Opinion
NO. 01-17-00835-CV
04-05-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF M.F. AND K.A., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2016-05332J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this parental-rights termination case, appellant S.J.-F. (Mother) appeals the trial court's decree terminating her parental rights to her daughters, M.F. and K.A. In one issue, Mother contends that the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS or Department) presented factually insufficient evidence that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children under Family Code section 161.001(b)(2).
We affirm.
Background
Mother has two children who are the subject of this proceeding: M.F., a daughter born in 2009, and K.A., a daughter born in 2014. The children's fathers are not parties to this appeal.
DFPS first became involved with the children in June 2016. In the supporting affidavit filed with DFPS's petition seeking to terminate Mother's parental rights, caseworker Cassandra Warren averred that DFPS first received a referral of neglectful supervision of the children on June 21, 2016. The referral stated that Mother, who engaged in prostitution, dropped M.F., who was six years old at the time, off at children's church. Mother was not wearing shoes, she smelled of marijuana and alcohol, and she could barely keep her eyes open. M.F. did not want to go to the bathroom by herself and was withdrawn, "especially from little boys." Warren averred that DFPS received a second referral of neglectful supervision on June 30, 2016. This report stated that Mother was abusing illegal substances, that there were concerns that the children were malnourished, and that M.F. was "intellectually challenged."
Warren averred that DFPS received a third referral on July 28, 2016. This report alleged that Mother left M.F. "at a home" and did not know where M.F. was. The report further alleged that Mother was intoxicated while taking care of the children and that an "unknown male was violent around" K.A. Law enforcement had to be called on this occasion. Finally, Warren averred that DFPS received a fourth referral on September 28, 2016, after Mother, M.F., and K.A. were involved in a car accident in Walker County, north of Houston. Mother and the children were taken to the hospital. Mother, who was suspected of being intoxicated, had minor injuries. The children did not appear to be injured. Mother was arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated and was incarcerated at the time DFPS sought termination of her parental rights on the next day, September 29, 2016. Warren's affidavit also set out Mother's extensive criminal history and history of involvement with DFPS concerning her older children, which included the termination of her parental rights to other children. The trial court appointed DFPS as the children's temporary managing conservator and placed the children with foster parents.
The trial court approved a family service plan for Mother. The family service plan required Mother to submit to random drug testing, maintain safe and stable housing for more than six months, maintain stable employment, participate in parenting classes, complete a substance abuse assessment, complete a psychosocial evaluation, and refrain from criminal activity.
At the final hearing in September 2017, the trial court admitted evidence that, in 2008, Mother had had her parental rights to four older children terminated on the basis that she had knowingly placed the children in endangering conditions, engaged in endangering conduct, constructively abandoned the children, and failed to comply with the terms of a family service plan. The trial court also admitted evidence concerning Mother's past criminal history. This evidence reflected that Mother had the following prior convictions: the state jail felony offense of theft of property valued between $1,500 and $20,000 in 2013, the state jail felony offense of prostitution with three or more priors in 2013, the Class B misdemeanor offense of theft of property valued between $50 and $500 in 2011, the Class B misdemeanor offense of criminal mischief in 2010, the Class A misdemeanor offense of prostitution—second offense in 2008, the Class A misdemeanor offense of prostitution in December 2007, the Class B misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass in 2007, the Class B misdemeanor offense of prostitution in July 2007, the state jail felony offense of possession of less than one gram of PCP in 2000, and the second-degree felony offense of arson in 1999.
The trial court also admitted Mother's medical records from the car accident on September 28, 2016. The medical records stated that Mother and her two children were involved in a motor vehicle accident in which Mother did a U-turn on the highway and her bumper was "clipped" from behind. M.F. was unrestrained in the backseat at the time of the accident. The medical records described Mother as "lethargic" and "unable to make complete sentences," and the records reflected that Mother had minor injuries and was pregnant at the time of the accident. The medical records also reflected that Mother tested positive for PCP usage and was discharged from the hospital into the custody of the Department of Public Safety.
