Opinion
M-1368
10-13-2015
In the Matter of Neil L. GROSS (admitted as Neil Lawrence Gross), a suspended attorney: Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Neil L. Gross, Respondent.
Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner. Respondent pro se.
Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner.
Respondent pro se.
ANGELA M. MAZZARELLI, Justice Presiding, JOHN W. SWEENY, JR., ROLANDO T. ACOSTA, DIANNE T. RENWICK, and RICHARD T. ANDRIAS, Judges.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.Respondent Neil L. Gross was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on January 23, 1995, under the name Neil Lawrence Gross. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained a registered address in New Jersey, where he is admitted to practice.
By order of April 2, 2009, this Court suspended respondent, pursuant to Judiciary Law §§ 90(2) and 468–a, until further order of this Court, for failure to file attorney registration statements and pay biennial registration fees (Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468–a, 64 A.D.3d 187, 878 N.Y.S.2d 253 [1st Dept.2009] ). Respondent has not moved for reinstatement and remains suspended.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, on or about February 28, 2011, also temporarily suspended respondent for failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation (205 N.J. 82, 12 A.3d 717 [2011] ). Although respondent was reinstated by order filed March 30, 2011 (205 N.J. 233, 14 A.3d 748 [2011] ), later that year respondent was censured in New Jersey for misconduct in three client matters. By order filed May 2, 2012, the Supreme Court of New Jersey again censured respondent for violating New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.1(a) (gross neglect) and RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities) (210 N.J. 115, 41 A.3d 736 [2012] ). Thereafter, the Supreme Court of New Jersey suspended respondent two more times before ultimately disbarring him on October 22, 2014, for, inter alia, practicing law while suspended (220 N.J. 3, 100 A.3d 190 [2014] ).By notice of petition dated March 25, 2015, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee now seeks an order, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(2) and the Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department (22 NYCRR) § 603.3, disbarring respondent predicated upon the discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, or, in the alternative, imposing whatever sanction this Court deems appropriate and granting such other and further relief as is just and proper. Respondent, pro se, was served with the Committee's petition, but he has not submitted a response.
Respondent was found guilty, by default, of gross neglect, failure to safeguard client property, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities by way of default, according to a decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey Disciplinary Board dated April 2, 2013 (Docket No. DRB 12–375).
By orders filed October 23, 2012, and January 7, 2014, the Supreme Court of New Jersey temporarily suspended respondent for failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation (212 N.J. 328, 53 A3d 1229 [2012] ) and for six months for failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation and violating RPC 1.15(b) (failure to promptly deliver funds to a client or third person), RPC 3.3(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal), RPC 5.5(a) (practicing law while ineligible), RPC 8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a disciplinary authority), RPC 8.1(b) (failure to reply to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), and RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), respectively (216 N.J. 401, 82 A3d 237 [2014] ).
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The only defenses to reciprocal discipline are enumerated at 22 NYCRR 603.3(c), to wit, a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard in the foreign jurisdiction; an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct; and where the misconduct at issue in the foreign jurisdiction would not constitute misconduct in New York (Matter of Hoffman, 34 A.D.3d 1, 822 N.Y.S.2d 42 [1st Dept.2006] ).
None of the enumerated defenses are available to respondent. Respondent received notice of the charges against him and was accorded an opportunity to be heard, but he defaulted. Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court's findings are amply supported by the record, and the actions for which respondent was disciplined in New Jersey constitute misconduct in New York. Specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that respondent violated RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), RPC 1.4(b) (failure to communicate), RPC 5.5(a)(1) (practicing law while suspended), RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), which correspond to several provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0 ), namely, rule 1.3, rule 1.4, rule 5.5(a), rule 8.4(c), and rule 8.4(d).
As a general rule in reciprocal disciplinary matters, this Court gives significant weight to the sanction imposed by the jurisdiction in which the charges were initially brought (see Matter of Peters, 127 A.D.3d 103, 3 N.Y.S.3d 357 [1st Dept.2015] ; Matter of Vialet, 120 A.D.3d 91, 987 N.Y.S.2d 65 [1st Dept.2014] ). In this matter, respondent was disbarred in the foreign jurisdiction. Furthermore, disbarment is in accord with this Court's precedent involving similar misconduct (see e.g. Matter of Kulcsar, 123 A.D.3d 251, 995 N.Y.S.2d 56 [1st Dept.2014] ; Matter of Streit, 89 A.D.3d 190, 931 N.Y.S.2d 588 [1st Dept.2011] ; Matter of Velella, 51 A.D.3d 73, 853 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1st Dept.2008] ).
Accordingly, the Committee's petition for reciprocal discipline should be granted, and respondent disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, effective immediately.
Order filed.
All concur.