Summary
holding a cosmetics store employee's injuries from a physical confrontation in a mall food court while she was on break resulted from her "personal motivations," not her employment for the cosmetics store
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C.A. No. 05A-08-008 MJB.
Submitted: March 28, 2006.
Decided: June 20, 2006.
On appeal From the Industrial Accident Board. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey S. Friedman, Esquire, Silverman, McDonald Friedman, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellant Renee Nicole Lauria.
Anthony M. Frabizzio, Esquire, Robert J. Deary, Esquire, Heckler Frabizzio, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Appellee M.A.C.
OPINION AND ORDER
Procedural History
This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board ("Board"). The issue is whether Renee Nicole Lauria ("Claimant") is entitled to compensation due to injuries she sustained on October 1, 2004. A hearing on the merits took place before the Board on August 4, 2005. A decision was rendered by the Board on August 23, 2005 denying Claimant compensation. Claimant filed a Notice of Appeal on August 29, 2005. This is the Court's Opinion and Order on Appeal.
Standard of Review
The Court has a limited role when reviewing a decision by the Industrial Accident Board. If the decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error, the decision will be affirmed. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person might find adequate to support a conclusion. The Board determines credibility, weighs evidence and makes factual findings. This Court does not sit as the trier of fact, nor should the Court substitute its judgment for that rendered by the Board. The Court must affirm the decision of the Board even if the Court might have, in the first instance, reached an opposite conclusion. Only when there is no satisfactory proof in support of a factual finding of the Board may this Court overturn it. The Board's legal interpretations are subject to plenary review. "In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court will consider the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below." Facts
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960).
Sirkin and Levine v. Timmons, 652 A.2d 1079 (Del.Super.Ct. 1994).
Oceanport Indus. Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965).
Id. at 66.
Brogan v. Value City Furniture, 2002 WL 499721, *2 (Del.Super.).
Id. at 67.
General Motors Corp. v. Parker, 1999 WL 1240820 (Del.Super.).
On October 1, 2004 Claimant was working as part of the management staff at the M.A.C. ("Employer") cosmetics store in Christiana Mall. Claimant was scheduled to work from 2:00 p.m. until 10:30 p.m. on the day of the incident. Employee was entitled to a one hour unpaid break and a paid fifteen-minute break during the course of her shift. Due to the large volume of business on October 1, 2004, Claimant was unable to leave for her one-hour break. At approximately 8:00 p.m. Claimant left the store to get something to eat and drink at the food court in the mall.
IAB Hearing No. 1262467 Transcript at 5-6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8, 10.
As Claimant was proceeding through the food court, she bumped into someone. Claimant said "excuse me" and continued through the food court. At that point Claimant heard someone behind her yelling, so she turned around and asked the person "excuse me, what did you say." The person responded by saying "you could have said excuse me, bitch." To which the Claimant responded "I did say excuse me." Claimant then turned around and the person again yelled obscenities at her. Claimant then faced the person and asked "what did you just say to me" and the person again yelled obscenities at her. Claimant then said "Look, I don't have time for this right now, I need to get back to work." Claimant then turned around to continue to her destination, when she felt something wet hit the back of her head. Apparently the person she had the confrontation with had thrown a soda at Claimant. When Claimant turned around the person threw another soda at Claimant, which she was able to avoid. As Claimant avoided the soda, the person began hitting Claimant on the back of her head and shoulders. As Claimant was being hit, another person came up behind her and held her arms, so she could not defend herself. After what Claimant describes as "two or three minutes," the assailants exited the mall through the food court doors.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
After briefly gathering her thoughts, Claimant went out the very same doors the assailants in the confrontation had just exited because, according to Claimant, there was usually security out there and it was a faster way back to Employer's store. Claimant also testified she went that way because she was afraid the assailants would follow her if she used the employee hallway she had used to get to the food court. When Claimant exited through the doors the assailants had just exited and turned to her right she heard someone yelling "bitch, you want more of me." As Claimant turned around on the sidewalk, she saw the person who had just assaulted her inside the mall kick her in the right side of the head. At that point, Claimant fell to the ground and both assailants from the previous confrontation began kicking her repeatedly. After some time, the assailants stopped kicking Claimant and left the scene. Claimant then went back to Employer's store, where her co-workers closed the store and called 911. Applicable Law
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
For an injury to be compensable under the Delaware worker's compensation statute, the injury must arise out of the employment, and must occur in the course of employment. "Arise out of" and "in the course of" employment are two separate requirements, which must be met for worker's compensation to apply.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304.
Rose v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Center Properties, 668 A.2d 782, 786 (Del.Super.Ct. 1995).
Id.