At the final hearing, Mother testified that she had recently given birth to the daughter with whom she had been pregnant at the time of her car accident and that this daughter is also in DFPS's care. This child is not one of the subject children of this proceeding.
The trial court also admitted Mother's drug test results. On March 9, 2017, during the pendency of this case, Mother tested positive for cocaine, cocaine metabolites, marijuana, and PCP. Mother was ordered to submit to a drug test on June 21, 2017, but she walked out before a sample could be collected, which DFPS considers a positive result.
At the final hearing, Mother agreed that M.F. and K.A. came into DFPS's care after the three of them were involved in a car accident that occurred on I-45. Mother denied that the accident occurred because she was driving the wrong way on I-45, but she identified a picture of her car at the accident scene that depicted her car facing the wrong way. Mother testified that she had a seizure while driving, which resulted in her car spinning around. She disagreed that M.F. was not restrained by her seat belt at the time of the accident, but Mother stated that she had told M.F. to lie down in the back seat. Mother agreed that she was taken to the Walker County Jail after she was discharged from the hospital and that her children went into DFPS's care at that time.
Mother testified that she was in the Walker County Jail for 112 days during the pendency of this case, that she participated in a 12-step program and completed some of her services while in jail, but that DFPS informed her this was insufficient to comply with her service plan. She also stated that she admitted herself to the Santa Maria drug treatment center, even though Mattlynn Washington, the DFPS caseworker, told her not to admit herself into a rehab program. She agreed that she did not complete the program at Santa Maria, but she testified that she left early because she was not able to see her children while in the program and because she could not work more than three days per week while in the program. Mother admitted that she had used PCP in the past, and she testified that the last time she had used PCP was August 2016, before she was aware that she was pregnant. She stated that she intended to go to a rehab program once her driving-while-intoxicated case was resolved, but she also testified that she does not have a drug problem and that she does not need inpatient drug treatment. Mother denied testing positive for drugs in 2017.
On examination by her counsel, Mother testified that the driving-while-intoxicated case which had resulted in her incarceration in the Walker County Jail was still pending. She denied driving under the influence.
Mother also testified that the baby's father told her that the PCP was fake and that he had gotten it from a smoke shop.
Mother also testified that she was aware that M.F. had participated in a forensic interview in February 2017 and that M.F. disclosed she had been sexually abused by an older brother. Mother characterized this disclosure as "a lie." Mother also stated that she had been homeschooling M.F.
Mattlynn Washington, the DFPS caseworker, testified that law enforcement was investigating the alleged abuse and that M.F. was receiving appropriate therapy.
Mother testified that she was not currently employed but that she intended to start her own company "helping women in recovery." She testified that she had an upcoming conference with Facebook concerning advertising for her company, and she intended to do a fundraiser for Hurricane Harvey victims. She stated that the business was not yet making money, but when it started making money, she would "be able to support a lot of people other than [herself]." Mother also stated that she was currently living with her aunt, but that she had her own property and was "getting access to more property" through her trust funds. Mother testified that she is entitled to a 164-acre property from family.
Mother stated that she has ten children and that she was not raising any of them at the time of the hearing. Mother agreed that she had not completed all of the services required by her family service plan, although she stated that she had set up an appointment to have her psychosocial evaluation completed.
Mattlynn Washington, the DFPS caseworker, testified that M.F. and K.A. had been in their current foster placement since April 2017 and that the foster parents intended to adopt both of them, as well as Mother's youngest daughter who was born during the pendency of this case but is not one of the subject children. Washington stated that DFPS's goal for the children was adoption by their current placement. Washington testified that when M.F. first started school after being placed into foster care, she was behind the other students in "every way possible" because she had not had any type of schooling before, and she "barely knew her ABCs" and could not write her name, even though she was seven years old. At the time of the hearing, M.F. was in first grade and was "thriving" in the foster home. Washington testified that K.A. was in daycare during the day and does not have any special needs.
