Opinion
Case No. 2D19-104
07-08-2020
J.A.L., Appellant, v. R.M.A., Appellee.
Stephen D. Gregg and Gary E. Williams, (substituted as counsel of record), of The Law Firm For Family Law, Clearwater, for Appellant. No appearance for Appellee.
Stephen D. Gregg and Gary E. Williams, (substituted as counsel of record), of The Law Firm For Family Law, Clearwater, for Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.
KELLY, Judge.
In this paternity action, the mother, J.A.L., appeals from the order on her motion for appellate attorney's fees and the order denying her motion for rehearing. We affirm the award of appellate attorney's fees to the mother but reverse and remand for the trial court to establish a reasonable time schedule for the father, R.M.A., to pay the award.
The trial court found that the mother was entitled to $2975 in appellate attorney's fees and that the father had the ability to pay. However, the court's order allows the father to wait until he has fulfilled his obligation to pay the mother's attorney's fees and costs incurred in the trial court action before he is required to begin making $200 monthly payments to the mother's appellate attorneys. Under the present payment schedule, it will be over twelve years before the $36,493.67 trial court attorney's fee award is paid and the appellate attorneys are compensated. This type of payment plan has been found to be "manifestly unreasonable." See Wright v. Wright, 965 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that it was manifestly unreasonable to give the former husband up to thirteen years to pay the former wife's attorney's fee award); see also Hood v. Hood, 535 So. 2d 715, 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (reversing the order giving the former husband a seven-year payment period); Urbieta v. Urbieta, 469 So. 2d 930, 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (holding that the trial court's order establishing an eight-year payment schedule was "manifestly erroneous" where the former husband had the ability to pay). "Allowing such a [payment] structure would discourage competent attorneys from representing clients in [paternity and child support] cases, thereby defeating the purpose of the statute providing for attorney's fees and costs ...." Wright, 965 So. 2d at 1170.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
LUCAS and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
See R.M.A. v. J.A.S., 269 So. 3d 649, 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).