Summary
holding plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of contract based on metro line service disruptions where the Metro Authority expressly informed them that no refunds would be given based on service disruptions
Summary of this case from McAuliffe v. The Vail Corp.Opinion
2018–08928 Index No. 606977/17
02-05-2020
Meredith JACOBS, etc., et al., Respondents, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, etc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.
Mark D. Hoffer, Jamaica, N.Y. (Kevin P. McCaffrey of counsel), for appellants.
Mark D. Hoffer, Jamaica, N.Y. (Kevin P. McCaffrey of counsel), for appellants.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In a putative class action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendants Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Long Island Railroad appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Antonio I. Brandveen, J.), entered July 12, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the motion of the defendants Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Long Island Railroad which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first and second causes of action insofar as asserted against them.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion of the defendants Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Long Island Railroad which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first and second causes of action insofar as asserted against them are granted.
The plaintiffs are monthly Long Island Rail Road ticket holders who allegedly suffered damages arising from, among other things, train service disruptions, overcrowded platforms, and unsanitary and unsafe conditions in trains and stations between April 2017 and January 2018. They commenced this putative class action on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated against the defendant Metropolitan Transportation Authority (hereinafter the MTA) and its subsidiary, the defendant Long Island Railroad (hereinafter the LIRR, and together with the MTA, the defendants), among others, asserting causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional dismiss.
The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them. They argued that the tort causes of action were barred under the prior notice and pleading requirements of Public Authorities Law § 1276(1) and (2), and under the doctrine of governmental immunity. They further argued that the plaintiffs failed to state causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiffs opposed the motion. In an order entered July 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action insofar as asserted against them and denied those branches of the motion which were to dismiss the breach of contract and negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against them. The defendants appeal.
Service of a notice of claim within 90 days after accrual of the claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of an action sounding in tort against the MTA (see General Municipal Law § 50–e[1][a] ; Public Authorities Law § 1276[2] ; Matter of Ryan v. New York City Tr. Auth., 110 A.D.3d 902, 902, 973 N.Y.S.2d 312 ). Here, the plaintiffs failed to serve the MTA with a notice of claim. In addition, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the public interest exception to the notice of claim requirement does not apply here (see 423 S. Salina St. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d 507, 503 N.E.2d 63 ; Incorporated Vil. of Muttontown v. Ryba, 121 A.D.3d 757, 759, 994 N.Y.S.2d 166 ; Gurrieri v. County of Nassau, 2017 WL 3432208, *8, 2017 U.S. Dist LEXIS 126293, *19–20 [E.D. N.Y., No. 2:16–cv–6983(ADS)(SIL) ] ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the negligence cause of action insofar as asserted against the MTA (see Public Authorities Law § 1276[2] ).
The complaint in an action against the LIRR "must contain an allegation that at least 30 days have elapsed since [the LIRR] was presented with a demand or claim" upon which the action is founded, and that the LIRR "has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the claim" ( Burgess v. Long Is. R.R. Auth., 79 N.Y.2d 777, 778, 579 N.Y.S.2d 631, 587 N.E.2d 269 ; see Public Authorities Law § 1276[1] ; Matter of Rodriguez v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 155 A.D.3d 520, 521, 65 N.Y.S.3d 44 ). This requirement is distinct from and serves purposes different from the notice of claim requirement contained in Public Authorities Law § 1276(2) (see Andersen v. Long Is. R.R., 59 N.Y.2d 657, 661, 463 N.Y.S.2d 407, 450 N.E.2d 213 ). Here, the amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs presented the LIRR with a demand upon which their action was founded, and that 30 days had elapsed without resolution. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the negligence cause of action insofar as asserted against the LIRR (see Public Authorities Law § 1276[1] ; Albano v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 122 A.D.2d 923, 924, 506 N.Y.S.2d 77 ).
Assuming that the purchase of a monthly commutation ticket establishes a contractual relationship between the defendants and the plaintiffs (see D'Angelo v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 106 A.D.2d 128, 129–131, 484 N.Y.S.2d 574, affd 65 N.Y.2d 714, 492 N.Y.S.2d 6, 481 N.E.2d 546 ; Levine v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 38 A.D.2d 936, 938–939, 331 N.Y.S.2d 451, affd 30 N.Y.2d 907, 335 N.Y.S.2d 565, 287 N.E.2d 272 ; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 9 A.D.2d 425, 429, 193 N.Y.S.2d 780, affd 8 N.Y.2d 103, 202 N.Y.S.2d 281, 168 N.E.2d 362 ), the documentary evidence submitted by the defendants, in the form of sections of the passenger tariff in effect at all relevant times, conclusively established a defense as a matter of law to the allegations of breach of contract. The tariff set forth a detailed procedure for obtaining refunds, which the plaintiffs do not allege to have followed. The tariff also prohibited refunds for service disruptions and only permitted refunds to the extent a commutation ticket has or could have been used for travel. Consequently, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the breach of contract cause of action insofar as asserted against them (see Stathakos v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth. Long Is. R.R., 109 A.D.3d 979, 980, 971 N.Y.S.2d 557 ).
We need not reach the defendants' remaining contentions in light of our determination.
BALKIN, J.P., HINDS–RADIX, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.