Opinion
E075313
06-17-2021
In re J.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.J., Defendant and Appellant.
Linda B. Puertas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand and Carol D. Perez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. INJ2000069 Arjuna (Vic) Saraydarian, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Linda B. Puertas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand and Carol D. Perez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P. J.
Defendant and appellant C.J. (father) appeals from an order of the juvenile court asserting dependency jurisdiction over his daughter J.F. (the child) pursuant to subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. He argues he did not cause the child to be at substantial risk of harm within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and there is insufficient evidence to support the finding she came within subdivision (g). We will affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
The record contains scant evidence of father's involvement with the child. It appears mother was her caretaker from birth in July 2010 until she was five years old. During three of those years (2012-2015), child services agencies in Santa Clara and Monterey Counties received several referrals concerning mother's drug use and general neglect. Investigations of those referrals resulted variously in findings that the allegations were unfounded, inconclusive (unable to locate mother or mother refused to cooperate), or were “evaluated out.” The reports of the investigations make no mention of father.
In July 2015, mother, who had a history of dumping the child at different places and disappearing for days at a time, left the child in the Riverside County home of the paternal grandfather where he lived with the paternal great-grandparents. The grandfather's petition for appointment as the child's guardian was granted on August 7, 2015.
Father, who had a lengthy criminal history, was incarcerated in October 2016 following conviction on unspecified charges. His anticipated release date is in 2023.
In April 2017, the child's mother died. The grandfather died in May 2019, and the child continued living in the home with the paternal great-grandparents.
Little is known of the child's circumstances in the first seven months following the grandfather's death. It seems she engaged in a pattern of disruptive acts such as cutting electrical cords to lamps, turning off the gas supply to the home, breaking windows of cars on the property, and intentionally clogging toilets with notebook paper. By early 2020, the child was engaging in self-harm and violence in addition to attention-seeking behaviors. In January, the nine-year-old attempted to stab herself with a pencil, wrapped a wire around her neck, and said she wanted to kill herself. She was taken to the hospital and put on a section 5150 hold. On February 12, 2020, the school found a note written by the child stating she wanted to kill herself, and when the great-grandparents picked her up, the child exited the moving vehicle. She was again placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold.
The child was released on February 16, 2020, and was returned to a psychiatric hold the same day after she expressed suicidal thoughts, made superficial cuts to her arm with a box cutter, and threw a shoe at the great-grandmother causing a laceration to the woman's eye because the great-grandparents refused to allow her to be alone in her room. That incident resulted in a 10-day referral to respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department).
The Department received an immediate response referral on February 19, 2020, when the great-grandparents refused to pick the child up when she was discharged. The child also reported she had been sexually abused by a paternal cousin two months earlier. The great-grandparents explained they could not protect the child or meet her needs, and they did not feel safe with her in their home.
The Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging the child came within subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) of section 300 on account of her father's failure to supervise, protect, and support her, and because he is incarcerated and unable to make arrangements for her care and support. The juvenile court ordered a court-appointed special advocate and the child's detention.
On June 25, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the petition. It adjudged the child a dependent of the court, denied family reunification services as to father, and found it was not in the child's best interest to set the matter for a permanent plan selection hearing pursuant to section 366.26 because she is not a proper subject for adoption. Father timely noticed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Jurisdictional Findings
Section 300 authorizes the juvenile court to assert dependency jurisdiction over minors who come within the descriptions set forth in its subdivisions.
We review a juvenile court's jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.).) Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) Under this standard of review, we examine the entire record in a light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to that court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (R.T., at p. 633; In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 318.) We determine only whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the juvenile court's order, resolving all conflicts in support of its determination and drawing all reasonable inferences to uphold its ruling. (Ibid.) The court's order will be upheld if there is substantial evidence to support it even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. (Ibid.)
Where, as here, the petition alleges multiple bases for jurisdiction, we need only find one ground supported by the evidence to affirm the court's decision to assert jurisdiction. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773-774.)
a. The evidence supports assertion of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) jurisdiction
In relevant part, section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over children if they have suffered, or are at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness as the result of the failure or inability of the parent to adequately supervise or protect them. Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), applies even if the parents are not at fault or blameworthy for their failure or inability to supervise or protect. (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 631-633.)
Father argues there is insufficient evidence to support assertion pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), because the Department failed to establish a nexus between risk of harm to the child and any failure on his part to provide her with adequate care. We are not persuaded. There is ample evidence to support the finding that the child had suffered and was at substantial risk of suffering physical harm or illness and that father had failed or was unable to supervise or protect her.
At the hearing on jurisdiction, the juvenile court had before it a nine-year-old child suffering from severe mental and emotional problems, engaging in self-harming behaviors, suicide attempts, and daily suicidal ideation. She was also disruptive and violent toward others. In March 2020, a psychiatrist reported the child had DSM diagnoses of posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and victim of sexual abuse. Psychotropic medications had been prescribed for her and were approved by the court.
The last time father had been in contact with the child was sometime before July 2015, when the mother left her with the paternal grandfather. There is no indication that father contacted the great-grandparents when the paternal grandfather died to check in or to make any arrangements for the child's continuation in their home. Rather, the great-grandparents simply assumed her care but were not able to address the child's behavior or coordinate appropriate services to assist her. Father did not provide any support for them. The child reported she was scared of father and did not wish to visit with him.
It is evident father had long failed to support the child or to be involved in her care. The child had a substantial history with child services agencies in other counties, with 13 referrals between February 2012 and July 2015, including one involving mother and the paternal grandfather for the purpose of discussing legal guardianship that was substantiated as to mother's neglect of the child. Notably missing from the reports of those referrals is any mention of father.
