cannot be said to pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In addition, as observed supra, the DOC has implemented measures that are sufficiently adequate to diminish any potential risk of prisoners contracting COVID-19. See Easley v. Wetzel, No. 1:21-CV-00063, 2021 WL 1200214, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1197483 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2021) (denying preliminary injunction where prison officials were taking reasonable measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19). That these measures do not guarantee Plaintiffs will remain free from disease is irrelevant, for the Constitution does not require such perfection. See Peterkin, 661 F.Supp. at 904.
Therefore, Plaintiffs do not establish they will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted
5. Harm to Non-Moving Party and Public Interest
Finally, Plaintiffs do not establish that granting preliminary relief will not result in an even greater harm to the nonmoving party or be in the public interest. Grill, 908 F.Supp.2d at 591. A prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must “be viewed with great caution” because of the “intractable problems of prison administration.” Milhouse, 721 Fed.Appx. at 111 (quoting Goff, 60 F.3d at 520). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants will sustain no cognizable harm if the injunction is granted and that the injunction advances the public interest. (Doc. 123, at 8-9; Doc. 127, at 8-10; Doc. 154, at 8-9). However, Defendants' interest and the public's interest in penological order could be adversely affected if the Court began dictating how the DOC must renovate the SCI-Huntingdon facility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (“[F]ederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.”). Therefore, consideration of “whether granting preliminary relief will result in an even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and . . . whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest,” also weighs heavily against Plaintiffs in this case. Gerardi, 16 F.3d at 1373.
Further, it seems that Plaintiffs seek proactive relief in the form of an Order requiring the renovation of SCI-Huntingdon, which would affect the actions of other prison officials who are not parties to the instant lawsuit. (Doc. 122, ¶ 18; Doc. 125, ¶ 18; Doc. 153, ¶ 18). This runs afoul of the “general rule that a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.” Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 56 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)). Indeed, courts in this circuit have refused to issue injunctions against non-parties. See Robertson v. Samuels, No. 3:13-CV-2500, 2014 WL 347007, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2014), aff'd, 593 Fed.Appx. 91 (3d Cir. 2014); Banks v. Good, No. 06253, 2011 WL 2437061 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2418699 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2011).
In sum, an assessment of the factors that govern the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief weighs against Plaintiffs. See Easley, 2021 WL 1200214, at *5. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction be denied. (Doc. 122; Doc. 125; Doc. 153).
IV. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108; Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit has also acknowledged that a district court has “substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Ruffin v. Mooney, No. 3:16-CV-1987, 2017 WL 3390361, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2017) (dismissing prisoner-plaintiff's case without prejudice where it was unclear whether he was seeking relief under § 1983 or a habeas statute). As noted above, Plaintiffs' complaints are subject to dismissal because of their failure to establish Defendants' personal involvement in the deteriorated condition of SCI-Huntingdon and their failure to adequately plead Defendants' deliberate indifference to the substantial risk COVID-19 posed to their health. However, due to their pro se status, it is recommended that the Court grant Plaintiffs leave to file a single fourth amended complaint that sets forth all of their claims.
If Plaintiffs decide to file a single fourth amended complaint setting forth all of their claims in one pleading, they must clearly label it as such on the face of the document. The amended complaint must fully allege every claim Plaintiffs wish to pursue and be a pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint or individual amended complaints. SeeYoung v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). However, the amended complaint should not assert state law negligence claims against Defendants in their official capacity as Commonwealth employees, as the undersigned recommends that such claims be dismissed with prejudice because Defendants are immune from liability. Each allegation must be set forth in individually numbered paragraphs in short, concise, and simple statements. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). The factual allegations of the amended complaint may not be conclusory. Instead, the facts alleged should be specific enough as to the time and place of the violations and must identify the specific person or persons responsible for the deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and what each defendant did to harm them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Failure to file a fourth amended complaint in accordance with the aforementioned requirements may result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety. V. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Plaintiffs Molina, Irizarry, and Bailey's motions for preliminary injunction (Doc. 122; Doc. 125; Doc. 153) be DENIED;
2. Plaintiff Maldanado's motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 117) be DENIED AS MOOT;
3. Defendants' motions to dismiss (Doc. 111; Doc. 115; Doc. 118; Doc. 120) be GRANTED;
4. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman in their official capacities be DISMISSED with prejudice on sovereign immunity grounds;
5. Plaintiffs' remaining claims be DISMISSED without prejudice;
6. Maldanado's motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint (Doc. 190) be DENIED;
7. Defendants' motion to stay discovery (Doc. 196) be DENIED AS MOOT; and
8. Plaintiffs be granted thirty (30) days to file a single fourth amended complaint curing the deficiencies outlined herein.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated July 25, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.