Opinion
No. 1655 C.D. 2011 No. 1656 C.D. 2011
07-31-2013
Alexander Medley, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Appellant, Alexander Medley, appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court), which denied his appeals from the suspensions of his vehicle operating privilege. Appellant argues that the imposition of consecutive license suspensions violates his right to equal protection and substantive due process. We affirm.
On March 2, 2011, pursuant to Section 3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(i), the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) suspended Appellant's operating privileges for one year as a result of his conviction for driving under the influence of a controlled substance, in violation of Section 3802(d), as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(d). Additionally, pursuant to Section 1532(c)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(c)(1)(i), PennDOT suspended Appellant's operating privileges for six months as a result of his conviction for violating Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act). The suspensions were to run consecutively.
Section 3804(e) provides in relevant part:
(1) The department shall suspend the operating privilege of an individual under paragraph (2) upon receiving a certified record of the individual's conviction ... for:
(i) an offense under section 3802; or
* * *
(2) Suspension under paragraph (1) shall be in accordance with the following:
(i) Except as provided for in subparagraph (iii), 12 months for an ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor of the second degree under this chapter.
Section 1532(c)(1)(i) provides as follows:
(c) Suspension.--The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any person upon receiving a certified record of the person's conviction of any offense involving the possession...of any controlled substance under the laws of the United States, this Commonwealth or any other state....
(1) The period of suspension shall be as follows:
(i) For a first offense, a period of six months from the date of the suspension.
Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). Section 13(a)(16) prohibits "[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not" so authorized by law.
Appellant appealed the suspensions to the trial court, which consolidated the two appeals for disposition. At his hearing, the trial court refused to allow Appellant to submit evidence of his medical condition, ruling that such evidence was not relevant to the suspensions. Appellant also argued that the two offenses occurred at the same time and were essentially one criminal incident and that the offenses should merge for purposes of the license suspension. Appellant further argued that the license suspension statute as applied denied him equal protection and due process. The trial court entered an order denying Appellant's license suspension appeals. Appellant appealed to this Court. In its opinion in support of its decision filed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court rejected Appellant's argument that the two crimes merged into a single criminal incident for the purpose of license suspension, but did not address Appellant's equal protection and due process arguments.
Appellant argues that the mandatory license suspension provisions, as applied, violate his right to equal protection and substantive due process. Appellant asserts that the law regarding mandatory license suspension is so stringent that it lacks a rational basis.
Appellant claims that in light of his alleged medical condition the imposition of two successive suspensions violated his right to equal protection because he is not in like circumstances as other offenders and therefore should not be treated the same as others. Appellant maintains that there is no important governmental interest in suspending his license for 18 months. Appellant further asserts that the imposition of consecutive suspensions lacks a rational basis in his case because his medical condition could lead to severe problems in the future which would otherwise not occur but for the license suspension and could lead to significant societal expense if he lost the function of his lone remaining kidney. Appellant relies upon Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), for the proposition that just as criminal sentences should be individualized and reasonable, a license suspension should also be subject to individualization rather than blanket mandatory punishment.
In Booker, the Supreme Court concluded that federal sentencing guidelines are merely advisory because the provision of the federal sentencing statute that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution, which requires juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to sentencing. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. Judges may consider the sentencing guidelines, but are permitted to tailor the punishment in light of other statutory concerns. Id. at 245-46. The Booker holding is not applicable to this proceeding as Sixth Amendment concerns are not relevant to the imposition of collateral civil consequences of a criminal conviction.
There is a strong presumption that statutes enacted by the General Assembly are constitutional. Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 304, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996). A statute will be found unconstitutional only if it "clearly, palpably and plainly" violates the constitution. Id. Under an equal protection analysis, "a classification which does not impermissibly interfere with a fundamental right or disadvantageously affect a suspect class will be upheld as long as it passes a rational relationship test." Commonwealth v. Jenner, 545 Pa. 445, 458, 681 A.2d 1266, 1273 (1996). To prevail upon an equal protection claim, the person claiming the violation must establish that the asserted classification and disparate treatment of certain drivers do not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly held that driving a motor vehicle is a privilege, not a fundamental right. Jenner, 545 Pa. at 458, 681 A.2d at 1273; Commonwealth v. Zimmer, 539 Pa. 548, 559, 653 A.2d 1217, 1222-23 (1995); Commonwealth v. Yarger, 538 Pa. 329, 335, 648 A.2d 529, 531 (1994); Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 394, 186 A. 65, 67-68 (1936). We also note that Section 1532(c)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code does not implicate a suspect class, such as race, religion, or sex.
In Commonwealth v. Wylie, 638 A.2d 433 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), Wylie appealed a 90-day suspension of her driver's license pursuant to Section 13(m) of the Drug Act, 35 P.S. § 780-113(m), asserting that the automatic suspension of her license for a drug offense violated her right to equal protection because it had a disproportionate impact on drug offenders who received less than a one year sentence and who lived in a rural area, and to whom a driver's license was necessary for their livelihood. The court held that even though a driver's license suspension may impact a rural resident more severely than an urban resident, such disparity does not violate a licensee's right to equal protection. Id. at 436. The court stated that just as mandatory criminal sentences are not unconstitutional, neither is the imposition of uniform penalties on licensees convicted of certain drug offenses without regard to the individual circumstance. Id. We accordingly conclude that Appellant's equal protection challenge is without merit.
