Opinion
CV-24-00110-TUC-JGZ (BGM)
07-30-2024
Aaron Douglas Jefts, Petitioner, v. A. Dulgov, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRUCE G. MACDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On February 26, 2024, Petitioner Aaron Douglas Jefts, who is currently incarcerated with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) and housed at the Federal Correctional Institution in Safford, Arizona (FCI-Safford), filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody. (Doc. 1.) Jefts raises one ground for relief in his petition, alleging that the Bureau arbitrarily suspended his ability to earn First Step Act time credits when he was temporarily housed at another corrections facility. (Id. 4.) Under Local Rules 72.1 and 72.2, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald for a report and recommendation. (Doc. 3 at 3.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge, after her independent review, deny the petition and dismiss this case.
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.
BACKGROUND
Aaron Jefts is currently serving a 120-month sentence for pleading guilty to a federal felony. Jefts has been housed at FCI-Safford for the entirety of his imprisonment with the exception of 61 days when he was transferred to the United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona (USP-Tucson). (Doc. 8-1 at 11.) While he was housed at USP-Tucson, Jefts was classified by the Bureau as a “holdover” inmate at an “in-transit facility.” (Id., ¶ 4 at 3.)
Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Jefts, No. 2:18-cr-857-DJH-1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2019), ECF No. 57.
On February 26, 2024, Jefts filed the petition at hand raising one claim for relief. (Doc. 1.) In the petition, he alleges:
The BOP suspended my ability to accrue FTCs from 12/9/22 to 2/8/23. This was due to my being held at a holdover facility (USP Tucson) after a large scale incident. I was being held for investigation and effectively in the SHU. Were I held on site at my facility, my status would have been “administrative detention” as I was not serving SHU time as part of a sanction (which would have been “disciplinary segregation” status) nor did I ultimately receive any sanction. According to Program Statement § 523.41(c)(4) I would have been eligible to receive FTCs in “administrative detention” status. In addition I was still serving my sentence in a federal institution. I could not control that the FCI Safford SHU was too full to accom[m]odate me, and I never received any reason for being under investigation. The only reason for being disqualified from earning FTCs for the course of the 60 day period was the arbitrary housing of me off site and the BOP interpreting that as a disqualifying factor.(Doc. 1 at 4.) On May 13, 2024, the Bureau filed its return and answer. (Doc. 8.) Jefts failed to file a reply. This report and recommendation follows.
LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner is in custody in “violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence are filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution are brought under § 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). A prisoner may challenge computation of his sentence or seek judicial review of any jail-time determination via a § 2241 petition. Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 358 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (cleaned up) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus”). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to federal law by a preponderance of the evidence. Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) was enacted into law. Cazares v. Hendrix, 575 F.Supp.3d 1289, 1294 (D. Or. 2021). “The act was the culmination of a bipartisan effort to improve criminal justice outcomes, as well as to reduce the size of the federal prison population while also creating mechanisms to maintain public safety.” Johnston v. Colbert, No. CV-22-260, 2023 WL 9510557, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-22-00260, 2024 WL 418123 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2024). “As part of the FSA, Congress directed the [Bureau] to implement reentry initiatives, including programming and programming incentives, good-time credit, and compassionate release opportunities.” Mars v. Heisner, No. CV-22-1933, 2023 WL 4977335, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 26, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-22-1933, 2023 WL 4960411 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2023).
One such programming incentive is participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction (EBRR) programming. Cazares, 575 F.Supp.3d at 1296. Eligible inmates who participate in EBRR programming earn 10 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful completion of programming. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i)). However, eligible inmates must be successfully participating in EBRR programming to earn credits for those programs. 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(c)(1). Eligible inmates will generally not be considered to be successfully participating in EBRR programs in certain situations, such as placement in a special housing unit (SHU), or having a designation status outside the institution. Id. § 523.41(c)(4)(i), (ii). Successful participation requires a determination by the Bureau that an eligible inmate has participated in the EBRR programs that it has recommended. Id. § 523.41(c)(2).
“An EBRR Program is a group or individual activity that has been shown by empirical evidence to reduce recidivism or is based on research indicating that it is likely to be effective in reducing recidivism; and is designed to help prisoners succeed in their communities upon release from prison.” 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(a); Cazares, 575 F.Supp.3d at 1297. EBRR Programs may include academic classes, cognitive behavioral treatment, substance abuse treatment, and vocational training. Id.
Jefts files the petition at hand asserting that while he was temporarily transferred to USP-Tucson and housed in the SHU, he should have remained in EBRR programming. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Jefts argues that if he would have remained in EBRR programming, he would have earned 30 days of time credits that could be applied toward his release. (Id.) Jefts requests that the Court direct the Bureau to “restore” these “disallowed” time credits for the 61 days that he was housed at USP-Tucson. (Id. at 6.) The Bureau responds by asserting that Jefts' petition should be denied because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review its FSA-related determinations; the Court lacks the authority to compel discretionary Bureau action; Jefts' petition is unripe; and the petition fails on the merits. (Doc. 8 at 410.) The Court agrees with the Bureau's jurisdictional argument, concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over discretionary Bureau programming determinations, and recommends that the District Judge deny the petition and dismiss this case.
Because the Magistrate Judge concludes that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, it declines to address the merits of Jefts' petition. See Hartman v. Summers, 120 F.3d 157, 160 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that district court's dismissal of habeas petition on merits was erroneous when court lacked jurisdiction to consider merits).
I. Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“Federal courts are always under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction” and may not entertain an action over which they lack authority. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865 (cleaned up). In the petition at hand, Jefts challenges the Bureau's determination that he was disqualified from earning EBRR programming time credits because he was temporarily housed at a facility outside of his designated institution.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally provides a cause of action for persons “suffering legal wrong[s] because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). Agency action can be held unlawful when it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). However, a court may not review agency action where the relevant statute “preclude[s] judicial review” or the “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2)). “The APA's ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional.” Brown v. Holder, 770 F.Supp.2d 363, 365 (D.D.C. 2011).
Here, the federal statute governing Bureau authority expressly strips this Court of jurisdiction to review discretionary Bureau programming decisions and inmate placement determinations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3625 (stating that the relevant portions of the APA “do not apply to the making of any determination, decision or order under this subchapter”). Other courts within the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have agreed. See Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review individualized Bureau determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 3621); Bluford v. Birkholz, No. CV-23-1587, 2024 WL 1016369, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-23-01587, 2024 WL 1012979 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 2024) (dismissing inmate's § 2241 petition that challenged Bureau's alleged failure to apply FSA earned time credits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Mars, 2023 WL 4977335, at *6 (dismissing inmate's § 2241 petition because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Bureau's FSA time credit determinations). Accordingly, Jefts' petition should be denied and this case dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge DENY the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1) and DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE this case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation, and a party may respond to another party's objections with fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted by the District Judge. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-24-110-TUC-JGZ. Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of de novo review.