Opinion
2014-01-15
In the Matter of CALVIN C. (Anonymous), appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and John A. Newbery of counsel), for appellant. Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Dona B. Morris of counsel; Rogan McCally on the brief), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and John A. Newbery of counsel), for appellant. Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Dona B. Morris of counsel; Rogan McCally on the brief), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Calvin C. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (McElrath, J.), dated September 17, 2012, which, upon an order of fact-finding of the same court (Elkins, J.), dated March 5, 2012, made upon his admission, finding that he had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period of placement has expired ( see Matter of Shaquary B., 110 A.D.3d 1065, 974 N.Y.S.2d 254). However, because there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency, the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent has not been rendered academic ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 783; Matter of Darnell G., 106 A.D.3d 906, 906–907, 965 N.Y.S.2d 568; Matter of Christian E., 68 A.D.3d 1109, 891 N.Y.S.2d 461).
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate disposition in a juvenile delinquency proceeding ( see Matter of Racheal M., 108 A.D.3d 770, 771, 970 N.Y.S.2d 249; Matter of W.E., 107 A.D.3d 988, 966 N.Y.S.2d 912; Matter of George R., 104 A.D.3d 949, 962 N.Y.S.2d 332). Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in adjudging him to be a juvenile delinquent, since a preponderance of the evidence supported the court's determination that he required “supervision, treatment or confinement” (Family Ct. Act § 352.1 [1]; see Matter of Richard H., 99 A.D.3d 1005, 952 N.Y.S.2d 457; Matter of Janay P., 11 A.D.3d 697, 783 N.Y.S.2d 293).
The appellant's contention that dismissal of the petition pursuant to Family Court Act § 315.2 is warranted is not properly before this Court. SKELOS, J.P., LEVENTHAL, LOTT and COHEN, JJ., concur.