Opinion
1:21-cv-00063-RAL-SPB
02-26-2021
WARREN EASLEY, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZEL, et al. Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectively recommended that Plaintiff Warren Easley's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction be denied.
II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Warren Easley (Easley) is a thirty-four-year-old inmate incarcerated at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest). He initiated this action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with an attached Complaint on January 26, 2021. See ECF No. 1. Easley also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that he faces immediate, irreparable harm due to the threat of contracting the COVID-19 virus because of current conditions and practices at SCI-Forest. The Court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 5. Easley seeks mandatory injunctive relief, including requiring prison officials to take stronger measures to stop the spread of COVID-19 and to provide more medical treatment to individuals who contract the disease. ECF No. 10, pp. 1-2 (Proposed Order). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Easley's motion on February 18, 2021, which included testimony and argument by Easley. Defense counsel called one witness, Corrections Healthcare Administrator (CHCA) Kim Smith, who is also one of the Defendants in this action.
B. Easley's Claims
Easley contends in his Complaint that prison officials are “failing to follow state wide protocols or protect inmates from COVID-19.” ECF No. 6, p. 1. Easley characterizes his claims as arising out of the Defendants' “failure to protect” him and other inmates from COVID-19 and “deliberate indifference” to health risks associated with COVID-19. Id. After reviewing the Complaint and hearing Easley's testimony and argument on February 18, 2021, the Court understands Easley to be asserting an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon inhumane conditions of confinement and alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Court will apply the legal principles applicable to such claims.
Rather than conferring any substantive rights, § 1983 “provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To prevail on a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he, she, or they were (1) deprived of a federal right (2) by a person acting under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
C. Statement of Facts
1. Easley's Complaint and Supporting Affidavit
Easley alleges that, in December of 2020, he developed flu-like symptoms, lost his sense of smell and taste, and felt very weak and achy. After experiencing these symptoms for two days, he notified Nurse Rogers on December 29, 2020 that he believed he had contracted COVID-19. ECF No. 6, p. 1. Easley asserts that Nurse Rogers advised him that he would not be seen by the medical department. Instead, on December 31, 2020, a “quarantine tag” was placed on his cell door. Easley asserts that this quarantine was “punishment” or “retaliation” by Captain Apodaca but does not plead a factual basis for this as a discrete legal claim. Id., ¶ 14. The Complaint further alleges that Easley has not yet spoken to a medical provider or been properly tested for COVID-19. Id., ¶ 4. He later adds that he was tested on January 5, 2021, but, to date, no one has told him his test result. Id., ¶ 17. Easley further contends that he told “medical” more than 6 times about his symptoms and concerns. He claims that “nurse supervisor Ferdarko and Kim Smith said ‘you will not be tested or assessed.'” ECF No. 8, ¶ 5 (Declaration in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction). Easley is currently housed in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). He notes that an inmate with COVID-19 named Menevin was brought to the RHU, and that after this, he and other inmates in the RHU contracted COVID-19. ECF No. 6, ¶ 13-16.
Easley identifies multiple ways he believes that staff at SCI-Forest are not following proper safety protocols for COVID-19. He showered on two days, December 31, 2020 and January 2, 2021, without a mask because of a shortage in the prison. ECF No. 8, ¶ 10 (Declaration in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction). Inmates on quarantine are not taken to showers separately. Id., ¶ 31. When he was displaying flu-like symptoms, staff interacted with him without wearing masks or protective gear. Id., ¶ 10. He says that common areas are not disinfected and that inmates are not provided disinfectant for their cells. ¶ 10. His Complaint alleges that on January 5, 2021, the prison placed Easley on “cell cleaning restriction, ” meaning he received no disinfectants. Id, ¶ 26. A week later, Captain Apodaca told him, “we will not provide you disinfect[ant].” Id.
He alleges that SCI-Forest conducts no contact-tracing for staff-i.e., identifying people positive with COVID-19 and with whom they have been in close contact and then notifying those individuals while providing health information about avoiding the spread of COVID-19. Id., ¶ 11. Nurses deliver medication throughout the prison from block to block without wearing protective gear or changing gloves. ¶ 22; ECF No. 6, ¶ 21. Guards make rounds without protective gear, going to and from blocks with COVID-positive patients. ¶ 23. He even alleges that guards want to get COVID so they can “get 14-20 days” paid time off. Id., ¶ 24.
2. Evidence from the Preliminary Injunction Hearing on February 18, 2020
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Easley's motion via Zoom video conferencing on February 18, 2021. The Court heard testimony from Easley and Corrections Healthcare Administrator (CHCA) Kim Smith as well as argument from Easley and counsel for the Defendants. Easley agreed with the Court's observation that his allegations generally fall into two categories: the failure of staff to take proper precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and their failure to provide him with appropriate medical assessment and care, allegedly in retaliation for raising his concerns.
