Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-01071-MGL-JDA
05-04-2022
Latson R. Matthews, Plaintiff, v. Captain Mr. Vela, Lt. Mr. Bayley, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Latson R. Matthews (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and is presently incarcerated at the Broad River Correctional Institution. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff broke his wrist on June 22, 2021. [Id. at 1.] On June 28, 2021, he was sent to the RHU because his roommate said that he had hit him; however, Plaintiff was never charged with anything. [Id.] Plaintiff stayed in the RHU for 82 days. [Id.] He had surgery on his wrist on July 1, 2021. [Id.]
Before Plaintiff left for the RHU, he placed all of his property in a buggy. [Id.] Defendants were in charge of Plaintiff's property and said they could send it to lock up only after it went through security. [Id.] When Plaintiff was placed back on the yard, all of his property was missing. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he has receipts for all of his missing property, which includes the following: a TV, a fan, a hot pot, a lamp, four wall cords, a TV cord, New Balance shoes, 5 Star boots, one pack of T-shirts, five pairs of socks, and all of his legal materials. [Id.] Plaintiff has asked the security staff and warden where his property is, but no one knows what happened to it. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments due to their “neglect and wrongful acts.” [Id. at 7.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends Defendants deprived him of his personal property when they moved him and lost his property. [Id.] Plaintiff summarizes his claim as follows:
My protective rights due to my property was stolen due to neglect and wrongful act of employee for Government. Lt. Bayley [and] Captain Velo were responsible for the protective right of my property. It is a procedure to keep safe all personal property when being transferred to lock-up or another yard. Allowed items to be stolen.[Id. at 8.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks $1,000 for actual damages for the cost of his lost items and $2,000 in punitive damages. [Id. at 9.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
No due process violation
Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights by losing his property when he was moved to the RHU. [Doc. 1 at 7-8.] The Court construes Plaintiff's claim as a procedural due process claim. However, the Constitution “does not provide a remedy to a prisoner whose personal property was lost or destroyed by prison personnel.” Sharpe v. Bush, No. 5:18-cv-00749-RBH-KDW, 2018 WL 4559100, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4538969 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2018). This is so because “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989). Although “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners form deprivations of property without due process[, ] an unauthorized deprivation of property by state officials does not violate the Due Process Clause if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss.” Simmons v. Green, No. 0:21-cv-422-RMG-PJG, 2021 WL 1431208, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2021), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 1172668 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2021) (citation omitted); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (explaining that state prison officials' destruction of a prisoner's personal property did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, even where the destruction was intentional and unauthorized by state law, because the state provided the prisoner with adequate legal remedies for his losses). Further, even “an intentional deprivation of property by a state employee, if unauthorized, does not violate the Due Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for loss is available.” Hammond v. Dean, No. 3:07-cv-654-SB, 2007 WL 3002362, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2007).
The State of South Carolina provides prisoners with post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of their lost property or to compensate them for the loss. See, e.g., Degree v. SCDC, No. 8:18-cv-2140-BHH-JDA, 2018 WL 4782335, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2018) (discussing South Carolina's post-deprivation procedures for the loss of prisoners' property), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4775066 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018); Temple v. Lewis, No. 8:19-cv-2659-SAL-JDA, 2020 WL 8872625, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 2020) (same), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 982482 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2021). Accordingly, Plaintiff's due process claim is subject to dismissal.
Negligence is not actionable
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a state law tort claim for negligence, any such claim is not actionable in this civil rights action under § 1983. [Doc. 1 at 8 (alleging his “property was stolen due to neglect and wrongful act” of Defendants).] The law is well settled that a claim for negligence is not actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[N]egligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Mere negligent conduct on the part of prison officials ... does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). Thus, to the extent that any of Plaintiff's claims arise under a theory of negligence, such claims fail, as a matter of law, to state a claim under § 1983.
Violation of prison policy is not actionable
Next, to the extent Plaintiff contends he is entitled to damages because Defendants violated prison policy or procedures, any such claim is subject to dismissal as well. [Doc. 1 at 8 (alleging “[i]t is a procedure to keep safe all personal property when being transferred to lock-up or another yard”).] Generally, violations of prison policies and/or procedures do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Joyner v. Patterson, No. 0:13-cv-2675-DCN-PJG, 2014 WL 897121, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2014) (“Section 1983 provides relief from a violation of federal constitutional rights, not from a violation of prison-created policies or procedures.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2014 WL 3909531 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2014), aff'd, 597 Fed.Appx. 748 (4th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. SCDC, No. 3:06-cv-2062-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (“[T]he failure of prison officials to follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”); Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (explaining that § 1983 “guarantees a person's constitutional rights against violation by state actors” but does not provide any relief against violations of SCDC rules and policies). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts giving rise to a constitutional violation, his contention that Defendants violated prison policy fails to state a claim for relief.
In sum, because Plaintiff “alleges nothing more than negligence on the part of the corrections officials resulting in an unintended loss of his personal property[, he] was not ‘deprived' of any right in the constitutional sense.” McIntyre v. Portee, 784 F.2d 566, 567 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, this action should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. In light of the allegations in the Complaint, the undersigned finds that no set of facts can support Plaintiff's asserted claims for relief. Accordingly, the District Court should dismiss this action without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to grant an opportunity to amend where amendment would be futile); Young v. Santos, No. GLR-16-cv-1321, 2018 WL 1583557, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018) (same).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).