Opinion
04-18-2016
In the Matter of ANDREW B. Monroe County Department of Human Services, Petitioner, Andrew B., Respondent.
Monroe County Law Department, N.Y. (Peter A. Essley of counsel), for Petitioner. The Legal Aid Society of Rochester, N.Y. (Kristen H. Porpora and Tanya J. Conley of counsel), for Andrew B.
Monroe County Law Department, N.Y. (Peter A. Essley of counsel), for Petitioner.
The Legal Aid Society of Rochester, N.Y. (Kristen H. Porpora and Tanya J. Conley of counsel), for Andrew B.
DANDREA L. RUHLMANN, J. Has the Monroe County Department of Human Services ("Petitioner") proved its defense—an inability to comply with a Family Court's order [Fam.Ct., Monroe County 2013 (Kohout, J.) ]—thus precluding a contempt finding? This Court finds Petitioner failed to prove such defense.
History
By Order to Show Cause filed April 28, 2014, the Attorney for the Child moved to find Petitioner in contempt of court. By orders of Monroe County Family Court (Hon. Joan S. Kohout) (the "Family Court") entered June 4, 2014, and the New York State Appellate Division, Fourth Department, dated May 8, 2015, the Attorney for the Child met its burden in proving the elements of contempt against Petitioner. Nonetheless, the matter was remanded to this Court for a hearing to determine whether Petitioner could prove its defense.
Andrew B. (DOB: 1996) was a troubled Person In Need of Supervision ("PINS") in the care of Petitioner, who turned 18 years old in 2014 while incarcerated. The day Andrew was released from jail Petitioner filed a petition to terminate his placement. The next day Petitioner gave Andrew a bus pass to go to the Salvation Army. Andrew lived in shelters and/or jail for approximately the next two months and ten days. Andrew's attorney filed a contempt motion on April 28, 2014 and Family Court found Petitioner in contempt on Thursday, May 1, 2014. The following Monday, May 5, 2014, a collaborative meeting of highly regarded child welfare professionals was held which resulted in a successful plan. Petitioner devised a specific, expensive, creative plan for Andrew at Hillside Children's Center ("Hillside") on the Monroe Avenue campus (with aftercare services through the Villa of Hope (the "Villa")). The next day Family Court was informed of the plan for Andrew and Petitioner withdrew its still-pending petition to terminate Andrew's placement in foster care. The Family Court thus vacated its two-hundred and fifty dollar ($250.00) contempt fine.
Andrew B. four and one-half years before, at just age 14, was adjudicated a PINS on June 3, 2010 and was placed in the care of Petitioner. In early 2012, his permanency hearing goal was changed to what was then Independent Living but what now is called Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement. On December 23, 2013 Petitioner agreed to an Extension of Placement and Permanency Hearing Order extending Andrew's placement with Petitioner for six months until June 23, 2014. Important the Family Court specifically ordered "[Andrew] shall not be discharged from foster care during the term of this order without prior permission of the Court" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 22).
Shortly thereafter on January 10, 2014 Andrew was living, for the third time, in the emergency foster home of Connie B. when he allegedly became threatening, was mental hygiene arrested and taken to Strong Memorial Hospital. The next day he was released from the hospital and taken to jail. He was incarcerated from January 11, 2014 until February 26, 2014. He turned 18 on during that time. When released from jail, "he was placed at the Salvation Army Booth Haven, he was then transferred to Genesis House due to his age. Salvation Army felt (emphasis added) Genesis House would be a more age appropriate setting for him since they house homeless young adults at that shelter" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 149). Petitioner filed a motion to terminate Andrew's placement the day he was released from jail (Respondent's Exhibit B at 12).
On March 17, 2014, the return date of the motion and first appearance, the Family Court ordered both that Petitioner could not house Andrew at Genesis House as it is a temporary shelter and that Petitioner plan for Andrew (Respondent's Exhibit B at 37–45). On April 11, 2014, the second appearance, the Family Court learned that Andrew remained at Genesis House, and reiterated its directive that Petitioner make a plan for Andrew and expected the Petitioner "to place Andrew in a certified foster setting. Placement in a shelter is not a certified foster setting, and it is not a discharge plan" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 51). Andrew was discharged from Genesis House based upon his behavior, and next went to another shelter, the Center for Youth.
On April 17, 2014, the third appearance, the Family Court approved a two-week home visit for Andrew but emphasized that it was merely a visit and not a trial discharge, and again reiterated "foster care to temporary assistance is not a discharge plan" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 64). The visit fell apart after a physical altercation occurred on April 21, 2014, when Andrew's mother asked him to clean the bathroom sink because her younger children had made a mess with the toothpaste that Andrew had left out. Andrew's mother was unwilling to have Andrew home (Petitioner's Exhibit 1 Mother's affidavit). The Irondequoit Town Justice Joseph A. Valentino detained Andrew on April 23, 2014 for a violation of adult probation.