Section 13(m) has been repealed and superseded by 75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(c). --------
Appellant further argues that Section 1532(c)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code is unconstitutional as applied to him because there are mitigating circumstances and factors that, if considered, would have relevance to the determination of the rational basis of the statute and the determination whether or not mandatory, consecutive penalties are appropriate for every offender. An as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of a statute does not challenge the constitutionality of a statute as written; rather it challenges its application to a particular person under particular circumstances as depriving that person of a constitutional right. Caba v. Weaknecht, 64 A.3d 39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated in Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 255, 666 A.2d 265, 267-68 (1995):
The essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection under the law is that like persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly. However, it does not require that all persons under all circumstances enjoy identical protection under the law. The right to equal protection under the law does not absolutely prohibit the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purpose of receiving different treatment, and does not require equal treatment of people having different needs.A successful equal protection claim must show that similarly situated licensees have not been treated the same and that the decisions were the result of an arbitrary classification, such as race or religion, or to prevent a licensee's exercise of a fundamental right. Id.
The license suspension statute is facially neutral and as stated above driving a motor vehicle is a privilege, not a fundamental right. Appellant belongs to a class of licensees whose operating privileges are subject to suspension as a result of their classification as first time offenders under the Drug Act. Section 1532(c)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code treats all first time offenders similarly. As to discriminatory effect, all that can be said is that from offender to offender, the loss of one's license will affect each licensee to varying degrees. This is simply a fact of life and not a violation of equal protection. Appellant's license suspension was a consequence of his conviction under the Drug Act, which is facially neutral and uniformly applied. We conclude that there is no equal protection violation as applied to Appellant.
Appellant further argues that the imposition of consecutive suspensions violates his right to substantive due process. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth does not possess a rational basis for blanket punishment for those who commit certain offenses. Analysis of a substantive due process challenge requires the court to first determine whether the statute seeks to promote any legitimate state interest or public value. Plowman v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314, 319, 635 A.2d 124, 127 (1993). Next, the court must determine whether the statute is reasonably related to accomplishing the articulated state interest. Id.
In Plowman, our Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth had a legitimate interest in preventing the proliferation of drug use and that the prospect of losing one's license may deter a potential drug user from committing a drug offense or to at least consider how the suspension of a driver's license could impact employment. Appellant argues that Plowman is distinguishable because the deterrent implications are absent in this case as he was sentenced to three years of incarceration, whereas Plowman was subject to de minimis punishment, i.e., no more than 30 days imprisonment and/or a $500 fine. Appellant's attempts to distinguish Plowman fail. The mere difference in the sentences imposed in the two cases does not negate the Commonwealth's interest in deterring drug use. Further, if the deterrent implications were absent in this case, Appellant would not now be arguing before this Court about the unfairness of having his license suspended for a total of 18 months. If Appellant had only considered the effect a license suspension would have on his ability to seek medical treatment, he would not have gotten behind the wheel of a car while not only in possession of a controlled substance but also under the influence of a controlled substance. We reject Appellant's substantive due process claim.
Finally, Appellant argues that it is irrational to permit offenders in underlying criminal proceedings to negotiate sentencing, while imposing mandatory civil consequences for criminal convictions. Appellant asserts that because the license suspension provisions are now contained in Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code entitled "Penalties," the General Assembly intended that such suspensions be considered criminal penalties rather than collateral civil consequences.
In Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174 (1994), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that license suspensions are collateral civil consequences rather than criminal penalties. See also Commonwealth v. Wolf, 534 Pa. 283, 291, 632 A.2d 864, 867 (1993) (holding that "a mandatory suspension of a driver's license upon conviction for DUI is a collateral civil penalty administratively imposed by [PennDOT] pursuant to the mandates of the Motor Vehicle Code not the Crimes Code" and that "the mandatory suspension is not a direct criminal penalty, but rather, is a civil sanction wholly unrelated to Petitioner's appeal of the criminal conviction to the Superior Court"). The Supreme Court noted that "[a] consequence is civil in nature where, 'imposition has been vested in an administrative agency over which the criminal judge has no control and for which he has no responsibility.'" Duffey, 536 Pa. at 442, 639 A.2d at 1177.
Appellant's argument is without merit. In 2003, the General Assembly amended the Vehicle Code consolidating many of the civil and criminal consequences of driving while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance into a single chapter. However, the General Assembly did not divest PennDOT of the authority to impose license suspensions. As long as the power to suspend operating privileges remains vested in PennDOT, such suspensions remain non-discretionary collateral civil consequences rather than criminal penalties.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 31st day of July, 2013, the order of Court of Common Pleas of Chester County is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge