Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. PC20060477
ROBIE, J.
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to an amended complaint without leave to amend. The dispositive issue is whether allegations in the amended complaint relate back to the original complaint, avoiding the statute of limitations bar. We hold that the amended complaint relates back and reverse the order of dismissal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2006, plaintiff Nicholas S. Jones filed a complaint against defendants Kelly Clark, Karalee Davis and Does 1 to 20 alleging general negligence and intentional tort. As to both causes of action, Jones asserted that on September 13, 2004, he was “legally on certain premises in the County of El Dorado, having been given permission and a key to the premises by a person having apparent authority to do so. While [Jones] was on those premises [Davis and Clark] sent an El Dorado County Sheriff’s Department service dog into the premises.” Jones was “severely mauled by the service dog and sustained permanent injury and damage to his person.” As to the negligence cause of action, Jones asserted that Davis and Clark sent the dog into the premises “negligently and carelessly and in violation of the guidelines set forth in the El Dorado County Sheriff’s Department Canine Service Manual.” As to the intentional tort cause of action, Jones asserted that Davis and Clark sent the dog into the premises “in violation of the guidelines set forth in the El Dorado Sheriff’s Department Canine Service Manual” and “[i]n doing so the defendants intended that the service dog would attack [Jones].”
On January 19, 2007, Clark and Davis filed a demurrer to the complaint alleging that Jones failed to file the required government tort claim.
On February 27, 2007, Jones filed an amended complaint against defendants Clark and Davis, whom he now identified as deputy sheriffs, and added as defendants two more deputy sheriffs (Mike Silvestri and Bennett Davidson), the County of El Dorado (the county), and the county’s sheriff’s department (the sheriff’s department). The amended complaint abandoned the state law claims and instead alleged a federal cause of action for violation of Jones’s civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983), thereby eliminating the requirement that he file a government tort claim. As to the federal civil rights cause of action, Jones alleged that he was “attacked and bitten by a police canine unleashed upon [him] by Defendants SILVESTRI, CLARK, DAVIS, and DAVIDSON without just cause and in clear violation of the guidelines prescribed in the ‘Canine Service Manual’ used by Defendant SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT.” As a result of the attack, he suffered severe bites, lacerations, scarring, and severe emotional distress. Jones further alleged that “[a]t all times relevant hereto and in all actions described herein,” Silvestri, Clark, Davis, and Davidson were acting under color of state law pursuant to their authority as deputy sheriffs employed by the county and serving as law enforcement officers for the sheriff’s department.
The amended complaint also alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We do not discuss that cause of action here because Jones does not challenge the order sustaining the demurrer as to this cause of action.
On June 19, 2007, defendants filed a demurrer to the amended complaint claiming that the federal civil rights cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations and was not brought in good faith.
The statute of limitations for Jones’s state law causes of action and for the federal civil rights cause of action was two years from the wrongful act. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1297.)
On September 5, 2007, the court sustained the demurrer to Jones’s amended complaint without leave to amend. The court reasoned that, among other things, the relation-back doctrine did not apply because Jones alleged “distinct wrongs.”
On November 9, 2007, Jones filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s order of dismissal.
DISCUSSION
Jones contends the issue of “greatest import to this appeal and the issue upon which this appeal ultimately turns, is whether or not [his] ‘FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT’ properly relates back to his original ‘COMPLAINT,’ thereby avoiding a statute of limitations bar.” Defendants, on the other hand, focus the majority of their argument on the concept of equitable tolling. They contend Jones is not entitled to equitable tolling of his federal civil rights cause of action because he has not shown that he has satisfied the requirements for that doctrine to apply. Namely, Jones has not shown that defendants had timely notice of the federal civil rights cause of action, that defendants were not prejudiced by having to defend against that cause of action, and that Jones’s conduct in amending the complaint was both in good faith and reasonable. (Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 319; Bacon v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2d 372, 374.)
Defendants’ argument misses the mark because equitable tolling does not apply here. At its broadest, equitable tolling has been described as “a general policy which favors relieving plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.” (Addison v. State of California, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 317.) That policy has no application here because this case involves only one legal remedy -- Jones’s lawsuit in state court. Here, if Jones’s amended complaint states a cause of action that is not barred by the statute of limitations, it does so not by virtue of the doctrine of equitable tolling, but by virtue of the relation-back doctrine, because Jones’s amended complaint -- filed after the statute of limitations had run -- relates back to the filing of his original complaint, which was filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations. It is that doctrine to which we turn now.
I
The Relation-Back Doctrine
Under the relation-back doctrine, an amended complaint will relate back to the date the original complaint was filed if the amended complaint: (1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) refers to the same instrumentality as the original complaint. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408-409.) The relation-back doctrine is grounded on “the strong policy in this state that cases should be decided on the merits.” (Idding v. North Bay Construction Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1114.) It “‘focuses on factual similarity rather than rights or obligations arising from the facts’” (Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 266) and “is in accordance with the basic principle of code pleading that a litigant need only allege the facts warranting recovery” (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 601).
Here, Jones has met the three requirements for the relation-back doctrine to apply. One, the amended complaint was based on the same operative facts as alleged in the original complaint, i.e., the police dog attacked Jones. It mattered not that the federal civil rights cause of action was a different cause of action from the state law causes of action for negligence and intentional tort. (See Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1094-1095 [a change in legal theory or cause of action is permissible if the operative facts creating a right to recovery are the same in both pleadings].) Two, the amended complaint sought recovery for the same injuries as the complaint, i.e., the dog bites. And three, the amended complaint referred to the same offending instrumentality as the cause of Jones’s injuries as the original complaint, i.e., the dog.
Defendants’ argument that the relation-back doctrine is inapplicable seems not to be based on a disagreement with the foregoing analysis, but rather, on an argument that the amended complaint “is silent as to an explanation for the delay in pursuing legal remedies under federal law” and there is “a strong inference that Jones’ actions were an attempt to obviate the governmental claim requirements.” While these things may be true, they have no bearing on the application of the relation-back doctrine. Jones’s failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act is not at issue now because the cause of action in the amended complaint is for a federal civil rights violation for which compliance with the Tort Claims Act is unnecessary. (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842.)
Government Code section 810 et seq.
Defendants do, however, raise one argument as to the relation-back doctrine that deserves some discussion, although it ultimately proves unmeritorious at this stage in the proceedings. Defendants claim the amended complaint cannot relate back to the four defendants named for the first time in the amended complaint because “Jones has not shown that he was genuinely ignorant of [their] identity or liability when the original complaint was filed.” This argument is based on case law that imposes additional requirements on a plaintiff when the plaintiff claims that the relation-back doctrine applies to defendants named for the first time in the amended complaint. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 1983) ¶ 6:740, p. 6-181 (rev. #1, 2008), citing Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company, supra,56 Cal.2d at pp. 600-601.) In that situation, one of the requirements for the relation-back doctrine to apply is that the “plaintiff was ‘genuinely ignorant’ of the defendant’s identity or the facts rendering defendant liable when the original complaint was filed.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 6:740, p. 6-181.)
Defendants’ argument on this issue is misplaced at this point in the proceedings. In the complaint, Jones alleged that the “true names of defendants sued as Does are unknown to [him]” and their “capacities are unknown to [him].” Because a demurrer challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint, we must accept these facts as true at this stage. (Campbell v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1310-1311.) Their truth and accuracy “are matters to be resolved after the case has moved beyond pleading litigation.” (Id. at p. 1311.) Indeed, the case cited by defendants in support of their position is not a case involving a demurrer but a case involving a summary judgment. (Miller v. Thomas (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 440, 442.)
In the same paragraph as this argument, defendants make a one-sentence argument that the amended complaint naming the county and the sheriff’s department cannot relate back as to those defendants because “the relation-back rule generally does not apply to public entities.” The cases they cite, however, do not stand for that proposition. (Chase v. State of California (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 808, 810 [“[t]he issue of the appeal is whether plaintiff had complied with the Tort Claims Act’s requirement that his action against the State of California ‘must be commenced within six months’ after rejection of his claim”]; Carlino v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1536 [plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because he was in good faith ignorant of the true identity of the defendant, but he had substantially complied with the claims presentation requirements by fortuitously filing a claim with the public entity that would have responded to a similar claim against the Doe defendant].)
II
Procedural Requirement Of Code Of Civil Procedure Section 474
Although not raised by defendants, we note one final issue that also deserves some discussion, although it also proves unmeritorious. It appears that Jones failed to comply with the procedural requirement in Code of Civil Procedure section 474 “that the new defendant in an amended complaint be substituted for an existing fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint.” (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176.) Here, Jones made no attempt to satisfy this procedural requirement. The amended complaint simply added the county, the sheriff’s department, Deputy Davidson, and Deputy Silvestri as defendants but did not identify them as substitutes for previously named fictitious Doe defendants. Nevertheless, given that we liberally construe amendments to the pleadings (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 603), and given that defendants themselves have not complained of this procedural deficiency, we exercise our power to excuse Jones’s noncompliance with the procedural requirements in Code of Civil Procedure section 474 and treat the amended complaint as the “functional equivalent” of a substitution of the four named defendants in the amended complaint for four of the fictitious Doe defendants in the complaint (Woo, at p. 175).
For all the foregoing reasons, the relation-back doctrine applies, and the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The order of dismissal is reversed. Jones shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
We concur: RAYE, Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.