Opinion
May 9, 2000.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered on or about December 18, 1998, which denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the complaint reinstated, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $63,263.78 plus interest from September 22, 1989.
Evan R. Schieber, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Blaine Z. Schwadel, for Defendants-Respondents.
ROSENBERGER, J.P., WILLIAMS, LERNER, ANDRIAS, FRIEDMAN, JJ.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, since he is clearly entitled, pursuant to New York City Rent Stabilization Law ("RSL") § 26-513, to bring a plenary action to enforce the Fair Market Rent Adjustment ("FMRA") order awarded in his favor (see, 3410 Kingsbridge Partners v. Atkinson, 265 A.D.2d 204, 696 N.Y.S.2d 439; Msibi v. JRD Management Corp., 154 Misc.2d 293, 298). The motion court erred in applying to plaintiff's action the inapposite provisions of RSL § 26-516, which governs, among other things, the remedies for enforcement of rent overcharge proceedings, and the provisions of CPLR § 213-a, which set the limitations period for rent overcharge actions. The RSL prescribes no limitations period for enforcement of FMRA orders. Similarly, defendant's contention that the limitations period set forth in the New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law should be applicable to plaintiff's action is also without merit (see, Duell v. Condon, 84 N.Y.2d 773, 778; Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 210).
Defendants' remaining contentions have been reviewed and found meritless.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.