Opinion
No. COA18-1087
05-21-2019
IN THE MATTER OF: N.B, M.S., L.W.
Richard A. Penley for petitioner-appellee Onslow County Consolidated Human Services. Dorothy Hairston Mitchell for respondent-mother. Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for guardian ad litem.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Onslow County, Nos. 17 JA 193-95 Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 16 July 2018 by Judge Sarah C. Seaton in Onslow County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 2019. Richard A. Penley for petitioner-appellee Onslow County Consolidated Human Services. Dorothy Hairston Mitchell for respondent-mother. Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for guardian ad litem. ZACHARY, Judge.
Respondent-Mother appeals from the trial court's Review and Permanency Planning Order. For the reasons explained below, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
I. Background
On 7 June 2017, the Onslow County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a Juvenile Petition alleging that six-year-old "Nia" was abused and neglected, and that nine-year-old "Mary" and one-year-old "Lori" were neglected juveniles. Respondent-Mother had left Nia and her other children at home without supervision. Because she was afraid, Nia wandered to a neighbor's, who sent Nia home. When Respondent-Mother learned that Nia had left the house, she "pulled [Nia] out of the top bunk bed by the back of her shirt, dragged her by her feet to the bathroom, spanked her with a belt till it broke and then proceeded to use a shoe on her and kicked her as well." A social worker discovered "red and purple bruising in a linear manner across [Nia's] back, and a large red and purple bruise from her left arm to the side under her left arm near her back." Mary and Lori were home when Respondent-Mother punished Nia. On 18 April 2017, DSS removed the children from the home and placed Nia and Mary with their paternal grandmother, while Lori was placed with her godmother.
The attorney for Petitioner-Appellee indicated in his brief that he represents the "Onslow County Consolidated Human Services." Throughout the record and pleadings, however, Petitioner-Appellee is referenced as the "Onslow County Department of Social Services." In this opinion, we refer to Petitioner-Appellee as "DSS."
Pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of the minor children.
After conducting a psychological evaluation of Respondent-Mother, Dr. Amy James diagnosed her with Intermittent Explosive Disorder, which is characterized by "outbursts that demonstrate an inability to control impulses." Dr. James recommended that Respondent-Mother "engage in medication management and cognitive behavioral therapy to address her issues," with weekly therapy sessions "for at least six months." Dr. James's report was filed with the trial court on 10 October 2017.
By order entered 25 October 2017, the trial court adjudicated all three juveniles neglected and ordered that they remain in their current placements. In its Juvenile Disposition Order filed 8 November 2017, the trial court ordered Respondent-Mother to continue her therapy and other treatment, and to "follow the recommendations contained in her psychological evaluation." Respondent-Mother retained legal custody of her children, but placement remained outside of the home, and DSS afforded Respondent-Mother regular visitation.
On 29 March 2018, the Honorable Sarah C. Seaton conducted a review and permanency planning hearing in Onslow County District Court. By order entered 16 July 2018, Judge Seaton ordered that further reviews and reunification efforts cease. The trial court determined that Respondent-Mother was unfit and had acted in a manner inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status as a parent. The trial court granted custody of Nia and Mary to their paternal grandmother and custody of Lori to her godmother, and ordered that Respondent-Mother receive regular supervised visitation with the children. Respondent-Mother timely filed notice of appeal on 13 August 2018.
II. Discussion
Respondent-Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) concluding that it was in the children's best interest to change custody; (2) waiving future review hearings; and (3) failing to adequately specify the visitation granted to Respondent-Mother.
We note that the same panel that heard this case also issued an opinion today, In re M.T.-L.Y., No. COA18-826, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (filed May 21, 2019), vacating in part the trial court's permanency planning order and remanding for a further permanency planning hearing. The holding in that case was controlled by In re C.P., ___ N.C. App. ___, 812 S.E.2d 188 (2018), which stated that "reunification must be part of an initial permanent plan" at the first permanency planning hearing. Id. at ___, 812 S.E.2d at 191 (emphases added). In the instant case, in lieu of ordering reunification as either a primary or secondary plan during the first permanency planning hearing on 29 March 2018, the trial court ordered a primary plan of custody with the caretakers without a secondary plan. However, unlike in M.T.-L.Y., Respondent-Mother did not appeal on this basis and did not cite C.P. Therefore, this issue is not properly before us and cannot be a basis for our decision.
