Opinion
04-21-00276-CV
01-26-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.L. IV, a/k/a M.E., a Child
From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-PA-00477 Honorable Kimberly Burley, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice.
Regina and Marcusappeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to M.C.L. Both parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's grounds for termination and the best-interest finding. Regina also challenges the trial court's conservatorship finding and its denial of her motion for continuance. We affirm.
To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to appellant, R.A.E., and appellant, M.C.L.III, by fictitious names and to the child by his initials. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8.
Background
The Department of Family and Protective Services filed an original petition on March 3, 2020. In the petition, the Department sought to be appointed as M.C.L.'s temporary managing conservator and to terminate Regina and Marcus's parental rights.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on June 7 and 10, 2021. The evidence at trial consisted of testimony from three witnesses and exhibits. After trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Marcus and Regina failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for them to secure M.C.L.'s return. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Marcus and Regina's parental rights was in M.C.L.'s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2). Based on its findings, the court terminated Marcus and Regina's relationship with M.C.L. and appointed the Department permanent managing conservator of the child.
In addition, the court found by clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination set forth in Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) & (P) as to Marcus.
Each parent timely appealed the trial court's order, challenging the grounds for termination along with the trial court's best-interest finding. Regina also challenges the trial court's appointment of the Department as managing conservator and its denial of her motion for continuance.
Standard of Review
A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b). To determine whether this heightened burden of proof was met, we employ a heightened standard of review to decide whether a "factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). "This standard guards the constitutional interests implicated by termination, while retaining the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder's role." In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, no pet.). We do not reweigh issues of witness credibility but defer to the factfinder's reasonable credibility determinations. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).
A legal sufficiency review requires us to examine the evidence "in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id. When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we evaluate "whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding." Id. The evidence is factually insufficient "[i]f, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction." Id.
The Evidence Presented at Trial
The Department's lone witness was its caseworker, Priscilla Sandoval. She testified Marcus punched Regina in the face two times in October 2019. After punching Regina, Marcus grabbed M.C.L, got into his vehicle, and drove away with him. Police eventually stopped Marcus's vehicle. They found Marcus had been driving with M.C.L. on his lap. Marcus was arrested and charged with endangering M.C.L. and assaulting Regina. As a result of this incident, the Department put a safety plan in place for both parents. The plan included a no contact order barring Marcus from having contact with Regina. However, the Department repeatedly found Marcus and Regina together; Marcus also admitted to the Department that he used marijuana. Based on those facts, the Department filed its petition and took possession of M.C.L.
Regina was treated at a hospital for a swollen, split lip.
A. Regina Did Not Complete All of Her Required Services
Sandoval testified the Department required Regina and Marcus to comply with a court-ordered family plan. The plan required Regina to complete counseling, drug assessment and any recommended treatment, a psychological evaluation, a parenting class, and a domestic violence class. It also required her to visit with her child and maintain stable housing and employment. Sandoval reviewed these requirements with Regina. Regina was told failing to comply with the plan could result in termination of her parental rights.
The evidence showed Regina completed a drug assessment, a parenting class, and attended nearly every visitation. She also maintained stable housing with her mother.
However, five months after the Department took possession of M.C.L., Regina gave birth to her and Marcus's second child, a baby boy. A few days later, the Department investigated Regina's care of the second child. Sandoval testified Regina was unable to explain to investigators how often the baby needed to be fed, what kind of formula he needed, or how she cared for him. The Department also found the child's sleeping arrangements were not appropriate. The investigation also concluded Regina was not engaging in all of her services in M.C.L.'s case. Based on those facts, the Department decided to remove the second child.
See In re M.C.L. V, No. 04-21-00277-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio) (affirming termination of parental rights to second child).
After the second child was removed, Regina continued trying to fulfill the plan requirements. Regina completed a domestic violence course. However, Sandoval testified Regina had not learned the lessons of the course. For example, despite the previous domestic violence incident, Regina continued to pursue a romantic relationship with Marcus. Sandoval testified she explained to Regina any relationship with Marcus risked termination of her parental rights. Regina testified she and Sandoval never had that conversation. She insisted Marcus's violence toward her was an "accident" during "a little argument." She also testified there had been no relationship since the incident; she later conceded that was not true.
Sandoval was concerned Marcus's presence was detrimental to Regina's commitment to complying with the plan. Sandoval testified Regina told her just before trial that she and Marcus were still a couple. Although Regina denied that conversation, Marcus began joining her on visits with the children in the months before trial. Sandoval testified that, during those visits, Regina focused on Marcus instead of the children.
Around the same time, Regina also quit working. She testified she needed a break and did not have time for her plan courses. When asked how she would financially provide for her children, Regina testified Marcus would provide for them. She also testified she qualified for government assistance.