April 17, 2014 was also the scheduled hearing date for termination of placement, however, Petitioner chose not to go forward on that date.
On April 28, 2014, the fourth appearance before Family Court, Andrew's attorney filed a contempt motion against Petitioner for its failure to comply with Family Court's directive to plan for Andrew (Respondent's Exhibit B at 23–36). On that same date, the Family Court specifically ordered Petitioner to redouble its efforts with regard to possible residential placements including, inter alia, Berkshire Farms Group Home, Canaan, Lincoln Hall and Baker Victory (Respondent's Exhibit B at 77–79).
On April 30, 2014, the fifth appearance, the Family Court gave Petitioner "until tomorrow to get [the Court] a written response [to Respondent's contempt motion]" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 95). On May 1, 2014, the sixth appearance, the Family Court issued an oral ruling holding Petitioner in contempt, as memorialized in writing on June 4, 2014 (Respondent's Exhibit B at 10–11). Andrew remained in jail until May 12, 2014 (after Petitioner was found in contempt) and only then was released to Hillside Children's Center, Monroe Avenue campus (Petitioner's Exhibit 6a). The Family Court had imposed a fine of two-hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) upon Petitioner, but vacated the same when Petitioner complied. The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Family's Court's contempt finding for its failure to conduct a hearing allowing Petitioner to present a defense. The Appellate Court further noted that Petitioner's situation changed in January 2014 due to Andrew's own conduct when he "was arrested after threatening to shoot his foster mother" and thus remanded the case to this Court for a hearing on Petitioner's defense ( Matter of Andrew B., 128 A.D.3d 1513, 9 N.Y.S.3d 506 [4th Dept.2015] ). This Court held the hearing on remand, spanning over five (5) days of testimony.
Inability to Comply:
In El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 114 A.D.3d 4, 978 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dept.2013), affd. 26 N.Y.3d 19, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340 (2015) relied upon by the New York State Appellate Division, Fourth Department, the Court delineated that once the three elements of contempt are proven—as were proven by clear and convincing evidence before Family Court and affirmed by the Fourth Department—then the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to offer a defense "such as an inability to comply with the order" ( id. at 10, 978 N.Y.S.2d 239 ). A hearing is required where a factual dispute is raised regarding the existence of a defense .
In El–Dehdan, the Court held that despite being offered a hearing and the opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense, Defendant failed to do so, because he refused to testify.
Here Petitioner did not prove its inability to comply with the Family Court's order. Instead the evidence shows unequivocally that with persistence Petitioner could plan for Andrew by placing him in a certified foster care placement within the time frame mandated by the Family Court. By its filing of a petition to terminate placement on February 26, 2014, Petitioner indeed highlighted to Family Court its purported inability to both keep Andrew in foster care and to find an appropriate placement for him. From the moment of its filing all parties should have been working towards finding an appropriate placement and/or discharge plan—not discharge to a shelter. The motion to terminate placement itself was still pending at the time of the contempt motion because Petitioner was not working fast enough. Petitioner's motion did not release it from its responsibility for Andrew.
Both supervising caseworker Tammy Powell, and caseworker Alexa Arellano testified at the hearing upon remand. This Court also admitted into evidence ten exhibits: Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 9 (all caseworker affidavits), 5 (Petitioner's case notes) and 6a (Monroe County Sheriff's booking summary) and Respondent's Exhibits B–E, which constituted the entire Record on Appeal (and the briefs filed) before the Supreme Court, Fourth Department. The parties further stipulated to lessen the standard of proof from competent evidence to allow for hearsay, if material and relevant (see El–Dehdan, 114 A.D.3d at 10, 978 N.Y.S.2d 239 ; Matter of Rosato v. Rosato, 21 A.D.3d 418, 799 N.Y.S.2d 782 [2d Dept.2005] ; see also In re Crystal A., 11 A.D.3d 897, 782 N.Y.S.2d 474 [4th Dept.2004] [respondent failed to preserve for review her objection to hearsay testimony, regardless hearsay was admissible at disposition, if material and relevant] ).
