Summary
holding that exclusion of evidence pursuant to Rule 193.6 is not death-penalty sanction
Summary of this case from Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. GAC Equip.Opinion
05-22-01296-CV
05-21-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF J.M.S., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 470th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 470-56640-2021
Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE
Father appeals pro se from the trial court's final divorce decree. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.
Mother and Father married in March 2013 and have one child together, J.M.S. Father petitioned for divorce in December 2021, and Mother counterpetitioned soon after. At the time of the trial, Father faced felony charges of continuous family violence against Mother.
Mother testified at the trial that Father abused her on multiple occasions during the marriage. She described one incident where Father choked her and held her against the wall by her throat. She described another incident where Father prevented her from leaving by grabbing her purse, which caused the strap to choke her briefly before it broke. She showed jurors a scar from another incident in which she alleged Father had assaulted her with a multi-tool. And the jury saw video evidence of another incident where Father forcibly threw Mother out of the house against her will. The video shows Father shouting, "I'm two seconds away from throwing you out of this fucking house if you don't continue this conversation!" As Mother turned to walk away, Father grabbed her and began forcing her towards the door shouting repeatedly, "Are you going to talk!?!" Father shoved her out of the house and locked the door behind her. Despite the contemporaneous video evidence showing that he violently threw Mother out of the house because she refused to continue talking to him, Father testified that he threw her out of the house in self-defense.
The evidence at trial also suggested Father violated the conditions of his bond in the felony abuse case by, among other things, purchasing a firearm, kicking the door in at Mother's residence, and sending her threatening and harassing texts. The evidence also showed the State had moved to revoke Father's bond in the felony case after his ankle monitor revealed he had twice gone within five hundred feet of Mother's residence.
Father's bond conditions, however, were not the only court orders he did not obey. Evidence in the record suggests that Father also refused to comply with a probate court's order requiring that he provide a receiver access to his property. And the record shows Father did not obey numerous orders from the trial court in this case, including orders that he pay child support, that he complete a batterer's intervention program, that he provide Mother with a sworn inventory and appraisal of all separate and community property, that he provide the court with accurate information concerning his income for purposes of calculating child support, and that he respond to Mother's discovery requests.
As a result of his refusal to comply with the trial court's orders compelling responses to Mother's discovery, the trial court entered an order prohibiting Father from introducing certain evidence at trial that he did not disclose or produce in response to Mother's discovery requests. The trial court additionally entered sanctions under civil procedure rule 215, finding among other things both that Father had abused the discovery process in resisting Mother's proper discovery requests and that he had refused to provide the financial information required by family code section 154.063 when ordered to do so in open court. The trial court thus concluded it was just to sanction Father by ordering that Mother's proposed property division be taken as "established as a just and right division of the estate of the parties under" family code section 7.001.
The court conducted a jury trial at which the parties asked the jury to determine: (1) the grounds on which divorce should be granted; (2) who between Mother and Father should be J.M.S.'s sole managing conservator; and (3) whether the managing conservator's designation of J.M.S.'s primary residence should be subject to geographic limitations. The jury determined that the parties should be granted a divorce on no-fault grounds of insupportability, rather than Mother's assertion of cruelty. And it determined that Mother should be J.M.S.'s sole managing conservator with the right to determine primary residence subject to geographical restrictions.
After the trial, the court entered a final divorce decree finding that Father had engaged in a history or pattern of family violence, naming Mother J.M.S.'s sole managing conservator, requiring Father to pay child support, and awarding Mother a disproportionate share of the marital estate. Father appeals.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Father's evidence.
Father first contends the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting him from introducing evidence of Mother's alleged abuse towards J.M.S. as a sanction for untimely discovery responses. He argues that such a prohibition was not in J.M.S.'s best interest. Civil procedure rule 193.6, however, provides that a party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response in a timely manner may neither introduce undisclosed information into evidence nor offer testimony from undisclosed witnesses. "The rule is mandatory, and the penalty-exclusion of evidence-is automatic, absent a showing of good cause, lack of unfair surprise, or lack of unfair prejudice." Santana v. Santana, No. 02-15-00140-CV, 2016 WL 278781, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Father frames his first issue as asking whether the divorce decree is in J.M.S.'s best interest, but his arguments address only the trial court's ruling prohibiting him from introducing certain evidence of abuse by Mother. To the extent Father's first issue could be construed as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting any finding that certain portions of the divorce decree are in J.M.S.'s best interest, Father has not sufficiently presented that issue for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; Sprowl v. Stiles, No. 05-18-01058-CV, 2019 WL 3543581, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Because Father refused to respond to discovery requests seeking information about his allegations that Mother abused J.M.S., exclusion of his evidence on that issue was mandatory under rule 193.6, unless he established one of the rule's exceptions. Father does not contend on appeal that he established an exception under rule 193.6. Instead, he relies on a case in which our sister court held that, because excluding important evidence in a child-custody case may not serve the best interests of the child, a court should order such an exclusion as a sanction under civil procedure rule 215 only as a last resort, after lesser sanctions have proved unsuccessful. See In re P.M.B., 2 S.W.3d 618, 624-25 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). But the trial court in this case excluded Father's evidence under rule 193.6, not as a sanction under rule 215.