In addition to reiterating the facts alleged in his Complaint and motion, Easley testified that he had not received the results of his COVID-19 test as of the hearing. Easley testified that he has continued to experience symptoms such as body aches over the past two weeks. He acknowledged that he has no underlying health conditions that place him at greater risk than others of serious illness. Nurses dispense medications to Easley three times each day, but these medications are for conditions unrelated to COVID-19 or heighted risk associated with COVID-19. Reiterating the allegations in his Complaint, Easley testified that he notified Nurse Rogers of his flu-like symptoms on December 29, 2020, but was told no one would see him; that Nurse Oleena told him his temperature was not being taken because he was not on the “medical list”; that Defendant Smith never responded to his request to know why a quarantine tag was placed on his cell; and that Nurse Smith and Nurse Ferdarko have told new nurses not to take Easley seriously.
Regarding personal protective equipment, Easley said that nurses walk around the prison handing out medication to inmates at their cells but that they do not wear masks, gloves, or other protective gear, even when they deliver medication to inmates who are COVID-19 positive. Inmates with COVID-19 use the same showers as other inmates. He added that other common areas also, are not disinfected, and inmates with COVID-19 are not required to wear masks.
Easley also asserted that inmates in the RHU are treated differently than other inmates. For example, he testified that while prisoners in general population are given zinc supplements- presumably as a prophylactic measure for COVID-19- RHU residents are not. He added that RHU inmates are not tested for COVID-19. Easley traces the outbreak of COVID-19 in the RHU to an inmate named Menevin, who was moved to the RHU and housed in his own cell after testing positive for COVID-19.
Easley said he wanted nurses to wear masks and personal protective equipment, for SCI-Forest staff to clean the common areas, for sick inmates to use different showers or for them to be cleaned after use by sick inmates, for the RHU inmates to get zinc and vitamin D supplements, and that COVID-19 testing be mandated for inmates in the RHU.
CHCA Smith testified with the aid of Easley's medical records, which she consulted during her testimony. Smith testified that Easley's medical records confirm that a nurse saw Easley on December 29, 2020, after he informed the medical department that “he feels like he has COVID.” On January 4, 2021, Easley told nurse practitioner Andrew Leslie that he was experiencing shortness of breath, difficulty breathing, and loss of taste and smell. Leslie's assessment showed that his lungs were within normal limits. Easley disputes that he was seen by Leslie. A COVID-19 test was ordered for Easley, which came back negative on January 6, 2021. CHCA Smith testified that she has no reason to believe that the results of his COVID-19 test were not conveyed to him, considering that his medical records show he was seen by a medical provider at least four times since he was tested.
Smith explained that quarantine tags are placed on inmate's cell doors when it is suspected that the inmate may have been exposed to COVID-19. This allows the staff to limit the inmate's movements to mitigate the disease's spread. She had no reason to believe Easley was in any way singled out for a quarantine tag for any reason other than his report of COVID-19 symptoms.
Smith also testified that personal protective equipment is required for all nurses and that Easley is wrong about nurses not wearing masks. SCI-Forest procedure dictates that nurses always wear a cloth mask, and, in an enhanced quarantine unit, they must wear an N95 mask-which is a more secure face covering. Gloves are not required for nurses, but some do wear them according to Smith.
Smith also testified that she had no reason to believe that cleaning supplies were being confiscated or threatened to be confiscated. The prison block's Captain reported to her that staff periodically remove inmates from their cells and disinfect the cells. Smith also testified that all showers are disinfected between each use pursuant to prison policy.
Regarding Easley's care, Smith testified that she has never directed medical staff to treat Easley differently from other inmates, was not aware of anyone else saying this, and was not aware until the day of the hearing that Easley made a complaint about the medical care he received on December 29, 2020.
To date, Easley has never tested positive for COVID-19.
D. The Legal Requirements to Issue a Preliminary Injunction Are High
The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. See Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2017); Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court should issue the injunction only if the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing ECRI v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)). The burden of introducing evidence to support a preliminary injunction is on the moving party with respect to the first two factors; however, the same is not true of the second two factors. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem Intern., Inc., 69 Fed.Appx. 550, 554 (3d Cir. 2003).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an "extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances." American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The facts must clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a "clear showing of irreparable injury." Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief. Acierno, 40 F.3d at 655.
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief "must always be viewed with great caution because 'judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration."' Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is "not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate 'in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are "in court" ... '." Stiel v. Fed. Breau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Mubammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, "appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the "operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
E. Analysis
At the outset, the Court acknowledges the unprecedented magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic and the extremely serious health risks it presents, particularly within the prison setting. The evidence before the Court in this case, however, is insufficient to support that the medical care Easley has been provided (or allegedly denied), or conditions within the RHU in general, threaten Easley with immediate or irreparable harm. Based upon the record, including the testimony introduced during the evidentiary hearing, Easley's claims of threatened harm are speculative, at best.
Easley has no underlying health condition that would make him more susceptible to COVID-19 or more vulnerable to serious illness in the event of infection. Although he reported certain symptoms commonly associated with COVID-19, he tested "negative" for the virus. When Easley reported these symptoms, nurse practitioner Andrew Leslie assessed Easley's lung function and determined it to be normal, and a COVID-19 test was administered promptly thereafter. Easley's medical records document that he has been seen by the medical department six times since he reported flu-like symptoms, including on December 29, 2020 and on January 4, 2021, when he was tested for COVID-19. Between January 4, 2021 and the date of the hearing, Easley was seen by the medical department on four additional occasions.
