Opinion
Argued September 29, 2000.
October 30, 2000.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (DePhillips, J.), dated October 7, 1998, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated July 20, 1998, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of menacing in the second degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and, inter alia, placed him on probation for a period of two years. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated July 20, 1998.
Lisa R. Marlow Wolland, Montrose, N.Y., for appellant.
Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Paul L. Herzfeld of counsel), for respondent.
Before: CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The record does not support the appellant's claim that the court should have required the presentment agency to document its search for allegedly missing Rosario material (see, People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286). The presentment agency represented that it had provided all of the Rosario material (cf., People v. Poole, 48 N.Y.2d 144; see, Matter of Robert H., 240 A.D.2d 409). The appellant provided no factual basis for his claim that there must have been additional Rosario material (see, Matter of Robert H., supra; Matter of Michael R., 223 A.D.2d 465; cf., People v. Ray, 224 A.D.2d 722).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see, Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793; Matter of George Omar-Saiid C., 272 A.D.2d 399; Matter of Frank Z., 259 A.D.2d 705; Matter of Jamarl J., 258 A.D.2d 583), we find that it was legally sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of menacing in the second degree (see, Penal Law § 120.14). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the court's determination was not against the weight of the evidence (cf., CPL 470.15).