In any event, as our sister court later recognized, while a court must consider the best interests of the child, "a party cannot ignore the rules of civil procedure and then argue best interests of the child to try to avoid the consequences of having failed to abide by the rules. After all, the discovery rules apply to family law cases. If they are not followed, consequences will result." Kernan v. Cratty, No. 14-00-00865-CV, 2001 WL 1136153, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 27, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op.). Despite numerous attempts by the trial court to get Father to comply with his obligation to provide relevant information, Father refused to abide by either the rules of civil procedure or the trial court's orders-attributing his obstinance to his belief that Mother had also failed to comply with the rules. Father cannot seek to avoid the consequences of his refusal to produce discovery by invoking J.M.S.'s best interests. See id.; see also Santana, 2016 WL 278781, at *1-3 & n.5 (distinguishing In re P.N.B. and holding that trial court properly excluded mother's evidence under rule 193.6).
The trial court properly refused to consider affidavits that were not admitted into evidence.
Father next argues the trial court erred by not accepting as true certain allegations of abuse set forth in affidavits he attached to his motion for ex parte relief and his objection to the trial court's conservatorship appointments. From that premise, he contends the trial court erred because his affidavits established a pattern or history of abuse by Mother that created a rebuttable presumption against naming her as J.M.S.'s sole managing conservator and allowing her unsupervised access to the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004.
Father bases his arguments on a quote taken out of context from a thirty-year-old opinion discussing the evidentiary burden a movant must meet to satisfy the Craddock standard for setting aside a default judgment. See Director of the State Employees Workers' Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994). In that very limited and specific context, the supreme court held that affidavits "attached to the motion for new trial do not have to be offered into evidence in order to be considered by the trial court for the meritorious defense element or any other element of the Craddock test. It is sufficient that the affidavits are attached to the motion for new trial and are part of the record." Id. at 268 (citations omitted). The supreme court did not hold, as Father appears to argue, that a trial court must always consider any affidavits in the record-regardless of the context in which those affidavits came into the record-as substantive evidence on issues resolved by a trial at which such affidavits were excluded from evidence.
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).
The trial court properly refused to consider Father's affidavits. See, e.g., In re Reid, No. 04-22-00325-CV, 2022 WL 2821241, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court cannot base conservatorship rulings on affidavits attached to pleadings that are not admitted into evidence). And to the extent Father argues that credible evidence otherwise admitted at trial suggested a history or pattern of abuse by Mother, the factfinder was free to conclude otherwise. Indeed, there was testimony by representatives of the Texas Department of Child Protective Services that the Department investigated Father's allegations of abuse and concluded they were unfounded. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Mother J.M.S.'s sole managing conservator in accordance with the jury's verdict.
The trial court did not reversibly err by denying Father's request to conduct additional discovery.
Father next argues the trial court erred by refusing to allow additional discovery after Mother amended her pleadings and provided discovery responses after the discovery deadline. Civil procedure rule 190.5 provides that a trial court must allow additional discovery related to pleadings filed or information disclosed after the discovery deadline if the party seeking discovery would be unfairly prejudiced without it.
Father identifies six items that he contends qualify as pleadings or supplemental discovery responses warranting additional discovery under rule 190.5. To the extent Father preserved an objection based on each of those items, he offers nothing more than a conclusory assertion that he suffered undue prejudice because of the trial court's refusal to allow additional discovery. Father does not explain what discovery he wished to conduct, what that discovery would likely have revealed, or how the lack of additional discovery adversely affected his ability to prepare for trial. Moreover, Father does not fully address the reasons the trial court gave for denying his request to conduct additional discovery.
