Opinion
W.C. No. 4-589-950.
November 9, 2005.
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order dated June 14, 2005 of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) that found the claimant had a reasonable excuse for filing her claim for compensation more than two years but fewer than three years after the injury and therefore determined that her claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.
The ALJ's pertinent findings of fact are as follows. The claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident on May 29, 2001 when she was on her way to a sales meeting. The claimant was ignorant of the law that would make such an accident a compensable work injury. The claimant consulted with an attorney and explained to that attorney all of the facts about her accident. The lawyer did not advise her she should report this incident as a compensable on-the-job injury. The claimant pursued a suit against the driver of the other car.
The claimant subsequently changed lawyers and was advised by her new attorney to file a workers' claim for compensation, which she did. The ALJ found that the claimant did not file her workers' claim for compensation within two years after becoming aware of the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of the injury. He found, however, she had a reasonable excuse for her failure to file the claim within two years.
On appeal the respondents contend that the ALJ erred in determining that the claimant had shown a reasonable excuse for her failure to file the claim within two years. The respondents argue that ignorance of the law regarding the compensability of her claim does not toll the statute of limitations. Under the circumstances in this case we perceive no basis on which to interfere with the ALJ's determination.
Section 8-43-103(2) C.R.S. 2005, provides that the right to workers' compensation benefits is barred unless a formal claim is filed within two years after the injury. However, the two year limitation period does not apply if:
"it is established to the satisfaction of the director within three years after the injury or death that a reasonable excuse exists for the failure to file such notice claiming compensation and if the employer's rights have not been prejudiced thereby."
We agree with the respondents that ignorance of the law is no defense to a party's failure to file a timely notice claiming compensation. Parties are presumed to know the law, including the statute of limitations. Paul v. Industrial Commission, 632 P.2d 638 (Colo.App. 1981). See also 7 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 126.09[3]; Johnson v. Alpine Living Center W.C. No. 4-586-703 (May 9, 2005). The claimant is presumed to know her legal rights, and a mistake in this regard does not constitute an excuse for filing a claim after the statute of limitations has run. Ramos v. Sears Roebuck Co., W.C. No. 4-156-827 (February 10, 1994). Thus, the claimant's understanding of her legal rights is not a basis for establishing a "reasonable excuse" for extending the statute of limitations under § 8-43-103(2). Patt v. City of Wheat Ridge W.C. No. 4-180-739 (July 24, 1997)
However, in Colorado negligence of a claimant's attorney can constitute a reasonable excuse for not filing a claim in time. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Foulds 167 Colo. 123, 445 P.2d 716. The ALJ's judgment in such instances cannot be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion. We cannot say that as a matter of law the evidence offered in behalf of the claimant was not reasonably sufficient to excuse the delay. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Stampfel 153 Colo. 448, 386 P.2d 582.
The respondents rely upon Emrich v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Service, W.C. No. 4-241-443 (October 27, 1998) in which the claimant had hired an attorney to represent her in a liability claim and did not file a claim for workers' compensation within the two-year statute of limitations, but did within three years of the injury. The ALJ dismissed the claim, finding that the statute of limitations had run and that the claimant had failed to establish a reasonable excuse for extending the statute by one year. However, we do not view Emrich as dispositive in the present case. In Emrich the ALJ expressly relied upon the fact that the Division had sent to the claimant correspondence specifically advising her to "file a notice of claim to preserve her right to benefits." Given that specific advice to the claimant to file a claim in order to preserve her rights, the ALJ could have reasonably inferred that any other factors tending to excuse the claimant were overriden by the Division's letter.
Ordinarily, the determination of when these circumstances came into existence so as to trigger the running of the statute of limitations is one of fact for the ALJ. Saxton v. King Soopers, Inc., W.C. No. 4-200-777 (March 11, 1997). The ALJ has wide discretion in determining whether the claimant presented a "reasonable excuse" for failure to file a claim within the two year statute of limitations. Further, a determination that the claimant has a reasonable excuse will not be set aside except on a showing of fraud or abuse of discretion. Industrial Commission v. Canfield, 172 Colo. 18, 469 P.2d 737 (1970). The appellate standard on review of an alleged abuse of discretion is whether the ALJ's order exceeds the bounds of reason. See Coates, Reid Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993). Applying this principle here, we perceive no error in the ALJ's order.
Respondents argue that the ALJ, in his order did not specifically conclude that the advice the first attorney provided was a reasonable excuse for the claimant's failure to file a workers' compensation claim. However, the ALJ is not held to a standard of absolute clarity when issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Itr is merely necessary that the basis of the order is apparent from the findings which are entered. When considering an order we may note findings which, although not expressly contained in the order, are necessarily implied by it. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals office, 5 P.2d 385 (Colo.App. 2000). The ALJ found that the claimant consulted with the first attorney, informed him of all the facts of the accident but was not advised that she had a compensable claim. This finding makes it clear that it was the failure of the first attorney to advise the claimant to file a claim which implicitly constituted the basis of his finding of a reasonable excuse.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated June 14, 2005, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________ Curt Kriksciun ____________________ Tom Schrant Joann Butler, Divide, CO, Memorial Gardens Cemetery, Colorado Springs, CO, Dana Brendemuhl, Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Englewood, CO, Renee C. Ozer, Esq., Colorado Springs, CO, (For Claimant).Gregory K. Chambers, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondents).