Opinion
Submitted June 16, 2000
October 2, 2000.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeals are from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Queens County (Fitzmaurice, J.), dated November 5, 1998, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the first degree and menacing in the second degree, and (2) an order of disposition of the same court, dated November 13, 1998, which, upon the fact-finding order, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services for three years.
Peter Wilner, Jamaica Estates, N.Y., for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Daniel P. Derechin of counsel), for respondent.
Before: ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., DANIEL F. LUCIANO, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the appeal from the fact-finding order is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order is not appealable as of right and leave to appeal has not been granted (see, Family Ct Act § 365.1); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The record does not support the appellant's claim that the presentment agency failed to turn over Brady and Rosario material (cf., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83; People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286; People v. Bailey, 200 A.D.2d 677; People v. McBayne, 160 A.D.2d 735; see also, People v. Figueroa, 213 A.D.2d 669).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see, Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793; Matter of Donnell T., 265 A.D.2d 330), we find that it was legally sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the first degree (see, Penal Law § 160.00, 160.15) and menacing in the second degree (see, Penal Law § 120.14). Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence, are primarily questions to be determined by the finder of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, Matter of Donnell T., supra; Matter of Frank Z., 259 A.D.2d 705; Matter of Jamarl J., 258 A.D.2d 583; Matter of Haile B., 252 A.D.2d 497; Matter of Nnennya P., 247 A.D.2d 476; Matter of Joseph J., 205 A.D.2d 776). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, Matter of Donnell T., supra; Matter of Nnennya P. supra). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the court's determination was not against the weight of the evidence (cf., CPL 470.15).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.