Opinion
Index No. 156255/2022
06-07-2024
SANDRA JARMUTH, Plaintiff, v. SANDRA NUNNERLEY, MICHAEL MURPHY, KENNETH LOVETT, PERRY ROSEN, MITCH UNGER, 36 EAST 69TH CORP Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DATE 12/02/2023
PRESENT: HON. MARY V. ROSADO Justice
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
Mary V. Rosado, Judge
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 57, 58 were read on this motion to/for REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATION
Upon the foregoing documents, Plaintiff Sandra Jarmuth's (Plaintiff) motion for leave to reargue is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants Sandra Nunnerley ("Nunnerley"), Michael Murphy ("Murphy"), Kenneth Lovett ("Lovett"), Perry Rosen ("Rosen"), Mitch Unger ("Unger") (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"), and 36 East 69th Corp.'s (the "Corporation") (collectively "Defendants") cross-motion for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in this action is denied.
A. Background
In this instant matter Plaintiff moves for leave to reargue this Court's Decision and Order dated April 26, 2023 (the "Prior Order") (NYSCEF Doc. 45), which granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, and awarded Defendants attorneys' fees incurred in defending this action. Plaintiff requests that the Court grant her application for leave to reargue, and upon the granting of such relief, to modify the Prior Order to deny Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs first cause of action for declaratory judgment ("First Cause of Action") and second cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty ("Second Cause of Action") and rescind the Court's award of attorneys' fees to Defendants.
During the pendency of this motion, counsel for Defendants submitted a letter dated August 14, 2023 wherein they informed the Court that the past legal invoices which were the subject of the instant declaratory judgment action have been waived "[i]n the interest of all parties putting this matter behind them (and not an admission of any impropriety of the fees)". (NYSCEF Doc. 59).
B. Standard
A motion for leave to reargue "shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked on misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion . . . and shall be made within thirty days after service of a copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry" (CPLR 2221 [d]). A motion for leave to reargue, "addressed to the discretion of the court, is designed to afford a party an opportunity to establish that the court overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts or misapplied any controlling principle of law. Its purpose is not to serve as a vehicle to permit the unsuccessful party to argue once again the very questions previously decided . . . nor does reargument serve to provide a party an opportunity to advance arguments different from those tendered on the original application" (Foley v Roche, 68 A.D.2d 558, 567-568 [1st Dept 1979] [citations omitted]).
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C. Discussion
i. The Underlying Motion to Dismiss
Leave to reargue the underlying motion to dismiss is denied as the Court did not overlook or misapprehend any matters of fact or law. Plaintiff alleges she was invoiced as additional rent purported legal fees incurred by the Corporation in prior litigation against the Plaintiff, but Plaintiff failed to allege any declared default or imminent foreclosure action. Indeed, as provided by the Court of Appeals "declaratory judgment may not be granted if it will only result in an advisory opinion." (Combustion Eng'g, Inc. v Travelers Indem. Co., 75 A.D.2d 777, 778 [1st Dept 1980] affd, 53 N.Y.2d 875 [1981). As noted by Justice Singh, "[u]ntil there is a declared default and the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, there is no justiciable controversy." (Rowland v HSBC Bank USA, 2014 NY Slip Op. 32479[U] at *3 [Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2014] eking Fair haven Properties Inc. v Garden City Plaza, Inc., 119 A.D.2d 796 [2d Dept 1986]). Here, there is no declared default, no rent demand, and no foreclosure proceedings.
Although Plaintiff claims in motion papers that she has now suffered a harm due to the invoiced legal fees at the most recent Board election, those allegations are not in the complaint in this action nor were they before the Court in the prior motion to dismiss and therefore there is no need for this Court to address them.
Moreover, because Plaintiff in essence is alleging that the invoices are improper under the proprietary lease which governs the relationship between Plaintiff and the Defendant Corporation, she has an adequate legal remedy for breach of contract if Defendants Corporation attempts to collect the fees which makes her declaratory judgment claim unsustainable (Cronos Group Ltd. v XComIP, LLC, 156 A.D.3d 54, 74 [ 1 st Dept 2017] citing Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC v Melvin, 33 A.D.3d 355, 358 [1st Dept 2006]).
Likewise, the Court did not misapprehend or overlook any matters of fact or law with respect to Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty because Plaintiff failed to allege any evidence of bad faith or tortious conduct by board members distinct from actions taken as a board collectively (see, e.g. Jarmuth v Leonard, 187 A.D.3d 407 [1st Dept 2020J; see also Hersh v One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 163 A.D.3d 500 [1st Dept 2018]).
Plaintiff does not seek reargument on her other three dismissed causes of action.
In any event, the past legal invoices which were the subject of the Plaintiffs declaratory judgment and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action have now been waived pursuant to Defendants' letter to the Court dated August 14, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. 59). Accordingly, reargument is also denied as the underlying causes of action should be dismissed as moot (see also Ovitz v. Bloomberg L.P., 18 N.Y.3d 753, 760 [2012] [declaratory judgment unavailable where defendant waived fees which were subject of litigation]).
ii.. Leave to Reargue the Award of Attorneys Fees is Granted and Defendant's Crossmotion for Fees is Denied
The Court grants leave to reargue the award of attorneys' fees to Defendant as controlling case law's interpretation of paragraph 28 of the proprietary lease required Plaintiff to be in default as a prerequisite to collecting fees. This was not the case here (see Dupuis v 424 E. 77th Owners Corp., 32 A.D.3d 720, 722 [1st Dept 2006] citing George Tower & Grill Owners Corp. v Honig, 232 A.D.3d 474 [2d Dept 1996]). Accordingly, upon granting leave to reargue, the Court's prior award of attorneys' fees pursuant to paragraph 28 of the proprietary lease is rescinded and Defendants' pending cross motion seeking attorneys' fees is denied.
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Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion seeking leave to reargue the portion of the Court's prior decision and order dismissing her first and second cause of action is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion seeking leave to reargue the portion of the Court's prior decision and order awarding attorneys' fees is granted, and upon reargument, the Court rescinds its prior award of attorneys' fees to Defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants' cross-motion seeking an award of attorneys' fees is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that within ten days of entry, counsel for either party shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, on all parties to this action; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.