Washington testified that Mother received a positive drug test in March 2017, during the pendency of this case, and she refused to provide a hair sample for a court-ordered drug test in June 2017. Mother did provide a urine sample in June 2017, and this sample was negative for drugs. Washington testified that she informed Mother to report for random drug testing in July and August 2017, but Mother did not attend. Washington testified that she recommended that Mother attend Santa Maria treatment center because, while Mother did complete a 12-step program while incarcerated in the Walker County Jail, she "could not provide us with any information on the steps." Washington also testified that Mother completed her parenting classes while at Santa Maria.
Washington further testified that she had recently attended a permanency conference with Mother and, during this conference, Mother tried to physically fight her by lunging at her across the table. Security had to be called to separate Mother and Washington. Washington also testified that Mother had given her the name of an aunt as a possible placement for the children, but Mother's aunt lived with her sister, who did not want to go through the required background check process and who also lived with her son, a convicted felon, so DFPS did not complete a home study for Mother's aunt. Washington received no other potential placements for the children.
Washington testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of M.F. and K.A. because they were currently in a safe and stable home in which they were thriving and attached to their caregiver, who was meeting M.F.'s educational needs. She agreed that Mother had experienced periods of sobriety while at Santa Maria and in the Walker County Jail, but Mother tested positive for drugs after her release from jail. Washington stated that Mother's drug use would not provide a safe environment for the children. Washington further stated that Mother's drug use—specifically, the car accident while she was under the influence of PCP—resulted in the children's coming into DFPS's care.
The children's foster mother also testified. She stated that the children are "very much" bonded to her biological children, all of whom are grown, and that she intends to adopt the children. Both of the subject girls call her "mom," and they are bonded to the foster mother's young grandchildren. She stated that she intends to provide the children with a "proper education, a safe environment, and a good support team." She testified that she had scheduled and planned to attend a meeting at M.F.'s school concerning her special education needs. The foster mother also testified that the trial court recently suspended M.F.'s visits with Mother because M.F. was "acting out" after visiting with Mother. Those behavioral issues had mostly resolved themselves, as the foster mother agreed that it was best that the children have no contact with Mother.
Jennifer Hernandez, the child advocate for the children, also agreed that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest. She testified:
This guardian ad litem believes that it is in the children's best interest that DFPS be granted permanent managing conservatorship of [M.F. and K.A.] and all rights be terminated because Mom has history of prior terminations [of her parental rights]. She has a history of drug abuse and she has a history of allowing the girls to be in an environment where other people have endangered them.
She has not provided the ability to provide a stable environment for them. She is not earning an income right now. And she did not submit to all of the drug tests that were—that she was supposed to be a part of back in June and then again in July or August.
The trial court signed a decree terminating Mother's parental rights to M.F. and K.A. under Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), and (O). The trial court also found that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests and appointed DFPS as the children's sole managing conservator. This appeal followed.
Best Interest of the Children
In her sole issue, Mother contends that DFPS presented factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights to M.F. and K.A. was in the children's best interest under Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's predicate findings under section 161.001(b)(1), and she concedes that DFPS presented legally sufficient evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. A. Standard of Review
A trial court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if DFPS proves, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the statutorily enumerated predicate findings for termination and that termination is in the best interest of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2017); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012) (stating that federal due process clause and Texas Family Code both mandated "heightened" standard of review of clear and convincing evidence in parental-rights termination cases). DFPS must prove both elements—a statutorily prescribed predicate finding and that termination is in the children's best interest—by clear and convincing evidence. In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803. The Family Code defines "clear and convincing evidence" as "the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2014); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.
When a parent challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, we review all of the evidence, including disputed or conflicting evidence. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). We should inquire whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). In applying this standard, our review "must not be so rigorous that the only factfindings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt." In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002)). B. Factors Relevant to Best Interest Determination
"[T]he prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child's best interest." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a) (West Supp. 2017). There is a strong, but rebuttable, presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b) (West 2014); Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (noting that while it is imperative for courts to recognize constitutional underpinnings of parent-child relationship, courts must not sacrifice emotional and physical interests of child "merely to preserve that right"). In determining whether a child's parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment, courts should consider factors including: (1) the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial intervention by DFPS; (5) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family; (6) the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services; (7) the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; and (8) whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).
