Opinion
No. 14-06-00428-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed October 11, 2007.
On Appeal from the 234th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 04-28965.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following an automobile accident, appellant, Wai-Ling Lee, sued appellee, Rose Marie Palacios, for negligence. The trial court granted Palacios's motion for summary judgment and entered a take-nothing judgment. Subsequently, the trial court denied Lee's motion for new trial. In three issues, Lee contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment, denying his motion for new trial, and refusing to modify its docket control order. All dispositive issues are settled in law. Accordingly, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In his first issue, Lee contends the trial court erred by granting Palacios's motion for summary judgment. On December 29, 2005, Palacios moved for summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds. On January 23, 2006, the trial court signed an order granting the motion. When, as in this case, the trial court does not specify in the order the grounds relied upon in granting summary judgment, we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds presented are meritorious. Western Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005); Pico v. Capriccio Italian Restaurant, 209 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). We conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the no-evidence ground.
Palacios had previously filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on February 11, 2005. A few months later, the trial court denied the motion. Subsequently, Palacios filed the motion at issue.
After adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550; Pico, 209 S.W.3d at 905. The movant must state the elements as to which there is no evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must grant the motion. Id.; Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550; Pico, 209 S.W.3d at 905.
The elements of a negligence action are (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550. In her motion, Palacios asserted there is no evidence on the third element. The record contains no response by Lee to the motion for summary judgment. To defeat a no evidence motion for summary judgment, the non-movant need not marshal his evidence, but must point out in his response evidence raising a genuine issue of fact as to the challenged elements. See comment to TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Johnson v. Brewer Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002); Pico, 209 S.W.3d at 912; San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist. 2005, no pet.); see also Michael v. Dyke, 41 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (recognizing that "[f]ailure to respond to a no evidence motion is fatal"); Judge David Hittner and Lynne Liberato, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 488 (2006) (stating that "[r]esponding to a no evidence summary judgment motion is virtually mandatory").
Although Lee has appeared pro se in the trial court and on appeal, he is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with the applicable laws and rules of procedure. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Brown v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 801 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
Although Lee's brief is unclear, he does not dispute that he failed to respond to the motion. Instead, when challenging the no-evidence summary judgment, Lee apparently cites the following items and/or accompanying "evidence" that he filed at various times: his petition; discovery responses; an untitled "letter" submitted after Palacios filed her first no-evidence motion for summary judgment; witness list, exhibit list, and proposed jury charge; his own motions for summary judgment; motion for new trial; "Submission on Reconsidering Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial"; "Motion to Exclude Evidence of Insufficient Personal Knowledge," and motion for modification of discovery control plan. Lee filed some of these items before the trial court granted summary judgment, but submitted others after the trial court granted summary judgment.
With respect to items filed before the trial court granted summary judgment, Lee did not meet his burden to respond to the no-evidence portion of Palacios's motion. Even when the non-movant files a response, the trial court is not required to search the record for evidence raising a material fact issue without more specific guidance from the non-movant See Blake v. Intco Invs. of Tex., Inc., 123 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.); Burns v. Canales, No. 14 04 00786 CV, 2006 WL 461518, at *5-6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Accordingly, absent a summary-judgment response identifying evidence raising a fact issue, the trial court was not required to review Lee's other filings to find any such evidence. Moreover, a nonmovant does not meet his burden to respond to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment by the mere existence in the court's file of a response to an earlier motion for summary judgment. See Saenz v. S. Union Gas Co., 999 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied). Consequently, even if any of the referenced items constituted a response to Palacios's earlier no-evidence motion for summary judgment, Lee did not meet his burden to respond to the later motion.
With respect to items submitted after the trial court granted summary judgment, the record does not reflect the trial court permitted late filing of a summary-judgment response. A trial court may accept summary judgment evidence filed late, even after summary judgment, as long as the court affirmatively indicates in the record that it accepted or considered the evidence. Stephens v. Dolcefino, 126 S.W.3d 120, 133-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Where nothing appears of record to indicate the trial court granted leave for late filing of a summary-judgment response, we presume the trial court did not consider the response. See Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996); INA of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614-15 (Tex. 1985); Brown v. Shores, 77 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Therefore, to the extent that any of the above-cited, late-filed items could suffice as a summary-judgment response, they were not before the trial court. See Brown, 77 S.W.3d at 887.
In sum, because Lee failed to respond to Palacios's motion for summary judgment, the trial court properly granted the motion on the no-evidence ground. See Gray v. The Kirkwood S. Comm. and All Tex. Demolishing. Inc., No. 01 02 00145 CV, 2003 WL 21513509, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 3, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding trial court did not err by granting no-evidence motion for summary judgment where non-movant failed to file a response). We overrule Lee's first issue.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF DOCKET CONTROL ORDER
Lee's second and third issues are interrelated. Again, his contentions are not clear. In his second issue, Lee apparently claims the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial because he presented an opinion from an accident-reconstruction expert after the trial court granted summary judgment. In his third issue, he complains that the trial court refused to modify its docket control order after granting summary judgment to allow Lee an opportunity to designate this expert.
Lee suggests he was entitled to a new trial because his expert's report constituted "newly discovered evidence." A party seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must establish (1) the evidence has come to his knowledge since trial, (2) it was not owing to want of due diligence that the evidence did not come to his attention sooner, (3) the evidence is not cumulative, and (4) the evidence is so material that it would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. 2003). We review the denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.
In his timely motion for new trial, Lee did not mention the expert or attach his report, much less argue that he satisfied the criteria for obtaining a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Although Lee suggests the expert was discussed at a hearing on the motion for new trial, we have no record of the hearing. Rather, Lee mentioned the expert opinion in his two pleadings entitled, "Submission on Reconsidering Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial," filed after the trial court denied his motion for new trial. Nevertheless, in these pleadings, Lee did not argue that he satisfied the criteria for obtaining a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. For instance, he failed to offer any reason he was unable to obtain an expert opinion before the trial court granted summary judgment, considering his suit had been on filed more than one and a half years at the time of the ruling. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We overrule Lee's second issue.
If these pleadings are tantamount to additional motions for new trial, they were not even timely because they were filed more than thirty days after the trial court signed the summary judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a) (providing motion for new trial shall be filed prior to or within thirty days after judgment or other order complained of is signed); IPM Products Corp. v. Motor Parkway Realty, 960 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (recognizing motion for reconsideration is equivalent of a motion for new trial). In fact, the trial court's plenary power had expired when Lee filed the second pleading because it was submitted more than thirty days after the trial court denied Lee's only timely motion for new trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e) (providing trial court has plenary power until thirty days after all timely filed motions for new trial are overruled). However, Lee seemed to characterize these pleadings as requests for rehearing from denial of the motion for new trial, as opposed to additional motions for new trial. Nonetheless, in these pleadings, he did not satisfy the criteria for obtaining a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
In addition, Lee complains that the trial court refused to modify its docket control order to extend the deadline for Lee's expert designation. This deadline expired before Palacios filed her motion for summary judgment. However, Lee suggests that, after granting summary judgment, the trial court should have modified its docket control order to allow Lee an opportunity to designate his expert. Obviously, such modification would have been meaningless unless the trial court also granted a new trial and vacated the summary judgment. As discussed, Lee failed to establish a right to a new trial based on this alleged newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the trial court did err by refusing to modify the docket control order. We overrule Lee's third issue.
Lee did not even file his "Motion for Modification of Discovery Control Plan" until after the trial court's plenary power had expired. Regardless, to the extent Lee asserts the trial court should have modified the docket control order in conjunction with ruling on his timely motion for new trial, he has shown no error.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.