On this record, and based on Father's insufficient appellate arguments, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1, we discern no abuse of discretion in denying Father's request for additional discovery under rule 190.5. See Choctaw Nation of Okla. v. Sewell, No. 05-16-01011-CV, 2018 WL 2410550, at *11 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 29, 2018, pet. dism'd) (mem. op.). And in no event has Father demonstrated the very baseline for reversal on appeal: that any error likely led to the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Father.
Father next argues the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights by ordering excessive "death penalty" discovery sanctions. Father's arguments on this issue rely on mischaracterizations both of the record and the trial court's orders. He begins both by understating the extent of his misconduct and overstating the trial court's sanctions. According to Father, the trial court sanctioned him for "untimely discovery responses" by "prohibiting him from presenting evidence or calling witnesses at trial." But the trial court did not sanction Father for serving untimely discovery responses; it sanctioned him for refusing to respond to discovery at all and for refusing to provide information required by statute, despite having been ordered to do so. The trial court did not sanction Father by prohibiting him from presenting any evidence or calling any witnesses at trial. Indeed, Father testified at trial, elicited extensive testimony, and introduced numerous exhibits into evidence.
Father also misrepresents that during a "pre-trial conference," the trial court "instructed that [Father] was not permitted to present any evidence pertaining to conservatorship and possession during the jury portion of trial." That is not accurate. Rather, the trial court informed Father that because he did not respond to Mother's discovery requests, it would not allow him to introduce any undisclosed evidence at trial. Regardless, as noted above, Father presented and elicited extensive evidence concerning conservatorship and possession during the jury portion of the trial.
Moreover, as also discussed above, the trial court's order to exclude undisclosed evidence was mandatory under rule 193.6. Contrary to Father's conclusory assertions, it was not a "death penalty" sanction subject to a TransAmerican analysis. See TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding); Amudo v. Amudo, No. 01-17-00318-CV, 2018 WL 3059729, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Because the exclusion of evidence under 193.6 is automatic and is not discretionary, the trial court's imposition of the automatic exclusions mandated by rule 193.6 is not a death-penalty sanction and is not subject to review under a TransAmerican analysis."). Father had the burden to establish an exception to the mandatory exclusion provisions of rule 193.6. See Choctaw Nation of Okla., 2018 WL 2410550, at *11. His bare assertion that Mother's inadequate discovery responses prevented him from complying with his own discovery obligations fell far short of meeting that burden.
Father also fails to address the only aspect of the trial court's order that was, in fact, a sanction entered under rule 215-its order that it would take Mother's proposed property division as "established as a just and right division of the estate of the parties under" family code section 7.001. Father provides no argument or authorities concerning whether that part of the trial court's order, standing alone, constitutes a "death penalty" sanction under these circumstances. And he likewise fails to address how the TransAmerican factors would apply to that portion of the trial court's order. Consequently, Father has not sufficiently presented the issue for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Sprowl v. Stiles, No. 05-18-01058-CV, 2019 WL 3543581, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Even ignoring Father's briefing deficiencies and considering the matter in the interest of justice, we can discern no clear abuse of discretion on this record. See Hizar v. Heflin, 672 S.W.3d 774, 787-88, 795 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2023, pet. denied) (noting that we will not reverse a trial court's sanction order absent a clear abuse of discretion). First, there is a direct relationship between the trial court's rule 215 sanction and Father's conduct in refusing to provide relevant information about his income and the extent of the marital estate. See TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917. Second, the sanction was not excessive under the circumstances; that is, the "punishment . . . fit the crime." Id. By refusing to disclose the full extent of his income and assets, Father made it very difficult-if not impossible-for either Mother or the trial court to accurately determine the extent and value of the marital estate. Sanctioning Father by preventing him from challenging Mother's proposed property division was no more severe than necessary to address the prejudice caused by Father's misconduct.
To the extent Father complains that the trial court failed to consider or test the viability of lesser sanctions, he does not explain how a lesser sanction would have sufficiently ensured his compliance. Moreover, the record reflects that, before the trial court entered its sanction order, Father refused to disclose the financial information required by family code section 154.063, despite having been threatened with contempt. Indeed, Father refused to answer the court's questions, repeatedly told the court he would not acknowledge its authority, and told the court that it lacked discretion to hold him in contempt. Even after the court threatened to have him arrested, Father provided only incomplete and evasive answers concerning his financial resources. This demonstrates both that the trial court did in fact consider lesser sanctions before issuing its sanction order and that the threat of such lesser sanctions proved ineffective in ensuring Father's compliance.