When the great-grandparents refused to take the child back into their home in February 2020, the Department made three unsuccessful efforts to contact father or his correctional officer before finally reaching father by telephone on March 10, 2020. During that call, father refused to discuss the allegations of the petition, the child's placement, or social history. All he would say is, “everything I want to say is in the letter I sent you, ” a letter that had not been received by the Department by the time of its June 19, 2020 report.
The father's long history of neglect and disinterest in the child combined with his failure to assist the Department when the child was in serious distress and without a place to call home fully supports assertion of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) jurisdiction. (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 483-484 (James C.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 82.)
Father argues it was error to assert section 300, subdivision (b)(1) jurisdiction because there is no “nexus” between the child's self-injurious behaviors and his conduct because he undertook to provide adequate care for her during his incarceration. As evidence of his efforts to provide for the child, he posits it is reasonable to infer he had a hand in securing her care because his relatives had been providing for the child since 2015. We do not agree for each of three reasons. First, the mere fact that paternal relatives acted as caretakers of the child does not reasonably support an inference that father had any role in making an arrangement either with the grandfather or the great-grandparents. Second, the reports of referrals to the child services agency refer only to the mother's involvement with the child and state mother left the child with the paternal grandfather. And last, but certainly not least, when the child began to suffer serious self-harming behaviors and the great-grandparents could no longer take of her, father did not undertake to make alternate arrangements and refused to participate in the Department's efforts to provide care, supervision, and support for her.
b. The evidence supports section 300, subdivision (g) jurisdiction
In view of our finding that the juvenile court properly asserted jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and because father does not challenge the court's decision to deny family reunification services, we need not consider whether any of the other challenged grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence. (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774.) Even so, we address father's claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to subdivision (g) of section 300.
In relevant part, section 300, subdivision (g), authorizes assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction if a parent is incarcerated and cannot arrange for care of the child.
Father complains the Department failed to produce any evidence of his inability to make arrangements for the child's care during his incarceration. We disagree. The record establishes father was aware of the child's need for a home by March 10, 2020, but failed to make arrangements with anyone to undertake the child's care between that date and the June 25 jurisdictional hearing. Moreover, as discussed ante, he had not demonstrated any interest in the child's welfare either before or after his incarceration in 2016, a fact sufficient to support an inference that he was unwilling or unable to make arrangements for her care. (James C., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 483-484.)
Father argues he made arrangements for the child's care because he provided the Department names of potential relative placements. He claims relatives were named in two June e-mails his counsel sent to the Department as well as in a letter he mentioned to the Department in the course of the March 10 telephone call (that is, the call in which he refused to discuss the child because all he wanted to say to the Department was in the letter)-a letter that was never received by the Department. His counsel mentioned only sending an e-mail to the Department's counsel on June 17 “requesting evaluation of relatives for placement because they do have preference.” Providing names of relatives to the Department for placement preference consideration is not evidence of making arrangements for the child's care.
Father cites Maggie S. v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 662 (Maggie S.) and In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068 (S.D.), to support his claim that providing names of relatives is sufficient to foreclose assertion of section 300, subdivision (g) jurisdiction. Both cases are readily and decisively distinguishable.
In Maggie S., the mother was incarcerated when she gave birth to her son at the Riverside County Regional Medical Center. (Maggie S., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 664-665.) Before the baby was born, the mother named a caretaker for him and the designated person told the social worker she was willing to provide care. (Id. at p. 672.) Those facts were sufficient to compel the conclusion the motherwas able to arrange for the infant's care. (Ibid.)
The juvenile dependency petition in S.D. alleged only that mother was incarcerated, not that she was unable to arrange for her child's care after her arrest. (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) And, the record clearly established that mother was able to arrange care for the child because a maternal aunt came from Missouri to assume immediate custody of the child after the detention hearing. (Id. at p. 1071.) The reviewing court found mother's counsel was ineffective because he conceded section 300, subdivision (g), applied to the case and the juvenile court erred when it asserted jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1077.)
Unlike the parents in S.D. and Maggie S., father had not undertaken to make arrangements for the child's care and no one contacted the Department asking to assume custody of her. Rather, his counsel provided the names of potential relative placements to the Department so they could be given preference in the course of the Department's efforts to arrange care for the child. And, contrary to father's claim, this is not a case like Maggie S. in which the child services agency failed to disclose the fact that the mother had in fact arranged for the child's care by a designated person willing to undertake that commitment. (Maggie S., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 672.) Here, father had not made any arrangement with a willing caregiver, so there was nothing for the Department to disclose.
Father also posits it was error to assert section 300, subdivision (g) jurisdiction because the Department had contacted a second cousin named in his counsel's June 17 e-mail, A.M. of Washington, and she had “agreed” to care for the child. What father fails to mention is he did not make any arrangements with A.M. It was the Department who undertook contacting her early in March. Nor did A.M. “agree” to care for the child. She told the Department she would be able to take the child and would like to do so, but she would not undertake the commitment unless she had assurances the child had received and benefitted from treatment because of concerns about her young son's safety if the child were placed in her home. In May, the child's therapist told A.M. that the child could harm younger children and would need additional time in the therapeutic setting where she was living. At the June 2020 jurisdiction hearing, the child's counsel represented her client had just been released to a group home a couple of weeks earlier and efforts were still being made to stabilize her, and there was “quite a lot of significant issues” needing to be addressed. In short, while A.M. may be a prospect for a relative placement in the future, father had not undertaken to make arrangements with her or with anyone else to care for the child by the time the juvenile court asserted subdivision (g) jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER J.MENETREZ J.