The Texas Supreme Court has also set out several non-exclusive factors that we consider when determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest, including (1) the child's desires; (2) the child's current and future physical and emotional needs; (3) the current and future physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the person seeking custody; (5) whether programs are available to assist the person seeking custody in promoting the best interests of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the person seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 641-42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). These considerations are not exhaustive, and it is not necessary that all of these considerations be proved "as a condition precedent to parental termination." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The absence of evidence concerning some factors does not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a firm belief or conviction that termination is in the children's best interest. In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d at 642.
Although proof of the predicate findings under section 161.001(b)(1) does not relieve DFPS from proving that termination is in the children's best interest, "the same evidence may be probative of both issues." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. The best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence. In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.). "A trier of fact may measure a parent's future conduct by [her] past conduct and determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest." Id. C. Analysis
DFPS presented evidence that Mother had an extensive criminal history dating back to 1999, while she was raising multiple young children. Mother had four prior felony convictions, including convictions for theft, possession of a controlled substance, and arson, and she had six misdemeanor convictions, including convictions for theft, criminal mischief, criminal trespass, and multiple convictions for prostitution. Four of Mother's prior convictions occurred after M.F.'s birth in 2009. All of these convictions involved Mother's serving at least some jail time. See In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) ("When parents are incarcerated, they are absent from the child's daily life and are unable to provide support . . . ."). At the time of the final hearing, Mother was awaiting trial for driving while intoxicated after being involved in a car accident with her children in the car. Although Mother denied being intoxicated on this occasion, her medical records reflected that she tested positive for PCP. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (stating that parent's criminal history is relevant to best-interest finding); In re S.L.W., 529 S.W.3d 601, 613 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied) ("[W]hen considering the child's best interest, we may take into account a parent's continuing criminal history, past performance, and poor judgment.").
DFPS also presented evidence of Mother's drug use, which occurred prior to and during the pendency of this case. Mother admitted that she had used PCP in the past, but she stated that the last time she had used drugs was in August 2016, before she learned that she was pregnant with her youngest daughter, who was born during the pendency of this suit. Mother tested positive for PCP at the hospital following her car accident—which occurred with the children present—in September 2016. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ("A factfinder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent."). She also tested positive for cocaine, cocaine metabolites, marijuana, and PCP in March 2017. While Mother had a clean urine sample in June 2017, she refused to submit a hair sample, and she did not follow Washington's instructions to submit to random drug testing in July or August 2017. See In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ("A factfinder reasonably could infer that [the parent's] failure to submit to the court-ordered drug screening indicated she was avoiding testing because she was using drugs.").
A pattern of illegal drug use by the parent suggests that the parent is "not willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment—a primary consideration in determining the child's best interest." In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d at 642; see In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) ("A parent's drug use supports a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child."). Mother's history of drug use and her history of having drugs in her system while in possession of her children is relevant to physical danger to the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (listing current and future physical danger to child as factor relevant to best-interest determination); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d at 266 ("Mother's history of drug abuse bespeaks a course of conduct that the fact finder reasonably could conclude endangers [the child's] well-being."); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8) (considering whether child's family has history of substance abuse).
Mother checked herself into the Santa Maria treatment center, where she completed the parenting classes required by her family service plan; however, she did not complete the drug treatment program offered by Santa Maria. Mother testified that she completed a 12-step program while in the Walker County Jail, but Washington testified that Mother was not able to demonstrate that she had learned anything from that program. Although Mother expressed a willingness to go to rehab after the resolution of her pending driving-while-intoxicated case, she also testified that she does not believe that she has a drug problem and that she does not believe that she needs inpatient drug treatment. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (listing consideration of whether programs are available to assist person seeking custody in promoting best interests of child as relevant to best-interest determination); In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d at 642 (considering mother's failure to complete family service programs or twelve-step programs after she was released from jail).