We also note that we lack a complete record of the relevant trial court proceedings necessary to fully evaluate the extent to which the trial court may have considered other sanctions. Father has not provided us with a transcript or other record of the evidentiary hearing specifically referenced in the trial court's April 2022 order compelling him to disclose information about the marital estate. "When confronted with an incomplete record, we presume the omitted portions are relevant to the appeal and the evidence contained within the omitted portions of the record support[s] the trial court's judgment." Hizar, 672 S.W.3d at 788. We must therefore presume that the missing portions of the record in this case sufficiently support a conclusion that the trial court considered lesser sanctions.
For example, the trial court may have unequivocally warned Father at the hearing that continued failure to produce responsive information would result in a case-determinative sanction. Under our precedent, such a warning, when paired with the trial court's order compelling discovery responses, might satisfy the "lesser sanction" requirement for imposing case-determinative sanctions. See Hizar, 672 S.W.3d at 788.
Because the record supports a conclusion that the trial court considered the viability of lesser sanctions, we need not address whether Father's behavior throughout the case would justify imposing a case-determinative sanction in the first instance, regardless of the availability of lesser sanctions. See GTE Commc'ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) ("Case determinative sanctions may be imposed in the first instance only in exceptional cases when they are clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance with the rules.").
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father's motion to postpone the trial.
Father next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his "agreed" motion to postpone the trial. The decision to grant or deny a trial continuance is left to the trial court's sound discretion, and we will not reverse its ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Moreno v. Silva, 316 S.W.3d 815, 817- 18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied).
Father does not cite to anywhere in the appellate record establishing that Mother agreed to his motion. Instead, he cites to an unfiled exhibit attached to his appellate brief that purports to show Mother signed a proposed agreed order to postpone the trial in May 2022-before the trial court had addressed its concerns about Father's refusal to respond to discovery requests. In any event, documents attached to the parties' briefs are not part of the appellate record, and we do not consider them on appeal. See Sink v. Sink, 364 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (An "appellate court cannot consider documents that are cited in the brief and attached as appendices if they are not formally included in the record on appeal."). But even if the parties had agreed to postpone the trial, the trial court would retain its discretion to deny the request. See Castro v. Moore, No. 05-97-02137-CV, 2000 WL 116060, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 1, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ("A trial court . . . is not required to grant a motion for continuance merely because the parties agree to . . . continue a case. Such a rule would give control of a trial court's docket to the litigants, rather than the trial judge." (citation omitted)).
Where, as here, a party seeks a continuance "in order to pursue further discovery, the motion must describe the evidence sought, explain its materiality, and show the party requesting the continuance has used due diligence to obtain the evidence." Richardson v. Republic Title of Tex., Inc., No. 05-22-00026-CV, 2022 WL 17843594, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 22, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). If the party's motion is not verified or supported by affidavit, we must presume the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying it. See Moreno, 316 S.W.3d at 818.
Here, Father's motion to postpone the trial was neither verified nor supported by an affidavit. That alone is fatal to Father's issue on appeal. But even if we were to consider the motion's unsworn statements, they offer little more than conclusory assertions that, because Mother had abused the discovery process, Father would suffer undue prejudice if not granted additional time to conduct discovery. Father's motion neither describes the evidence sought nor explains that evidence's materiality. And it does not address Father's diligence in seeking to obtain the discovery. See Richardson, 2022 WL 17843594, at *4. The trial court was well within its discretion to deny Father's motion to postpone the trial.
The trial court's family violence finding did not violate Father's constitutional right to the presumption of innocence.
Father next argues that by finding he engaged in a history or pattern of family violence against Mother, the trial court violated his constitutional right to the presumption of innocence. Father's argument lacks merit.
The presumption of innocence applies in criminal cases where a defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not apply in civil custody cases, which are decided under a different standard of proof. See Stary v. Ethridge, No. 01-21-00101-CV, 2022 WL 17684334, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 15, 2022, pet. filed) ("[Mother] was not entitled to an evidentiary standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as required in a criminal trial of a felony offense.").
To the extent Father argues that the evidence does not sufficiently support the trial court's finding that he engaged in a history or pattern of family violence, we note that his arguments on this issue rely on assertions that are not supported by record citations. According to Father, the State ultimately dismissed the felony charges against him due to sworn statements Mother previously made recanting her allegations of abuse. Putting aside the fact that Father's assertions are not supported by record evidence, neither the fact that a prosecutor may have decided not to further pursue criminal charges nor the fact that Mother may have previously recanted her allegations establishes that Father did not commit family violence against Mother.