A. Children's Best Interest
Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court's order contained insufficient findings to support the conclusion of law that it was in the children's best interest to change custody. We disagree.
After removing custody from a child's legal parent, "[t]he court shall conduct a review hearing within 90 days from the date of the initial dispositional hearing." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(a) (2017). The purpose of permanency planning hearings is "to review the progress made in finalizing the permanent plan for the juvenile, or if necessary, to make a new permanent plan for the juvenile." Id. At the permanency planning hearing, the trial court "shall adopt one or more . . . permanent plans the court finds is in the juvenile's best interest." Id. § 7B-906.2(a). "Within 12 months of the date of the initial order removing custody, there shall be a review hearing designated as a permanency planning hearing." Id. § 7B-906.1(a). "Reunification shall remain a primary or secondary plan unless the court . . . makes written findings that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health or safety." Id. § 7B-906.2(b).
1. Cessation of Reunification Efforts
Respondent-Mother first contends that the trial court "improperly made findings of fact and improperly concluded that efforts toward reunification . . . should cease."
This Court reviews an order ceasing reunification efforts to determine "whether the trial court made appropriate findings, whether the findings are based upon credible evidence, whether the findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions, and whether the trial court abused its discretion with respect to disposition." In re D.A., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 811 S.E.2d 729, 731 (2018). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." In re N.G., 186 N.C. App. 1, 10-11, 650 S.E.2d 45, 51 (2007), aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 229, 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008). "Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by sufficient evidence and are binding on appeal." In re H.D., 239 N.C. App. 318, 326, 768 S.E.2d 860, 865 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).
At permanency planning review hearings, the trial court is required to make certain relevant findings of fact, including:
[w]hether efforts to reunite the juvenile with either parent clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile's health or safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time. The court shall consider efforts to reunite regardless of whether the juvenile resided with the parent, guardian, or custodian at the time of removal. If the court determines efforts would be unsuccessful or inconsistent, the court shall schedule a permanency planning hearing within 30 days to address the permanent plans in accordance with this section and G.S. 7B-906.2, unless the determination is made at a permanency planning hearing.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d)(3).
When a trial court eliminates reunification as a permanent plan pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2(b),
the court shall make written findings as to each of the following, which shall demonstrate lack of success:
(1) Whether the parent is making adequate progress within a reasonable period of time under the plan.
(2) Whether the parent is actively participating in or cooperating with the plan, the department, and the guardian ad litem for the juvenile.
(3) Whether the parent remains available to the court, the department, and the guardian ad litem for the juvenile.
Id. § 7B-906.2(d). The trial court's findings need not quote the statute verbatim, but(4) Whether the parent is acting in a manner inconsistent with the health or safety of the juvenile.
the order must make clear that the trial court considered the evidence in light of whether reunification would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time. The trial court's written findings must address the statute's concerns, but need not quote its exact language.In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 167-68, 752 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court stated in paragraph 10 of its review and permanency planning order that "[e]fforts to reunite the juveniles with the parents clearly would be unsuccessful and inconsistent with the juveniles' health or safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time." The trial court then made the following extensive and detailed findings of fact under paragraph 10:
i. On August 28, 2017, this Court did adjudicate the juveniles to be neglected by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. This Court did find that on April 17, 2017, [Respondent-Mother] physically abused her daughter [Nia] by using a belt which caused linear red and purple bruising across [Nia's] back and a large red and purple bruise from her left arm to the side under her left arm near her back. This Court also found on August 28, 2017 the other juveniles were in the home on April 17, 2017.
ii. Today, [Respondent-Mother] admits that she spanked [Nia] with a belt and did it too hard for which she has previously apologized for. [Respondent-Mother] states that she didn't lose her temper but only got frustrated because her daughter was not listening to her and didn't mean to hit her. She was unsure whether she lost control at the time.
iii. This Court found as fact by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence on August 28, 2017 that [Respondent-Mother] was unable to demonstrate an ability to reduce the risk to the juveniles as she has been observed to have erratic behaviors at times with angry outbursts and was in need of a full scale psychological evaluation.
iv. [Respondent-Mother] has not followed through with this Court's order of individual therapy and medication management to wit:
(1) On October 10, 2017 a dispositional hearing was conducted, and this Court found that [Respondent-Mother] had obtained a full scale psychological evaluation with Dr. Amy James conducted on July 31, 2017.