On February 27, 2014 Petitioner gave Andrew a bus pass to go to the Salvation Army shelter. Caseworker Arellano was reassigned to Andrew's case on or around March 2013. Through Arellano, this Court received into evidence an affidavit of caseworker LaTonya Stamps dated March 18, 2014 wherein Ms. Stamps supplied a list of 16 foster homes Petitioner contacted to request placement for Andrew but "[a]ll the homes contacted felt they could not accept Andrew into their homes as they felt they could not safely plan for him" (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). The number 16 is deceiving. The first was the home of Connie B., the foster mother who both filed criminal charges against Andrew on or about January 10, 2014 and had an existing order of protection against him. Seven homes contacted, including Connie B.'s, did accept "teen males," but four accept only "teen females," one accepts children "ages 0 to 12 years old," and three of the homes accept "ages 0 to 12 years old, but [have] taken teen placements in the past." (Id. ) By affidavit dated April 10, 2014, Todd Ramos, Senior Matcher for the YOU Team, averred that he contacted "many of the foster homes who take teenagers into their homes, prior to the court date on 3/17/14 and there were no foster homes willing to take [Andrew]" (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). There is no detail as to when Petitioner contacted each home. Since Andrew was in care from 2010 Petitioner's failure to clarify when it contacted each foster home constituted insufficient proof of its defense. Petitioner failed to prove that it had timely explored all available foster care home placements for Andrew.
Family Court continually stated that shelters were not an option and specifically sent Andrew home to his mother for a visit, not a trial discharge. That visit did end in conflict. The conflict between Andrew and his mother was not new, nor surprising. Caseworker Arellano acknowledged that most of the therapists and clinicians who have worked with Andrew over the years view him as a traumatized child and expressed concerns about his relationship with his mother. She testified the underlying source of his traumatized childhood was neglect by his mother.
Petitioner's proof regarding its attempts to identify a residential placement for Andrew also was vague. Caseworker Arellano testified only generally that she too sent referrals to "about five" residential facilities, but did not indicate when. She explained that caseworkers have a very long list of residential placements, some of which Petitioner works with more frequently. Petitioner sends by facsimile a "referral packet," usually containing the child's educational information, evaluations of the child's physical and mental health, and summaries of the child's behavior to chosen agencies.
On cross-examination the caseworker conceded that on January 16, 2014 she told Andrew's probation officer that she was intending to end his foster care placement. In April 2014 she discussed placement with Andrew, and Hillside at Varick was Andrew's first and only choice . By letter dated April 8, 2014, Hillside Varick denied Andrew placement. On remand Ms. Arellano testified that Berkshire Farms Group Home said "no" to Andrew but she did not specify when: Petitioner too was inexplicit before Family Court about the timing of the Berkshire Farms referral, "As far as checking [in the] last couple weeks if they would take him, I don't know if we have. We did recently ... The last four weeks, I would say" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 50). Caseworker Arellano conceded that the Irondequoit Town Judge in April 2014 had remanded Andrew to jail simply because he had no place to live.
When Petitioner originally argued before Family Court, the Court found the specific residential placements were "not up to Andrew" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 78).
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By letters dated April 29–30, 2014, certain facilities did reject Andrew for placement: The William George Agency for Children's Services, Inc., Lincoln Hall, Berkshire Farm Center in Canaan, Mountain Lake Academy and Wyndham Lawn Home for Children. By telephone call received on April 29, 2014, Baker Victory Services rejected Andrew for placement (Respondent's Exhibit E, "Exhibit D" therein). Unknown is when Petitioner made these specific referrals. Petitioner acted in good faith in making referrals yet, should have done so sooner: regardless once made, these referrals were not fruitful. Petitioner, however, failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that it had explored all placement options with its contracting residential facilities.
The Fourth Department in reversing Family Court's contempt finding for its failure to conduct a hearing to allow Petitioner to present a defense emphasized that Hillside, "[t]he agency that eventually accepted [Andrew B.] after the finding of contempt had denied acceptance at the time of the motion." Hillside is a large agency with a myriad of residential treatment placement options at different locations both in and outside Monroe County. True Hillside Varick located in Romulus, New York did not accept Andrew B. Still the evidence on remand showed Petitioner did not explore Hillside's other placement options.
On remand Tammy Powell testified that she was Arellano's current casework supervisor but she was not the supervisor when Petitioner decided to terminate Andrew's placement. Casework Supervisor Powell testified that the agencies with the largest number of Monroe County youth in residential care are Hillside and the Villa. Supervisor Powell called Dave Autovino at Hillside on April 30, 2014, because he had helped her with a difficult placement in the past. Just the day before Petitioner by Powell made a referral for Andrew to the Villa.
