Opinion
May 1, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Lefkowitz, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order entered November 10, 1992, is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment entered March 30, 1993, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from that portion of the order dated June 14, 1993, as denied the petitioner's motion to reargue the provision in the order entered November 10, 1992, which directed a hearing on damages is dismissed, as no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to reargue; and it is further,
Ordered that the portion of the order dated June 14, 1993, which denied in part the petitioner's motion to amend the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.
The appeal from that portion of the intermediate order entered November 10, 1992, as granted the respondent's cross motion to confirm the arbitration award must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The appeal from that portion of the intermediate order entered November 10, 1992, which directed a hearing on damages must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of a judgment dated December 14, 1993 (see, Matter of Kaplan v Werlin, 215 A.D.2d 387 [decided herewith]; see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order were brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from that judgment (see, CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The parties participated in an arbitration proceeding to resolve claims under a written retirement agreement which dissolved their law partnership. The arbitration award was issued and required the respondent, inter alia, to provide the petitioner with an accounting of 23 tort cases handled by the partnership and to remit fees based on that accounting. The petitioner commenced this proceeding to, among other things, set aside that portion of the arbitration award which limited his share of fees to only those 23 tort cases set forth in the award, and the respondent cross-moved, inter alia, to confirm the award.
The petitioner contends that the arbitration award should be set aside because the arbitrator misinterpreted the retirement agreement with respect to his share of fees derived from partnership tort cases. However, an arbitration award will not be set aside unless it is against public policy, totally irrational or in excess of the arbitrator's powers (see, Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308; Matter of Board of Educ. v Mt. Sinai Teachers' Assn., 139 A.D.2d 733). An arbitration award will not be vacated even if the arbitrator misconstrued the plain meaning of the agreement or misapplied substantive rules of law, as long as the determination is not totally irrational or violative of a strong public policy (see, Maross Constr. v Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 66 N.Y.2d 341, 346; Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], supra). We conclude that none of the petitioner's arguments warrant vacatur of the award.
We have examined the petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Sullivan, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter and Goldstein, JJ., concur.