(2) Dr. Amy James noted in the evaluation at page 5 last paragraph that [Respondent-Mother] was not wholly forthcoming in her responses as she engaged in positive impression management thus attempting to portray herself free from shortcomings to which most people would readily admit to and is reluctant to recognize or admit faults in herself. When asked about this today, [Respondent-Mother] denies that this is true at the time she participated in the evaluation.
(3) Dr. Amy James noted in the evaluation at page 7 that [Respondent-Mother's] style was defensive (faking good) and as such, the profile was invalid for interpretation. [Respondent-Mother] says today
that it's not an issue as she has acknowledged mistakes and [does not] believe this is true about herself.
(4) [Respondent-Mother] does not believe that her diagnosis of Intermittent Explosive Disorder is accurate. In short, Intermittent Explosive Disorder is characterized and could include recurrent outbursts not premeditated or serv[ing] no premeditated purpose, display aggressive behaviors grossly disproportionate to the magnitude of psychological stressors, outbursts cause distress or impairment of functioning or lead to financial or legal consequences. Since the evaluation of July of 2017, [Respondent-Mother] has been observed frustrated and angry. On February 13, 2018 [Respondent-Mother] stated she wanted to give up custody of the juveniles by signing her parental rights away because she felt like the social worker and placement provider were not working with her. This statement was impulsive and characteristic of her diagnosis. She had made the statement before to the first social worker in May of 2017 which tends to suggest that she cannot control her impulsivity despite being in therapy for approximately four months in September, October, November, and January one hour per session[ ] with one or possibly two sessions per month.
(5) [Respondent-Mother] admits that she previously engaged in unpredictable verbal and physical outbursts but only in regard to [Nia] in April of last year.
(6) Dr. Amy James recommended that [Respondent-Mother] seek a psychiatric consultation for medication to assist with the diagnosis. [Respondent-Mother] states that her therapist told her she doesn't need medication for that type of diagnosis. [Respondent-Mother] therefore claims
she never sought out the medication management through [Coastal Carolina Neuropsychological Center] as a result of what her therapist told her. The evidence suggests that she was on medication from CCNC as she states, was for sleep disturbances from April to July of 2017 but not for what she was recommended as a result of the psychological evaluation.
(7) Dr. Amy James further recommended that [Respondent-Mother] attend weekly individual therapy for at least six months to address emotional regulation, distress tolerance, impulse control, communication skills, parenting skills, and stress management if able to do so, [Respondent-Mother's] prognosis would be moderate to good if not, it would be highly probable she will continue to engage in the same or similar behaviors.
(8) Despite attempts to obtain the records through . . . (CCNC) in which [Respondent-Mother] states she was seeing a therapist in September, October, November and January, records have not been provided to this Court regarding her therapy recommendations or medication recommendations. [Respondent-Mother] claims she has provided consent to release of information as court ordered on October 10, 2017. DSS has been unable to obtain those records after talking with the therapist who was reluctant to disclose any progress in therapy to the social worker regarding [Respondent-Mother]. However, as it stands today, [Respondent-Mother] provided no documentation from CCNC regarding this issue. In any event, [Respondent-Mother] was court ordered to follow the recommendations contained in her psychological evaluation and continue individual therapy and medication services at [CCNC]. It was incumbent upon her to seek out and continue with these services by this Court which DSS has provided a previous referral in September.
[Respondent-Mother] states that her therapist told he[r] she doesn't get court involved. At this permanency planning hearing this Court is required to determine whether the parent is making adequate progress within a reasonable amount of time under the plan of reunification and whether the respondent parent is actively participating in or cooperating with the plan, the department, and the guardian ad litem.
(9) [Respondent-Mother] discharged herself from therapy according to CCNC documents given to Maegan Glynn by [Respondent-Mother] as stated in a letter from Community Prevention Services, Inc. dated March 19, 2018. The contents of the letter read in part:
[Respondent-Mother] showed me paperwork from her therapist, however she had some concerns regarding the content. The discharge paperwork states that she discharged herself, but [Respondent-Mother] said that they told her that she did not need medication or anything else from them. She is worried that this might look bad for her.
