Opinion
06-14-2017
In the Matter of MALIK B. (Anonymous), appellant.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (Tamara A. Steckler and Amy Hausknecht of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Deborah A. Brenner and Victoria Scalzo of counsel), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (Tamara A. Steckler and Amy Hausknecht of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Deborah A. Brenner and Victoria Scalzo of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Amanda E. White, J.), dated July 7, 2016. The order of disposition, insofar as appealed from, adjudicated Malik B. a juvenile delinquent. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review an order of fact-finding of that court dated April 20,
2016, which, after a hearing, found that Malik B. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
"The evidence supporting a fact-finding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is legally sufficient if, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, any rational trier of fact could have found the appellant's commission of all the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt" (Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685 ; see Matter of Chakelton M., 111 A.D.3d 732, 733, 975 N.Y.S.2d 95 ; Matter of Imani MC., 78 A.D.3d 705, 706, 911 N.Y.S.2d 381 ). The test is no different when the evidence supporting the fact-finding is circumstantial (see Matter of Chakelton M., 111 A.D.3d at 733, 975 N.Y.S.2d 95 ). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of grand larceny in the fourth degree, robbery in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (see Matter of Brandon V., 133 A.D.3d 769, 769, 20 N.Y.S.3d 385 ; Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d 1250, 1251, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122 ; Matter of Ellius R., 97 A.D.3d 586, 587, 947 N.Y.S.2d 882 ; People v. Carr–El, 287 A.D.2d 731, 732, 732 N.Y.S.2d 256, affd. 99 N.Y.2d 546, 754 N.Y.S.2d 198, 784 N.E.2d 71 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Brandon V., 133 A.D.3d at 769, 20 N.Y.S.3d 385 ; Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d at 1251, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122 ; Matter of Kaseem R., 113 A.D.3d 779, 780, 978 N.Y.S.2d 886 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Dajahn M., 110 A.D.3d 812, 813, 973 N.Y.S.2d 248 ; Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d at 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685 ; Matter of Jamel C., 92 A.D.3d 782, 782–783, 938 N.Y.S.2d 456 ; Matter of Kalexis R., 85 A.D.3d 927, 928–929, 925 N.Y.S.2d 356 ). The Family Court's credibility determinations should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Brandon V., 133 A.D.3d at 769, 20 N.Y.S.3d 385 ; Matter of Darnell G., 125 A.D.3d 969, 969, 5 N.Y.S.3d 180 ; Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d at 1251, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122 ). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the fact-finding determination of the Family Court was not against the weight of the evidence.