In early 2021, Regina also quit counseling. Regina testified she had lost contact with her counselor. However, she later conceded she was dropped for lack of engagement. She claimed the issue was the Department did not provide proper paperwork for a new counselor. But Sandoval testified Regina did not continue counseling after Sandoval referred her to a new counselor.
Sandoval testified it was in the child's best interest to terminate Regina's parental rights. She reasoned M.C.L. and his brother have been living in their foster home almost their entire lives. She explained they were meeting every milestone and their foster family was providing for their needs. She added Regina had more than a year to complete her services because of the birth of the second child, but she did not.
B. Marcus Did Not Complete Most of His Required Services
Sandoval testified Marcus's plan had the same requirements as Regina's plan. Sandoval explained the plan to Marcus and told him failure to comply with it could result in termination of his parental rights. She further testified services were set up for Marcus and he was provided their contact information.
Marcus completed a drug assessment, and had a job at Pacesetters-a temporary staffing agency. Marcus did not complete his domestic violence class, parenting class, counseling, or a psychological evaluation. He testified he did not need a domestic violence class because he was "not a violent person" and "he didn't punch [Regina]." Sandoval also testified Marcus did not maintain a stable residence. During the pendency of the case, Marcus lived in an unspecified apartment, then he lived with his mother, he was in jail for approximately three weeks, and he occasionally lived with Regina. Marcus conceded he had been in jail; however, he testified he always lived with his mother. Marcus also did not comply with the requirement that he visit M.C.L., visiting him only a handful of times in the beginning of his case. Then in the two months just before trial, he accompanied Regina on her visits rather than set up his own visits.
Marcus completed his drug assessment requirement with the help of services provided by his probation officer. Sandoval testified the drug assessment requirement would have been met if she had received confirmation from his probation officer.
In the two days between the first and second day of trial, Marcus took an online domestic violence course without consulting the Department. The Department did not approve the course.
Marcus testified he was on probation based on his prosecution for the domestic violence. Marcus testified he was also required to complete the services assigned in M.C.L.'s CPS case as a part of his probation in his domestic violence case.
Marcus testified he did not complete his services because he was busy and not ready. He also testified he found the process stressful and smoked marijuana a month before trial to deal with the stress. He conceded, however, that he had Sandoval's number and could have asked her for help. Marcus testified he was only eighteen years old when the case started and did not have an identification card. Marcus also testified he has bipolar disorder and was diagnosed with ADHD.
Marcus testified he was working to secure SSI and was taking a prescription regimen for his diagnosis. Sandoval testified she only learned about his efforts to secure SSI along with his diagnosis the day before trial. Sandoval testified Marcus could have received additional assistance had he timely completed his psychological evaluation.
Sandoval testified it was in M.C.L.'s best interest that Marcus's parental rights be terminated. She further testified he had over a year to work on his services and only began working on them in the last few months. She testified he could not provide M.C.L. a safe and stable environment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Grounds for Termination
The trial court terminated both Marcus and Regina's parental rights pursuant to subsection (O) of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code. Marcus and Regina argue the evidence in support of the subsection (O) ground was legally and factually insufficient.
In order to terminate parental rights under subsection (O): (1) the parent must have failed to comply with the provisions of a court order, which (2) specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to receive custody of the child from the Department.. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The necessary actions are usually set forth in a court-ordered service plan. D.L.S. v. Texas Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-20-00369-CV, 2020 WL 7041564, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 30, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). "The burden of complying with the court order is on the parent." In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 690 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, pet. denied). "Subsection (O) looks only for a parent's failure to comply with a court order, without reference to quantity of failure or degree of compliance." D.L.S., 2020 WL 7041564, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). We may not reverse a termination decree based on substantial compliance. In re J.M.K., No. 04-20-00387-CV, 2020 WL 7232133, at *3 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Dec. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re A.D.N., No. 01-16-00785-CV, 2017 WL 491286, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 7, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). "Thus, a parent may violate subsection (O) even when the parent had sporadic incidents of partial compliance with the court order." D.L.S., 2020 WL 7041564, at *4 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 278 (Tex. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Subsection (O) includes two additional requirements not at issue here: The child was in the Department's care for at least nine months and removed from the parent due to abuse or neglect. Tex. Fam. Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(O).
A. Regina
Both parents' plans were incorporated by reference in the trial court's initial permanency hearing order on August 25, 2020. The evidence shows Regina did not comply with the requirements of her plan. Regina conceded she quit working a few months before trial. She claimed she needed a "break" and did not have time for plan courses.
Regina testified she did not comply with her counseling requirement because she was not provided with the proper paperwork to re-engage in counseling after she had been discharged. Section 161.001(d) precludes termination under subsection (O) if the parent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she was unable to comply with specific provisions of the court order incorporating the service plan; and (2) she made a good faith effort to comply with the order and her failure to comply is not attributable to any fault of her own. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(d); In re Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2019). In the order of termination, the trial court concluded Regina did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence she was unable to comply with the plan or that she made a good faith effort to comply and the failure to comply with the order is not attributable to any fault of her own. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(d). The record shows Sandoval testified she provided it; Regina simply did not re-engage in these services. Regina also conceded she was discharged from counseling due to lack of engagement. The trial court reasonably could have resolved credibility issues and conflicts in this evidence about the reasons that Regina did not comply with the plan to find Regina's failure to comply was her own fault. W.C. v. Texas Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-19-00713-CV, 2020 WL 1281643, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 18, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Although she completed a domestic violence class, Regina also continued to minimize Marcus's actions. She put her relationship with Marcus before regaining possession of M.C.L. even though the plan specifically required Regina "to demonstrate the ability to remove herself from domestic violence incidents."
B. Marcus
The evidence shows Marcus failed to complete a psychological evaluation, counseling, a parenting class, and a domestic violence class. Marcus argues he was unable to comply with the plan because Sandoval never reviewed it with him. However, Marcus was able to complete some services. He also conceded during trial Sandoval did explain his services to him. Sandoval also provided him with contact information for service providers.
Marcus also argues Sandoval did not give him the help he needed when he became frustrated with the process of scheduling his classes. However, he conceded he had Sandoval's number and could have contacted her. He also conceded Sandoval could not always follow up with him because she did not always have his most current number.
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court was presented with clear and convincing evidence that was legally and factually sufficient to support its finding that Marcus and Regina failed to comply with specific, itemized actions in the trial court's order that were required to secure M.C.L.'s return. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 239 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); W.C., 2020 WL 1281643, at *5.
Having found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the predicate ground set out in section 161.001(b)(1)(O), we do not address the trial court's findings as to the other two predicate grounds for terminating Marcus's parental rights. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (concluding court need uphold only one termination ground along with a challenged best-interest finding).
Best-Interest Finding
Regina and Marcus argue the evidence was not legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b). Under Texas law, there is a strong presumption the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). However, a court must also presume "the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is . . . in the child's best interest." Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(a). In making a best-interest determination, the factfinder looks at the entire record and considers all relevant circumstances. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27-29 (Tex. 2002).
In determining the best interest of a child, a court should consider the factors set out in section 263.307 of the Family Code. Courts also apply the non-exhaustive Holley factors. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future emotional and physical needs of the child; (3) the present and future physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5)the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6)the plans held by the individuals seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home of the parent and the individuals seeking custody; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
These factors include: the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after intervention by the department; whether the child is fearful of returning to the child's home; the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child's parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child's home; whether there is a history of abusive conduct by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency's close supervision; the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills; and whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307.
Not every factor must be proven for a court to find that termination is in the child's best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Instead, we must consider "the totality of the circumstances in light of the Holley factors" to determine whether sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding. In re B.F., No. 02-07-334-CV, 2008 WL 902790, at *11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). The reasons supporting termination under subsection O may also support the trial court's best-interest finding. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013).
A. Marcus's Assaultive Conduct Toward Regina and the Future Physical Danger to M.C.L.
Domestic violence may be considered in analyzing the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307 (b)(7) ("whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home"); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) ("[E]ndangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the child."). Both parents have refused to acknowledge the gravity of Marcus's assault on Regina. Marcus declined to take a domestic violence course because he was "not a violent person" and "he didn't punch [Regina]." Unlike Marcus, Regina completed a domestic violence course. But Regina has not learned the lessons from the course. She characterized the incident, which occurred only a few months after M.C.L. was born, as an "accident" resulting from a "little argument." After the incident, Regina continued her relationship with Marcus despite being on notice of the risk it posed to M.C.L. and her parental rights. It is reasonable to conclude the parents' lack of appropriate understanding of the seriousness of domestic abuse could threaten M.C.L. (and his baby brother) with physical danger in the future. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307; In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. This factor weighs strongly in favor of the trial court's best-interest finding.
Marcus also conceded that he endangered M.C.L. when he drove with him on his lap.
B. The Desire of M.C.L.
M.C.L. was one year old at the time of trial. When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider whether the children have bonded with their caregivers, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent. See In re N.J.D., No. 14-17-00711-CV, 2018 WL 650450, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 1, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
The Department placed M.C.L. in foster care in early 2020 when he was a baby, more than a year before trial. The current placement is meeting his basic needs. He is doing well, thriving alongside his baby brother, and reaching his milestones. He had a minor developmental physical condition the foster parents resolved through medical care shortly after he came into their custody. The current plan calls for the foster parents to adopt him.
The second child joined him days after he was born in August 2020.
Marcus mostly avoided visits until two months before trial when he began accompanying Regina on her regular visits. Marcus testified he developed a bond with M.C.L. Sandoval disagreed; she testified Marcus was only beginning to develop a connection with M.C.L. The evidence shows M.C.L. has bonded with Regina, but she has focused more on Marcus during recent visits.
This factor weighs strongly in favor of the trial court's best-interest finding as to Marcus; it is neutral with respect to Regina.
C. The Present and Future Physical Needs of M.C.L.
Marcus was employed with Pacesetters. However, it was not clear from Marcus's testimony whether he could support M.C.L. (and his baby brother) on his Pacesetters' income. Regina could not support M.C.L. because she quit her job. She claimed she would secure government assistance. This factor weighs strongly in favor of the trial court's best-interest finding as to Regina; it only slightly weighs in favor of the trial court's best-interest finding as to Marcus.
Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the best-interest finding and applying the Holley factors, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Marcus and Regina's parental rights were in M.C.L.'s best interest. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We further conclude that any disputed evidence, viewed in light of the entire record, could have been reconciled in favor of the trial court's best-interest finding or was not so significant that the trial court could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in M.C.L.'s best interest. We therefore hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2).
The Trial Court's Conservatorship Finding
Regina contends the trial court abused its discretion in making its conservatorship finding because its termination order was based on insufficient evidence. If the Department is appointed managing conservator solely as a consequence of the trial court's termination order, then a parent's challenge to the Department's conservatorship appointment is automatically subsumed within the parent's appeal of the termination order. See In re D. N.C. , 252 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 161.207(a). However, if the Department has pled alternative grounds for conservatorship, and the trial court has entered findings supporting appointment under those alternative grounds, then the parent appealing the termination order must separately challenge the Department's appointment under the alternative grounds. Tex. Fam. Code § 153.131 (authorizing appointment of Department as nonparent managing conservator if trial court makes certain findings); In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615-17 (Tex. 2007) (holding parent must specifically challenge trial court's section 153.131 findings because such a challenge not subsumed within parent's challenge to termination order).
In this case, the trial court's conservatorship order was not made solely as a consequence of the termination order. It was instead based on the trial court's findings that appointment of Regina or Marcus as a managing conservator would not be in the best interest of M.C.L. and such appointment would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development. See Tex. Family Code § 153.131. Regina does not challenge these findings. Because she does not challenge these findings, and because we have already held the evidence supports termination is in the child's best interest, we affirm the trial court's conservatorship finding. See In re I.G., No. 13-18-00114-CV, 2018 WL 3062581, at *5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Denial of Regina's Motion for Continuance
Regina also contends the "court should not have denied [her] not-ready announcement" because she was entitled to "an extension of time" to continue working her services. Regina identifies no authority in support of her argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (brief must contain, among other things, appropriate citations to authorities). Construing the argument liberally, Regina appears to contend the trial court improperly denied her a continuance when she indicated she was not ready for trial. See Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); In re R.F. III, 423 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.). We review the denial of a motion for continuance for abuse of discretion. R.F., 423 S.W.3d at 490. Whether this court might have ruled differently under the same circumstances does not warrant a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251 provides that no continuance shall "be granted except for sufficient cause supported by affidavit, [] by consent of the parties, or by operation of law." Tex.R.Civ.P. 251. When a movant fails to comply with these requirements, we must presume the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986); R.F., 423 S.W.3d at 490. Regina's attorney did not offer an affidavit in support of a continuance, did not proclaim any agreement on a continuance between the parties, or otherwise identify a basis for a continuance by operation of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251.
Additionally, in determining whether to deny a motion for continuance, the trial court may consider the procedural history of the case. In re J.G., No. 12-18-00111-CV, 2018 WL 5318008, at *2 (Tex. App.-Tyler Oct. 29, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). At the August 24, 2020 initial permanency hearing, the trial court set the case for a February 3, 2021 trial on the merits. Regina and her attorney appeared at the hearing. At a March 30, 2021 hearing attended by Regina and her attorney, the trial court continued the trial date more than four months to June 7, 2021. After Regina's attorney announced not ready during the June trial, the court heard argument on the issue. Regina's attorney asked the court to reset the trial date to allow Regina to continue her services, arguing she had already substantially complied with them. The court denied the continuance. It explained the case had been ongoing for nearly fifteen months, and the child, given his age, needed permanency. See J.G., 2018 WL 5318008, at *3.
Because Regina did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251, was aware of the trial date early on in the case, and the trial date was continued for four months providing Regina more than twelve months to complete her service plan, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for continuance.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's order.