Opinion
605338/19
07-09-2019
MHC GREENWOOD VILLAGE NY, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Defendants.
For Plaintiff: Lazer Aptheker Rosella, P.C., 225 Old Country Road, Melville, NY 11747 For Defendant: United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 151 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20410
For Plaintiff: Lazer Aptheker Rosella, P.C., 225 Old Country Road, Melville, NY 11747
For Defendant: United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 151 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20410
Carmen Victoria St. George, J. Plaintiff moves this Court unopposed pursuant to CPLR § 3215 for a default judgment against defendant, who has not answered the complaint.
I. Background
This is an action for declaratory judgment as concerns the status of a leasehold mortgage purportedly held by the defendant to a modular home located at 175 Village Circle West, Manorville, NY 11949. In a separate action (Index No.: 620356/2017, Quinlan, J.) , the leasehold mortgage held by Urban Financial of America LLC was extinguished and cancelled and Urban Financial of America LLC's leasehold interest was terminated. Plaintiff now seeks a declaration that any leasehold mortgage held by defendant in the instant action is extinguished with any rights and interests of defendant in connection with such leasehold mortgage. Allegedly, ownership of the modular home was transferred to plaintiff in exchange for the release of past due and continuing liability. By operation of law when the modular home was conveyed to plaintiff any agreements were terminated and plaintiff assumed the obligation for the ongoing real property taxes. Urban Financial of America LLC consented to the extinguishment and cancellation of its mortgage secured by its leasehold interest, and accordingly a judgment was entered extinguishing and cancelling the record of mortgage.
MHC Greenwood Village NY, LLC v. Urban Financial of America LLC f/k/a Urban Financial Group, Inc. and Gregory Davidowitch, as Executor and Distributee of the Estate of Diane Davidowitch
The instant action was commenced on March 29, 2019 by service of a summons and complaint upon defendant by personal service. Additionally, plaintiff mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the Attorney General by certified mail on April 1, 2019. Defendant has not as of yet appeared, answered or moved in respect to the verified complaint. In support of its motion, plaintiff submits, inter alia , copies of the proof of service with electronic confirmation notice and a printout of the New York State Courts Electronic Filings for the instant action. This Court, ex mero motu , dismisses the action in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 3211. II. Analysis
This term here being equivalent to cx proprio motu or sua sponte.
Pursuant to CPLR § 3211, an action or a proceeding may be dismissed by reason of the fact that the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. ( CPLR § 3211 [a][2] ). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court, even if stipulated by the parties. An objection may be made at any time during the action, and parties are not foreclosed from raising it in the future if they had previously failed to do so. Furthermore, the court, on its own motion may refuse to proceed further and dismiss the action if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. ( Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. , 112 N.Y. 315, 324, 19 N.E. 625 [1889] ; see also Henry v. Green , 126 Misc.2d 360, 481 N.Y.S2d 940, 941 [Mt. Vernon City Ct. 1984] )("if the [c]ourt itself notices a lack of such jurisdiction, it may dismiss on its own motion, regardless of the means whereby the objection to the jurisdiction comes to its attention and whether or not any motion has been made for dismissal").
"Subject matter jurisdiction has been defined as the power to adjudge concerning the general question involved, and is not dependent upon the state of facts which may appear in a particular case, arising, or which is claimed to have arisen, under the general question." ( Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co. , 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 225 N.E.2d 503 [1967], quoting Hunt v. Hunt , 72 N.Y. 217, 229 [1878] ). As a "court of original, unlimited and unqualified jurisdiction" ( Matter of Fry v. Village of Tarrytown , 89 N.Y.2d 714, 718, 658 N.Y.S.2d 205, 680 N.E.2d 578 [1997], quoting Kagen v. Kagen , 21 N.Y.2d 532, 537, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195, 236 N.E.2d 475 [1968] ), the New York State Supreme Court is vested with general original jurisdiction and is competent to entertain almost all causes of action. (see NY Const. Art. 6 § 7 [a] ). The word almost is a necessary qualifier, although general and limited are seen as antonyms in the doctrine of jurisdiction, general does not mean unlimited. In fact, there are two categories of original jurisdiction the New York State Supreme Court lacks; cases in which the federal constitution or an act of Congress confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts and actions against the State of New York where jurisdiction is conferred exclusively on the Court of Claims. (see Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co. , 19 N.Y.2d at 159, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 225 N.E.2d 503, supra). Neither an act of our state legislature nor contractual terms between parties can divest the Supreme Court of its general original jurisdiction. (see Pollicina v. Misericordia Hosp. Ctr. , 82 N.Y.2d 332, 604 N.Y.S.2d 879, 624 N.E.2d 974 [1993] ; Lischinskaya v. Carnival Corp. , 56 A.D.3d 116, 865 N.Y.S.2d 334 [2d Dept. 2008] ).
US Const. art. VI (Supremacy Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (exclusive federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a) (exclusive federal jurisdiction over patents).
Ct. of Claims Act § 8,9 (waiver of sovereignty conditioned on Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction over such matters).
To be sure, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for declaratory judgment. ( CPLR § 3001 ). This Court, therefore, can only be divested off its general, original subject matter jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment by competent constitutional provisions or acts of federal law. The inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction is necessary because before this Court is no ordinary defendant but in fact the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) - the head of a federal agency and an officer of the United States. In deciding whether this Court possesses jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action brought against the defendant HUD the court must possess subject matter jurisdiction. Claims against the United States are barred unless sovereign immunity has been "unequivocally" waived by a federal statute. (See United States v. Mitchell , 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 [1980] ). "Because an action against a federal agency or federal officers in their official capacity is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are also barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived." ( Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp. , 21 F.3d 502, 510 [2d Cir. 1994] ).
When the United States holds title to property, the statute that provides a remedy is the Quiet Title Act; the exclusive means by which a person may bring a claim. ( Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands , 461 U.S. 273, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 [1983] ) (holding that the Quiet Title Act was the exclusive means by which a property owner may challenge the United States' interest in real property).
The Quiet Title Act is the exclusive means by which a person may bring a claim challenging title to real property held by the United States because as a sovereign it cannot be sued without its consent. ( Id. at 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811 ; see also Hercules, Inc. v. United States , 516 U.S. 417, 422, 116 S.Ct. 981, 134 L.Ed.2d 47 [1996] ). Consent is provided when the Congress, by enacting legislation, waives the United States' sovereign immunity. "Only upon passage of the [Quiet Title Act] did the United States waive its immunity with respect to suits involving title to land." ( Block , 461 U.S. at 280, 103 S.Ct. 1811 ]. When Congress "attaches conditions to legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, those conditions must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied." ( Id. at 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811 ).
One condition imposed by the Quiet Title Act is that claims challenging the United States' title to real property must be brought in federal court. Federal district courts, "have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil actions" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409 (a) "to quiet tile to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States." ( 28 U.S.C. § 1346 [f] (emphasis provided); see also Cummings v. United States , 648 F.2d 289, 291 [5th Cir. 1981] ). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (f), state courts have no jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff's claim disputing title to real property held by the United States.
The Quiet Title Act divests this Court of its original jurisdiction. In short, the Court "has not the competence" to adjudicate the matter further. Thus, because this Court has no jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims - the action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons 156 (Vintage International 1990) (1960).
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff's action is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a)(2), on the Court's own motion.
ORDERED, the action is dismissed in its entirety.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.