"In the course of" employment relates to the time, place and circumstances of the incident. "It covers those things that an employee may reasonably do or be expected do to [sic] within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time."
Dravo Corp. v. Strosnider, 45 A.2d 542, 543-544. (Del.Super.Ct. 1945).
The standard for an incident "arising out of" employment has been stated as follows:
It is clear, however, that the mere fact of the happening of an injury is not intended to make such injury a compensable one. There clearly must be shown a causal relation between the injury and the employment, and that the injury arose out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment, or that a connection exists between the employment and the injury, by which the employment was a substantially contributing, but not necessarily the sole or proximate, cause of the injury.
Id. at 544.
The Board found the confrontations were the result of personal motivations, and therefore, did not arise out of Claimant's employment. This Court agrees.
IAB Hearing No. 1262467 Decision at 5.
Claimant argues her injuries arose out of her employment because the "nature, condition, obligations or incidents of her employment" caused her to rush to the food court on October 1, 2004, where the confrontation occurred. Claimant avers that the busy nature of the store that day caused her to take her break late, and to quickly obtain some food and drink and, as a result, she was involved in the confrontation in the food court. Claimant further states that because the food court is a place Claimant could be reasonably expected to go during her working hours, there is a causal connection between Claimant's injuries and her employment.
Appellant Brief at 9; Dravo Corp. v. Strosnider, 45 A.2d at 544.
Appellant Brief at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Delaware recognizes the distinction between attacks on employees that are of a personal nature and attacks on employees that are neutral in character. The Board found the confrontations resulted from a personal problem the assailants had with Claimant, not anything that arose out of her employment. As authority for this holding, the Board cited Brogan v. Value City Furniture, in which the Court found an employee at Value City Furniture was assaulted by her supervisor's wife due to personal animosity, not anything related to the employment. The employee claimed the assault occurred due to gossip spread by workers at Value City, and therefore, it arose out of the employment. The Court held:
Rose v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Center Properties, 668 A.2d 782, 789-790 (Del.Super.Ct. 1995).
IAB Hearing No. 1262467 Decision at 5.
2002 WL 499721 (Del.Super.).
Id. at *4.
In order to hold the employer responsible for compensation, there must be some evidence that the company's policies or procedures contributed to the injury or their failure to take appropriate corrective action fostered a work environment that contributed to the events that lead to the injuries. Those conditions are simply not present in this case.
Id. at *3.
DEL CODE ANN. tit 19, § 2301(18)(b) excludes recovery under the worker's compensation statute for injuries that are sustained due to personal reasons:
"Personal injury sustained by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment:"
b. Shall not include any injury caused by the willful act of another employee directed against the employee by reasons personal to such employee and not directed against the employee as an employee or because of the employee's employment.
In Ward v. General Motors Corp. the Court held an injury is excluded under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(18)(b) when the injury is ". . . directed against the victim by reasons personal to such employee and not directed against (the victim) as an employee or because of (the victim's) employment." The Court went on to state "[t]he consideration is whether the motivation or causation of the assault was founded on reasons which were personal between the wrongdoer and the victim." If an assault is perpetrated on an employee by an unknown assailant, it is "neutral" and falls under the worker's compensation statute.
431 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Del.Super.Ct. 1981).
The Court cited DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 2301(14)(b). The text currently appears at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(18)(b).
Ward v. General Motors Corp., 431 A.2d at 1280 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 790.
In Rose v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Center Properties, the employee was assaulted in the parking lot outside her place of employment by an unknown attacker. She was required to park a long distance from the entrance by her employer. The court found because the employee was assaulted ". . . for no personal reason to her," it was "neutral" and not "personal." Therefore, it arose out of the employment.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 790.
Id.
In the instant case, the confrontation and resulting injuries resulted from a personal problem the assailants had with Claimant that developed as a result of the way the confrontation unfolded. As the talking back and forth continued between Claimant and the assailants, it even more clearly became of a personal nature. Whatever injuries Claimant sustained were not due to a neutral assault. This confrontation was decidedly personal in nature, as shown by the exchange between the assailants and Claimant in the facts section above.
There was substantial evidence in the record for the Board to find the injuries resulted from a personal confrontation that developed against Claimant. Therefore, the claim falls outside the worker's compensation statute. The Board properly denied benefits. This holding renders others arguments proffered by Claimant and Employer moot. Conclusion
Claimant argues the confrontation was in the course of employment. Employer makes arguments regarding the "going and coming rule." Because the Court holds the injuries to Claimant did not arise out of the employment, Claimant may not recover under the worker's compensation statute. Therefore, the Court need not reach these issues.
For the reasons set forth herein the decision of the Industrial Accident Board is AFFIRMED.