(10) [Respondent-Mother] was in therapy monthly from September through January. She no showed in December which she states was due to car trouble. At most the therapy sessions were once maybe twice per month according to [Respondent-Mother] who also claims she didn't know it was supposed to be weekly per the recommendations from Dr. Amy James. She did not read the report but allowed the social worker to read it to her. If she could show Community Prevention Services, Inc. discharge paperwork from CCNC, it stands to reason that she has some CCNC records in her possession. However, she did not provide any to the social worker, [guardian ad litem,] her attorney[,] or this Court today.
(11) By January 29, 2018, [Respondent-Mother] stated to social worker that she was discharged successfully, didn't need medication, and believed she was in her right state of mind. Today [Respondent-Mother] believes that she has done everything asked of her.
v. Despite services offered to [Respondent-Mother], [she] continues to show an inability to reduce the risk of the juvenile[s] to wit:
Then in paragraph 12 of its order, the trial court stated that(1) Social Services has provided PEERS parenting education referrals, which [Respondent-Mother] completed Cooperative Parenting, Triple P and Making Your Children Mind Without Losing Yours. The social worker referred [Respondent-Mother] to comprehensive clinical assessment (Psych. Eval.) in June of 2017 and CCNC referral in September as well as Community Prevention as well as conducting Child and Family Team Meetings and visitation services or opportunities via third party supervision. Despite this, [Respondent-Mother] states that the social worker will not work a case plan with her. As found above, [Respondent-Mother] did not complete individual therapy or medication management with CCNC.
(2) [Respondent-Mother] has difficulty effectively communicating with social services and the placement provider . . . .
(3) During Child and Family Team Meetings from January to March there were constant struggles regarding visitation parameters. . . . Despite the services provided such as the parenting education, [Respondent-Mother] displays a level of defiance which interferes in her ability to co-parent while the juveniles are in placement.
[p]ursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §7B-906.2, the Court considers and makes written findings regarding the following:The trial court repeated verbatim the findings quoted above from paragraph 10 in support of its conclusion that efforts toward reunification would be unsuccessful.
a. Whether the parent is making adequate progress within a reasonable period of time under the plan; whether the parent is actively participating in or cooperating with the plan, the department, and the guardian ad litem for the juveniles[;] whether the parent remains available to the court, the department, and the guardian ad litem for the juveniles[;] and whether the parent is acting in a manner inconsistent with the health or safety of the juveniles . . . .
Respondent-Mother declares in her brief that she "does not concede that these findings were properly supported by the evidence." Respondent-Mother takes issue with the following broad findings: (1) "the Court made findings that [Respondent-Mother] failed to make adequate progress within a reasonable amount of time under the plan, that she acted inconsistent with the health or safety of the juveniles and that she continues to show an inability to reduce the risk of the juveniles"; (2) "the Court found that [Respondent-Mother] has not actively participated in or is not cooperating with the existing plan"; (3) "the Court found that it was unlikely that the juveniles could be returned to their mother within six months"; and (4) "the Court found that the permanent plan of custody to the caretakers had been achieved and that there was no need for a secondary plan." Respondent-Mother asserts in her brief that these findings are "insufficient to support that reunification efforts should cease, that the plan should change from reunification with [Respondent-Mother] to custody to the caretakers and that it was ultimately in the children's best interest to grant custody to Court approved caretakers."
Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court "improperly made findings of fact and improperly concluded that efforts towards reunification with the [Respondent-Mother] should cease." However, Respondent-Mother fails to identify which required findings of fact the trial court allegedly omitted. Although the trial court found that reunification efforts "clearly would be unsuccessful and inconsistent with the juveniles' health or safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time," none of the trial court's numerous findings were specifically couched in the language of the statute. That is perfectly acceptable. The trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to embrace the substance of the statute. See L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168, 752 S.E.2d at 455 ("The trial court's written findings must address the statute's concerns, but need not quote its exact language.").
It is evident upon review that the trial court considered the factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.2(d). Additionally, the trial court's findings demonstrate that Respondent-Mother was not making adequate progress under her court-ordered case plan. Dr. James advised Respondent-Mother to seek individual therapy weekly for six months, but Tiffani Hopkins, the children's former social worker, testified that Respondent-Mother only "completed four months." Hopkins further testified that Respondent-Mother had discharged herself from CCNC, yet she informed Hopkins that she was successfully discharged. In addition, Respondent-Mother was not "forthright" in her responses to Dr. James. Moreover, Respondent-Mother also continued to show an inability to reduce the risk to the children by failing to complete therapy and medication management recommendations. Respondent-Mother also had difficulty communicating with DSS employees and the caretaker of one of the children. Hopkins testified that DSS attempted to address Respondent-Mother's behavioral issues, but that she could "get very upset . . . and become very unstable." Hopkins also stated that Respondent-Mother "was not fully communicating with the other kinship provider."