Easley has also failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate healthcare, an inmate must demonstrate that the defendant was "deliberately indifferent" to the his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). "The Constitution 'does not mandate comfortable prisons,' but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and ... 'the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment."' Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (first quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), then quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)). "In order to sustain this constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that 'the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs' and (2) an objective showing that 'those needs were serious."' Pearson v. Prison Hlth, Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Deliberate indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or "persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury." White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990). This is not an objective test of intent; instead, deliberate indifference means that "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In assessing an alleged Eighth Amendment violation in the COVID-19 context, the central inquiries are whether the plaintiff presents with a serious medical need and whether the Defendants' mental state evinces deliberate indifference to that need. Easley's evidence falls short on both inquiries. Regarding the first inquiry, although Easley previously exhibited several symptoms consistent with a coronavirus infection and complains that some of those symptoms persist, he has not tested positive for the disease and his medical records and overall appearance do not indicate any acute or chronic serious medical need. Cf. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 840 (6th Cir. 2020) (objective "serious medical need" element of Eighth Amendment claim satisfied where plaintiff inmate was elderly and presented with particular vulnerability to COVID-19).
The second inquiry considers the medical care prison officials have provided and the prophylactic steps they have taken to reduce the disease's spread. See Willson, 961 F.3d at 840 (noting that the key inquiry is whether officials "responded reasonably to the risk" of COVID-19) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970)). In this case, the evidence shows that Easley is both receiving care for his complaints and symptoms and that SCI-Forest prison officials are taking reasonable measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Easley was promptly assessed and tested for coronavirus after he reported symptoms. He was quarantined pending the results of his test, which were negative. He was seen by the medical department on six different occasions from December 19, 2020 to the date of the hearing. Regarding measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the prison, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and SCI-Forest policies require nurses and staff to wear masks and other personal protective equipment, quarantine of inmates with suspected COVID-19 exposure, use of quarantine tags on the cells of possibly infected inmates, and single-cell assignment and isolation of prisoners in the RHU who test positive for COVID-19.
Other courts have found such actions constitute reasonable measures to combat the spread of the virus in prison. See Wilson, 961 F.3d at 841. Although SCI-Forest's execution of these measures may be incomplete or nonoptimal at times, any alleged deficiencies fall well short of the evidence necessary to show deliberate indifference. See id. ("while the harm imposed by COVID-19 on inmates at Elkton 'ultimately [is] not averted,' the BOP has 'responded reasonably to the risk' and therefore has not been deliberately indifferent to the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights") (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970).
See also Bevins v. Kauffman, 2021 WL 322168 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021) (noting: “The DOC has provided publicly available information regarding its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See COVID-19 and the DOC, https://www.cor.pa.gov/PAges/COVID-19.aspx (last accessed Jan. 28, 2021 7:06 a.m.).
In Massey v. Wetzel, this Court denied a preliminary injunction sought by an inmate who feared catching COVID-19 even where that inmate had underlying medical conditions-including diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, and obesity-that placed him at a higher risk for mortality or serious injury. 2020 WL 5526688, at *1, *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2020). The plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm because his prison had no positive COVID-19 cases among staff or inmates. Id., at *3. Moreover, he failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment due to the numerous and sustained efforts undertaken in good faith by the staff at his prison to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Id., at *3. When presented with a motion for reconsideration based on new evidence of a new and "alarming" spread of COVID-19 in the prison, the Court in Massey denied reconsideration. 2020 WL 7769831 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2020) (slip copy) appeal filed, No. 21-1234 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2021). When the "question before the Court is whether the Eighth Amendment requires Defendants to do more than they are already doing to mitigate the risk of harm, '' the Court explained, "an increase in infection rate alone is insufficient to prove deliberate indifference, especially in light of the many preventative measures the institution has implemented." Id., at *2. The Court noted that, to its knowledge, the prison was "making every reasonable effort to protect inmates against the virus and to treat those who have contracted it." Id. Easley is younger and in better health than the inmate in Massey. And based on Easley's submissions and CHCA Smith's testimony, the Court has no reason to believe that SCI-Forest officials are not acting diligently and in good faith to limit COVID-19's spread within the prison.
Furthermore, to the extent Easley seeks to raise a deliberate indifference claim on behalf of other inmates, he lacks standing. To successfully assert third-party standing, a plaintiff must suffer an injury, have a close relationship with the third party, and the third party must face some obstacle that prevents it from pursuing its own claims. See Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 376 (3d Cir. 2003). Easley has made no such showing. See Cortlessa v. Fitzgerald, 2015 WL 8488859 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2015) (dismissing claim for lack of standing when allegations were that defendants were beating other inmates, not plaintiff) (citing Nasir, 350 F.3d at 376)) report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 8492766 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2015.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Easley's Motion for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order at ECF No. 6 be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(6)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party' opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(6)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).