Supervisor Powell testified that Dave Autovino was "able to gather key people together and we were able to meet on this fairly quickly." A meeting was set up at Hillside on May 5, 2014 involving approximately twenty professionals, five of whom worked for Petitioner, including Powell's new supervisor, Jackie Sofia. Together Petitioner, Hillside and the Villa devised a plan to discharge Andrew to a certified foster care placement. It was a plan tailored just for Andrew. The plan included short term placement at Hillside with two staff assigned to Andrew 24 hours a day, a care coordinator, a skill builder and then a transition to a community placement like a therapeutic foster home.
When asked why this pivotal meeting was not arranged earlier, for example in January 2014, Supervisor Powell answered, "I wasn't on that unit in January." Why not then in March when Powell was first assigned as the supervisor, or at least by the first week of April: Powell simply answered, "no, it was not." Petitioner had a duty to exhaust all placement options for Andrew. Difficulty in placing a child—in and of itself is not a defense—as by definition a child finding himself at the confluence of the juvenile justice and child welfare systems has demonstrated high needs.
In King v. King, 124 Misc.2d 946, 949, 478 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup.Ct., N.Y. County 1984), the court held that a father may be held in contempt for his failure to have his 13–½ year old daughter visit with her mother as ordered by the court. "[D]efendant as a father is chargeable with finding a solution to the conflict between the court's order and his child's wishes. He has a parental obligation to control and direct his daughter's activities while she is in his care ... A father may not use his daughter's wishes to shield him from the consequences of disregarding his duty to obey the court's lawful mandate (citations omitted)." Likewise, here, Petitioner should not use the difficulty in placing Andrew as a shield to following what the law requires, and was chargeable with finding a solution (see Matter of Michael D., 30 Misc.3d 502, 916 N.Y.S.2d 736 [Fam.Ct., Bronx County 2010] [Commissioner of Social Services held in contempt for its failure to institute an interstate compact]; Matter of Terry, 151 Misc.2d 48, 571 N.Y.S.2d 881 [Fam.Ct., N.Y. County 1991] [NYC Commissioner of Social Services found in civil contempt] ).
Family Court found Petitioner in contempt on May 1, 2014. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider that same day. Petitioner was able to comply with Family Court's directive and placed Andrew in a certified foster care placement after a pivotal meeting was held at Hillside on May 5, 2014. On May 6, 2014 Petitioner reported to Family Court that there was a certified foster care placement at Hillside Monroe Avenue Campus willing to accept Andrew. The Irondequoit Town Justice released Andrew from the Monroe County Jail to Hillside on May 12, 2014. Petitioner had to "clearly establish" its inability to comply with the Family Court's order ( Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 638, n. 9, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 [1988] ; Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2510, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 [2011] ; see also Huber v. Marine Midland Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 10 [2d Cir.1995] ; United States Sec. and Exch. Commn. v. Universal Exp., Inc., 546 F.Supp.2d 132, 134 [S.D.N.Y.2008] ) [civil contemnor must prove an inability to comply "clearly, plainly, and unmistakably"]. Petitioner did not meet its burden. Once Family Court found Petitioner in contempt it set terms for Petitioner to purge the finding (see Midlarsky v. D'Urso, 133 A.D.2d 616, 519 N.Y.S.2d 724 [3d Dept.1987] ; see also Bell v. Bell, 181 A.D.2d 978, 581 N.Y.S.2d 470 [3d Dept.1992] [a court has broad discretion in determining appropriate conditions upon which a contemnor may purge the contempt] ). Family Court gave Petitioner "an opportunity to purge the contempt, that is to find a location for Andrew" (Respondent's Exhibit B at 124).
On May 6, 2014 Petitioner found a certified foster care placement for Andrew. That day Family Court imposed a two-hundred and fifty dollar ($250.00) fine upon Petitioner pursuant to Judiciary Law §§ 753, 773 [absent proof of damages the aggrieved party is entitled to two-hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) ]. With Petitioner's consent Family Court suspended that fine until June 23, 2014, the expiration date of the original December 23, 2013 order. This Court finds the two-hundred and fifty dollar ($250.00) sanction a nullity, as Family Court vacated it on or after June 23, 2014.
Note Andrew ultimately was discharged from care on or about August 23, 2014. On November 25, 2015 Andrew moved this Court to return to care pursuant to Family Court Act § 1091, which this Court granted over the objection of Petitioner. Andrew currently is enrolled and attending Job Corps (a free education and training program that helps young people learn a trade, earn a high school diploma or GED, and find and keep a good job). Andrew's next permanency hearing is scheduled for July 5, 2016.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is
ADJUDGED that the Monroe County Department of Human Services failed to prove its inability to comply with the order of Monroe County Family Court (Hon. Joan S. Kohout); and it is further
ORDERED the two-hundred and fifty dollar ($250.00) fine against Petitioner is and hereby deemed a nullity.