Opinion
2012-07-5
In the Matter of ELLIUS R. (Anonymous), appellant.
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers and Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Ellius R. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Freeman, J.), dated September 12, 2011, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated August 2, 2011, made after a hearing, finding that he committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the presentment agency established the voluntariness of the appellant's inculpatory statement beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Witherspoon, 66 N.Y.2d 973, 974, 498 N.Y.S.2d 789, 489 N.E.2d 758). The evidence established that the appellant's “ ‘will [was not] overborne and his capacity for self-determination [was not] critically impaired’ ” (Matter of Cy R., 43 A.D.3d 267, 268, 841 N.Y.S.2d 25,cert. denied552 U.S. 1320, 128 S.Ct. 1891, 170 L.Ed.2d 762, quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037;cf. People v. Miller, 244 A.D.2d 828, 666 N.Y.S.2d 281;People v. Lange, 77 A.D.2d 632, 430 N.Y.S.2d 370).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of Clarissa S., 83 A.D.3d 1083, 1084, 921 N.Y.S.2d 540), we find that the identification testimony was legally sufficient to support the finding that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( cf.CPL 470.15[5]; see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Clarissa S., 83 A.D.3d at 1084, 921 N.Y.S.2d 540;cf. People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determinations were not against the weight of the evidence ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 342.2[2]; Matter of Charles S., 41 A.D.3d 484, 486, 838 N.Y.S.2d 136).