Opinion
April 2, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thorp, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The hearing court, with its advantages of having seen and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761), determined that the defendant's claims of having demanded and been refused access to counsel, of having been forced to participate in the lineups by threat of physical abuse, and of having been interrogated in the same manner, were patently incredible. We find no reason for disturbing this conclusion on appeal. Because the defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily made after waiver of his Miranda rights, they were properly ruled admissible. The defendant waived any claim of untimely notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 (1) by pleading guilty (see, People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1).
The evidence clearly indicated that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, the facts leading to the reasonable inference that he had committed the robbery in question (see, People v. Crosby, 91 A.D.2d 20; CPL 140.10).
The defendant's assertion that the lineup was conducted in an unfair or unduly suggestive manner is clearly without merit. That the complainants were informed that the individual who had robbed them might be in the lineup in no way tainted the procedure or led to the danger of an irreparable misidentification by either complainant (see, People v. Rodriguez, 64 N.Y.2d 738; People v Wiredo, 138 A.D.2d 652).
The defendant's argument that the gun was improperly ruled admissible is unfounded. The police had probable cause to believe that the car driven by the defendant was stolen, and might contain evidence of the crimes the defendant was reasonably suspected of having committed (see, People v. Brown, 28 N.Y.2d 282). In addition, at the hearing, the defendant did not sustain his burden of demonstrating that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen vehicle (see, People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160; People v. Vargas, 140 A.D.2d 472).
The defendant's contention that he was improperly denied access to exculpatory Brady evidence is plainly without merit. Complainant Wilson merely stated during her initial review of photographs on the day of the robbery that one photograph "favored" the individual who had robbed her and her companion. However, she likewise made it clear that she did not believe the photograph was of the perpetrator. The police were thus under no duty to set this photograph aside for submission to the defense, since it was immaterial (cf., People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to either be without merit or unpreserved for appellate review. Sullivan, J.P., Harwood, Balletta and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.