Father notes that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do not specify any act of family violence Father committed against Mother. Instead, the trial court's findings refer to facts concerning Father's arrests and the charges stemming from the allegations of family violence to which Mother testified. To the extent Father complains that the trial court's findings of fact were not sufficiently specific, he waived that argument by failing to request additional, more specific findings. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 298; In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.).
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by making a family violence finding if "some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support" its decision. See In re A.E.E., No. 05-18-00210-CV, 2019 WL 1552450, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). In reviewing the trial court's conservatorship findings, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and indulge every legal presumption in favor of its judgment." Id.
Here, there is ample record evidence from which the trial court could conclude Father had engaged in a history or pattern of family violence-regardless of Mother's prior inconsistent statements or the eventual disposition of his criminal charges. See Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ("The jury observed the complainant's demeanor and was entitled not only to reconcile any such conflicts, but even to disbelieve her recantation. We hold the complainant's recantation of her videotaped testimony did not destroy its probative value."); Saldaña v. State, 287 S.W.3d 43, 60 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2008, pet. ref'd) (When "a witness recants prior testimony, it is up to the fact finder to determine whether to believe the original statement or the recantation. A fact finder is fully entitled to disbelieve a witness's recantation." (cleaned up)); cf. Tex. Fam. Code § 85.025(a-1)(1) (providing that a court may issue a protective order of indefinite duration if it finds the subject of the order "committed an act constituting a felony offense involving family violence . . . regardless of whether the person has been charged with or convicted of the offense").
Beyond evidence of Father's arrests, the evidence at trial included Mother's testimony detailing various acts of violence by Father, as well as video evidence corroborating Mother's allegation of one such violent act. Indeed, the video introduced at trial showed that Father violently grabbed Mother and shoved her out of the family home for refusing to continue a conversation with him, which Father implausibly testified was an act of self-defense. There was at least "some evidence of a substantive and probative character" supporting the trial court's family violence finding. See In re A.E.E., 2019 WL 1552450, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Father's constitutional rights by entering that finding.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Mother a disproportionate share of the marital estate.
Finally, Father complains that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Mother a disproportionate share of the marital estate. He contends the trial court impermissibly considered his fault in breaking up the marriage, despite the jury determining that neither party was at fault. He further argues that there was no evidence of the estate's value to support the trial court's property division and that the division divested him of separate personal property. We reject his arguments.
As an initial matter, we need not determine whether the trial court erred by considering Father's "fault" in breaking up the marriage, because Father has not demonstrated how such consideration ultimately resulted in an unjust property division in light of both the trial court's sanction order-which we have already upheld-and the numerous other factors the trial court identified as supporting a disproportionate division. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (error is harmless unless it probably results in an improper judgement); see also Phillips v. Phillips, 75 S.W.3d 564, 573 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (holding that even if a trial court erroneously considers fault, the appellant must "demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in making its ultimate 'just and right' division of the community estate . . . because the trial court is still permitted to consider any other 'non-fault' factor(s) in awarding a disproportionate amount of the community estate to one spouse"). Here, those considerations included among others: (1) Father's family violence against Mother; (2) Father's actual and constructive fraud on the marital estate; (3) Father's wasting community assets; and (4) Father's refusal to provide relevant information about the estate despite being ordered to do so.
We also reject Father's conclusory argument that because "there is no evidence in the record to establish the value of the marital assets and debts, the Trial Court could not have considered these important factors, and therefore could not have determined a division that was just and right." Father appears to ignore Mother's trial exhibits, which included an inventory and appraisement of the community estate. Indeed, the trial court specifically found that Mother's "proposed property division exhibit at trial set forth the values of the assets in the community estate."
We likewise reject Father's conclusory assertion that the decree impermissibly divested him of his separate personal property that was in Mother's possession. "Under Texas law, property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property, and a party who seeks to assert the separate character of property must prove that character by clear and convincing evidence." Sink v. Sink, 364 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.); see Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003. Father points to no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, establishing the separate character of any property awarded to Mother under the decree.
To the extent Father contends the trial court erroneously prevented him from introducing evidence of the separate character of any property awarded to Mother, he failed to make an offer of proof or formal bill of exceptions. Thus, he has not preserved the issue for our review. See Sink, 364 S.W.3d at 346-47.
On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's property division.
Conclusion
Having overruled each of Father's issues, we affirm the trial court's divorce decree.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.