Washington testified that Mother had never presented her with proof of employment, and Mother agreed that she was not employed at the time of trial, although she stated that she was in the process of starting her own company. Mother testified that she lived with an aunt, but that she was trying to access more property via trust funds. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (listing stability of parent's home as factor relevant to best-interest determination); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 121 (stating that mother subjected child to uncertainty and instability by failing to maintain stable housing and employment during pendency of case).
DFPS also presented undisputed evidence that Mother's parental rights to four older children had been terminated on the basis of endangering conduct. In making the best interest determination, the fact finder may consider a parent's failure to care for other children not the subject of the suit in evaluating parenting abilities. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119.
At the time of trial, M.F. was nearly eight years old and K.A. was nearly three. The young age of K.A., in particular, weighs in favor of the best-interest determination. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1) (considering child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities); In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (noting that young age of child—fourteen months at time of trial—weighed in favor of trial court's finding that termination was in child's best interest). Although DFPS did not present direct evidence concerning the desires of the children, both Washington and the foster mother testified that M.F. and K.A. were doing well in their current placement. The foster mother testified that both children called her "mom" and that they had bonded with her biological children and grandchildren. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118 ("When children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent."). The foster mother also testified that the trial court suspended Mother's visitation with the children shortly before trial when M.F. had started acting out after her visits with Mother. That behavior had subsided after the trial court suspended Mother's visitation. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (consideration of indications that parent-child relationship was not proper one is relevant to best-interest determination).
DFPS presented evidence that the children had been with their current foster mother since April 2017, that they were bonded to the foster mother, and that the foster mother wished to adopt both of them, which was DFPS's goal for the children. Mother did not testify concerning her specific plans for the children. See id. (considering plans for child by person seeking custody); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (comparing agency's plans and proposed placement with plans and home of parent seeking to avoid termination of rights).
Washington testified that the children were "thriving" in their current foster placement. Mother testified that she had homeschooled M.F., but Washington testified that when M.F. came into the Department's care she was behind her peers academically in almost every way, she barely knew her alphabet, and she could not write her name despite being almost seven years old. Washington testified that M.F. had improved while in the care of her foster mother, and the foster mother testified that the children's education was a priority and that she had scheduled and planned to attend a meeting at M.F.'s school concerning M.F.'s special education needs. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (considering child's current and future physical and emotional needs and parental abilities of persons seeking custody); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d at 533 ("[T]he need for permanence is a paramount consideration for the child's present and future physical and emotional needs.").
Furthermore, DFPS presented evidence that M.F. had disclosed that one of her older brothers had sexually abused her. Mother testified that Washington had informed her of this allegation, but she believed that M.F. was lying. Washington testified that law enforcement authorities were investigating the allegations and that M.F. was receiving appropriate therapy. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (considering child's current and future physical and emotional needs).
Mother argues that factually insufficient evidence supports the trial court's best interest finding. She argues that her parental rights should not have been terminated because she "worked some services" and she is bonded with her daughters. Mother points to the facts that she participated in a 12-step program while in the Walker County Jail, she checked herself into the Santa Maria treatment center, and she experienced periods of sobriety while in both of these places as evidence that termination of her parental rights is not in the children's best interest.
Entering a drug treatment program and completing her parenting classes while in that program is a positive step for Mother. However, DFPS presented evidence that Mother did not complete the program at Santa Maria and that, although she completed a 12-step program while incarcerated, she could not demonstrate to DFPS that she had learned anything from that program. Mother had a clean urine sample in June 2017, but she refused to provide a hair sample on that occasion, she refused to participate in random drug testing in July and August 2017, and she had a positive drug test in March 2017, six months before the final hearing. Mother also had not demonstrated that she had stable housing or employment, and she gave no indication of how she would address M.F.'s educational needs in light of the testimony that M.F. had been significantly behind her peers when she started school and might need further intervention. Furthermore, given Mother's long criminal history and history with DFPS, which included having her parental rights to four of her older children terminated, and the positive impact that the current foster placement was having on the children, we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (stating that parent's drug use, inability to provide stable home, and failure to comply with family service plan supports finding that termination is in child's best interest). We hold that factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest.
We overrule Mother's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the decree of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley.