Opinion
February 2, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Albany County.
Petitioner, a receptionist, alleges that she sustained injuries when she slipped and fell on wet pavement while walking through a garage in an underground walkway during the performance of her duties. Her application to respondent New York State and Local Employees' Retirement System for accidental disability retirement benefits was denied on the ground that she was not permanently disabled. After a request for a review and redetermination, respondent Comptroller concluded, following three administrative hearings, that petitioner had not suffered an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law. It was further determined that her fall was not causally related to her injuries and that she was not permanently unable to perform her duties as a receptionist. Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding contending that the determination was not supported by substantial evidence.
We note that although the application was initially denied upon a finding that she was not permanently incapacitated, it is well established that in order to be entitled to benefits, petitioner bears the burden of establishing that she suffered an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law, that she is permanently incapable of resuming her employment duties, and that such disability is causally related to her fall (see, e.g., Matter of Longendyke v. Regan, 195 A.D.2d 695; Matter of DiFede v. Regan, 130 A.D.2d 832; Matter of Finnegan v. Regan, 116 A.D.2d 878). Hence, since the Comptroller is vested with "exclusive authority" to determine all applications for retirement benefits (see, Matter of Leone v. Regan, 146 A.D.2d 869; Matter of Augustine v. Regan, 81 A.D.2d 708; Matter of Schack v. Levitt, 65 A.D.2d 881), he was not estopped from raising any defense thereto at any time (see, Matter of Augustine v Regan, supra). We further note that as to the manner in which the accident occurred, petitioner testified in detail as to such facts and did not object to the introduction of this evidence until the Retirement System attempted to explore such facts upon cross-examination. Accordingly, we find that the Hearing Officer committed no procedural error in allowing the Retirement System to raise such issue at the hearing (see, Matter of Schack v Levitt, supra).
Petitioner's contention that the Hearing Officer improperly excluded the introduction of the findings of permanent disability rendered by both the Workers' Compensation Board and Social Security Administration is similarly rejected since "an administrative determination under one statute is not binding on another agency when the same question arises under another statute" (Matter of Dickstein v. State Tax Commn., 67 A.D.2d 1033, 1034; see, Matter of Kurzyna v. Communicar, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 924, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 754; Matter of Leone v. Regan, supra). Therefore, the Hearing Officer was not obligated to accept the introduction of such findings at the hearing before him (see, Matter of Snyder v. New York State Empl. Retirement Sys., 43 A.D.2d 871, lv denied 34 N.Y.2d 519; Matter of Sohmer v. Levitt, 23 A.D.2d 714). We note further that the Hearing Officer did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit a hearsay report containing medical conclusions as to the permanency of petitioner's disability (see, Matter of Motta v. New York State Policemen's Firemen's Retirement Sys., 68 A.D.2d 994; Matter of Nolan v Comptroller of State of N.Y., 59 A.D.2d 799) and that any further procedural irregularities noted by petitioner have been reviewed by us and found to be without merit.
Addressing the Comptroller's determination to deny petitioner accidental disability retirement benefits, it is well settled that the Comptroller "is responsible for construing the terms of the Retirement and Social Security Law, constructions of which must be upheld if not unreasonable * * *. It is equally well settled that the Comptroller's determinations must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Cassidy v. Regan, 160 A.D.2d 1210, 1211 [citations omitted]). We find that petitioner testified that her duties regularly required that she pick up photograph requests which necessitated her to regularly walk through the garage where she fell. On the date of the alleged injury, it is uncontested that the garage was wet and slick as a result of a rainstorm. Petitioner acknowledges being warned by a maintenance worker to be careful due to the wet floor and petitioner acknowledges that she thereafter proceeded with caution. Petitioner further acknowledges that the maintenance man held her arm while she was walking to avoid falling.
It is axiomatic that an "accident" within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law § 63 "contemplates a sudden fortuitous mischance which is out of the ordinary and injurious in impact" (Matter of Smith v. New York State Local Retirement Sys., 199 A.D.2d 763, 764), and that "an injury which occurs without an unexpected event as the result of an act undertaken in the performance of ordinary employment duties is not an accidental injury" (supra, at 764-765; see, Matter of McCambridge v. McGuire, 62 N.Y.2d 563; Matter of Lichtenstein v. Board of Trustees, 57 N.Y.2d 1010). We find that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Comptroller's determination that petitioner did not meet her burden of proving that she suffered an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law, whether due to a slip on the wet surface (see, Matter of Covel v. New York State Empls. Retirement Sys., 84 A.D.2d 902, lv denied 55 N.Y.2d 606) or a "misstep" when her heel was allegedly caught in a drain regularly in her path (see, Matter of Seim v. Regan, 191 A.D.2d 931; Matter of Dering v. Regan, 177 A.D.2d 931, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 751; Matter of Chambers v. Regan, 125 A.D.2d 920).
Moreover, were we to reach the issue of permanency, we would uphold the Comptroller's finding that petitioner was not permanently unable to perform her duties as a receptionist.
Mikoll, J.P., Mercure, Crew III and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.