The trial court's numerous and detailed findings demonstrate that Respondent-Mother was not actively participating in or cooperating with her case plan. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ceasing efforts to reunify Respondent-Mother with her children.
2. Constitutionally Protected Status
Respondent-Mother next contends that "the trial court erred in finding and concluding that [Respondent-Mother] was unfit and that she acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status as a parent to the minor children when it is neither supported by competent evidence nor by the findings of fact."
"A natural parent's constitutionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of his or her child is a counterpart of the parental responsibilities the parent has assumed and is based on a presumption that he or she will act in the best interest of the child." Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534 (1997). "[T]he parent may no longer enjoy a paramount status if his or her conduct is inconsistent with this presumption or if he or she fails to shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a child." Id. Accordingly, "absent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children must prevail." Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 403-04, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905 (1994). "[C]onduct inconsistent with the parent's protected status . . . would result in application of the 'best interest of the child' test." Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534. "Unfitness, neglect, and abandonment clearly constitute conduct inconsistent with the protected status parents may enjoy. Other types of conduct, which must be viewed on a case-by-case basis, can also rise to this level so as to be inconsistent with the protected status of natural parents." Id. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534-35.
Because of the "constitutionally protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children," the trial court must make findings that the "parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their children" before granting custody to a non-parent third party. Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 145, 579 S.E.2d 264, 266 (2003). The findings must be based on "clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 147, 579 S.E.2d at 268. "Whether conduct constitutes conduct inconsistent with the parents' protected status presents a question of law and, thus, is reviewable de novo." Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 276, 710 S.E.2d 235, 242 (2011). We review the trial court's determination of the child's best interest for abuse of discretion. In re J.H., 244 N.C. App. 255, 269, 780 S.E.2d 228, 238 (2015).
In paragraph 7 of the review and permanency planning order, the trial court found "by clear and convincing evidence that [Respondent-Mother] is unfit and has acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status as [a] parent regarding the juveniles." To support this determination, the order then sets forth the previously quoted findings of fact.
The trial court's findings amply support the conclusion that Respondent-Mother was unfit and had acted in a manner inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status as a parent. For example, the trial court found that it had previously "adjudicate[d] the juveniles to be neglected by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" due to Respondent-Mother's treatment of her daughter Nia. The trial court also received testimony and made a finding that Respondent-Mother told DSS employees and other care providers several times that "she wanted to give up custody of the juveniles by signing her parental rights away," which the trial court found to be "impulsive and characteristic of her diagnosis." These findings, along with the trial court's other unchallenged findings of fact, support the conclusion that Respondent-Mother was unfit and had acted in a manner inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status as a parent. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by so concluding.
3. Plan of Custody
Respondent-Mother next claims that "the trial court improperly made findings of fact and improperly concluded that the plan of care for the children should be custody with court approved caretakers."
At any permanency planning hearing where the juvenile is not placed with a parent, the court shall additionally consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding those that are relevant:
(1) Whether it is possible for the juvenile to be placed with a parent within the next six months and, if not, why such placement is not in the juvenile's best interests.
(2) Where the juvenile's placement with a parent is unlikely within six months, whether legal guardianship or custody with a relative or some other suitable person should be established and, if so, the rights and responsibilities that should remain with the parents.
(3) Where the juvenile's placement with a parent is unlikely within six months, whether adoption should be pursued and, if so, any barriers to the juvenile's adoption.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e).(4) Where the juvenile's placement with a parent is unlikely within six months, whether the juvenile should remain in the current placement, or be placed in another permanent living arrangement and why.
(5) Whether the county department of social services has since the initial permanency plan hearing made reasonable efforts to implement the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(6) Any other criteria the court deems necessary.
The trial court is not required "to make written findings with respect to all six factors; rather, as the plain language of the statute indicates, the court must enter written findings in its order concerning only those factors 'that are relevant.'" In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 221, 753 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2014) (quoting and applying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a), which also requires the trial court to "consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant"). "[A] factor is relevant if there is conflicting evidence concerning the factor, such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the evidence presented before the trial court." H.D., 239 N.C. App. at 327, 768 S.E.2d at 866 (quotation marks omitted). A finding is not required if the factor does not have "an impact on the trial court's decision." D.H., 232 N.C. App. at 221, 753 S.E.2d at 735.
Here, the trial court found and determined in paragraph 13 of its order that, inter alia,
a. It is not possible and unlikely for the juveniles to be placed with a parent within the next six months and is unlikely that the juveniles can be returned to their parents within six months; and the Onslow County Department of Social Services has made reasonable efforts to either prevent the need for placement or eliminate the need for placement of the juveniles . . . .To support this determination, the trial court again repeated the previously quoted findings of fact.
Respondent-Mother challenges the finding that "it was unlikely that the juveniles could be returned to their mother within six months." The statute merely requires the trial court to make findings on the factors "that are relevant." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court properly made findings that it would not be possible for the children to be placed with a parent within the next six months. The trial court's findings regarding Respondent-Mother's failure to complete her treatment, as detailed above, support the conclusion that placement with Respondent-Mother is not in the children's best interest. The trial court's order contains extensive findings, supported by competent evidence, to support its conclusion that it would be in the children's best interest to grant custody to court-approved caretakers.
B. Waiver of Future Hearings
Respondent-Mother next argues that the trial court erred in waiving further review hearings when none of the children had resided in their placements for at least one year. We agree.
A trial court may waive future permanency planning hearings only after it finds all of the following by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:
(1) The juvenile has resided in the placement for a period of at least one year.Id. § 7B-906.1(n). In determining whether to waive further review hearings, subsection (n)(1)'s one-year requirement is measured from the date of the initial permanency planning hearing. See In re P.A., 241 N.C. App. 53, 66, 772 S.E.2d 240, 249 (2015).
(2) The placement is stable and continuation of the placement is in the juvenile's best interests.
(3) Neither the juvenile's best interests nor the rights of any party require that review hearings be held every six months.
(4) All parties are aware that the matter may be brought before the court for review at any time by the filing of a motion for review or on the court's own motion.
(5) The court order has designated the relative or other suitable person as the juvenile's permanent custodian or guardian of the person.
Here, the children were removed from Respondent-Mother's home on 18 April 2017, and the permanency planning hearing was held on 29 March 2018. Thus, the children could not have resided in their placements for at least one year. The trial court's finding that "the juveniles have resided in the placement for a period of at least one year (at the time of entry of this order)" is therefore not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the order waiving future review hearings and remand to the trial court. In its discretion, the trial court may hear additional evidence and enter a new order waiving future review hearings based on appropriate findings.
C. Visitation
Finally, Respondent-Mother claims that "the trial court did not enter an appropriate minimum outline of visitation when it granted that Respondent-Mother is allowed supervised visitation for a minimum of two hours per month at a schedule set by the caretakers for the children." We disagree.
When granting visitation, the trial court's order "shall specify the minimum frequency and length of the visits and whether the visits shall be supervised. The court may authorize additional visitation as agreed upon by the respondent and custodian or guardian." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c).
The trial court's order granted Respondent-Mother visitation with all three minor children, supervised by the respective custodian or a third-party supervisor chosen by the custodian, for a minimum of two hours per month on a schedule set by the custodian. The order sets forth the minimum frequency and length of Respondent-Mother's visitation—two hours, once per month—and provides that the visits will be supervised. This is all that the statute requires. In re N.B., 240 N.C. App. 353, 364, 771 S.E.2d 562, 570 (2015) (stating that when a trial court grants visitation, there is no "requirement that the trial court include in its order the particular time or place for such visitations, but only . . . a framework for such visitations"). Thus, we affirm the trial court's order regarding visitation.
III. Conclusion
The trial court did not err by: (1) ceasing reunification efforts; (2) determining that Respondent-Mother was unfit and had acted in a manner inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status as a parent; (3) awarding custody of the children to court-approved caretakers; or (4) granting visitation to Respondent-Mother. However, the trial court did improperly waive further review hearings. Accordingly, the trial court's Review and Permanency Planning Order is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. On remand, the trial court may waive further review hearings based on adequate findings supported by the evidence.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Judges STROUD and INMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).